Yijia Huang

This paper reconsiders Searle’s Chinese Room argument in light of contemporary large language models (LLMs) and selected resources from classical Chinese philosophy. I argue that Searle is right that formal symbol manipulation is insufficient for full understanding, but that his opposition between syntax and semantics is too rigid for the context-sensitive and pattern-tracking of generative AI. Drawing on Zhuangzi and Xunzi and classical Chinese vocabulary, I develop an account of meaning as relational, norm-governed participation in practices of distinction making. I argue that meaning runs in two directions, from the world to the mind and language back to what becomes salient to the mind. With this, I suggest linguistic patterning carries a directional force that shapes affective and normative responses regardless of the source. This grounds four tiers of semantic competence: empty formal manipulation, derived textual meaningfulness, relational semantic competence, and full lived understanding. LLMs may occupy the middle tiers, exerting directional force without consciousness, intentionality, or embodied salience. This blocks any inference to human-like understanding while allowing a more detailed account of LLM semantic competence. The final payoff is ethical. I suggest LLMs may shape public language without being accountable for the linguistic and normative distinctions drawn.

Xunzi made a notable departure from Mengzi and Kongzi, by insisting that people are inherently bad and need to be shaped by social institutions. This may represent the beginnings of institutional politics in ancient China, which focused on establishing social order from chaos. There are obvious and interesting similarities with Thomas Hobbes’s social contract theory in their shared cynicism of human nature, which have received only partial attention. Structurally, the institutionalism found in Xunzi is comparable to the social contract theory, making politics an objective, external and measurable set of institutional rules rather than virtues. There have been no notable attempts at this comparison. The Anglophone scholarship has not paid much attention to the structural and institutional dimensions of Xunzi’s political philosophy. The Sinophone scholarship has not paid as much attention to the comparative elements between the social contract theory and Xunzi’s social-moral institutions. This thesis attempts to supply a comparative interpretation of several key concepts in the Xunzi: 1. order zhi 治; chaos luan 亂, which are Xunzi’s foundational moral concerns; 2. duties yi 義; public gong 公, which alludes to a way public duties are generated from internal impulses; 3. rituals li 禮, which is a means of distributing esteem as a scarce social resource; 4. reason/coherence LI* 理, which is an externally accessible set of quasi-empirical principles that justifies political prescriptions; 5. the way and hierarchy dao 道/ fen 分, which show that hierarchies as the device that makes social order possible. Through these explications, I argue that Xunzi’s systematic political philosophy amounts to an alternative way to achieve civility through social institutions distinct from but comparable to the social contract theory familiar to Western philosophy.

This paper challenges the conventional view that pre-Qin Confucianism represents kingly virtue politics that lacks institutional duty. By interpreting Xunzi’s notion of yi 義, particularly gong-yi 公義, as a form of public obligation, I show that Xunzi exposes yi to state institutions to oblige people to serve public ends. While institutional duty is often associated with post-Enlightenment political philosophy, this paper argues that Xunzi’s philosophy offers a comparable framework of public–private exchange. Xunzi’s gong-yi may be a public-servicing sense of duty that combines moral and civic dimensions, compelling individuals to cooperate for the collective good. Unlike social contract theories that trade private rights with public duties, Xunzi’s system relies on moral compulsion and normative reciprocity. This system posits a sensible exchange between individual duties from inner compulsion for the public good. By contrasting gong 公 (the public) with si 私 (the private), Xunzi envisions the public as an entity that is serviced through public duties and a place for human flourishing. Positioning the role of gong-yi in Xunzi’s broader institutional project crystalizes this nascent concept of a “public” and its relationships with civic duties.