YiLi Zhou

Many moral error theorists reject moral realism on the grounds that moral realism implies the existence of categorical normativity, yet categorical normativity does not exist. Call this the Metaphysical Argument. In response, some moral realists have emphasized a parity between moral normativity and epistemic normativity. They argue that if one kind of normativity is rejected, then both must be rejected. Therefore, one cannot be a moral error theorist without also being an epistemic error theorist. Call this the Parity Argument. In this paper, we address three possible responses to the Parity Argument from moral error theorists: (1) accept the parity but still reject epistemic error theory, (2) reject the parity, (3) accept the parity and defend epistemic error theory. We argue that there are problems with each of these responses, so the Parity Argument stands as a strong counterargument to the Metaphysical Argument. We conclude by drawing some lessons for any future challenges to the Parity Argument.

In a letter to Czerny about teaching his nephew to play the fortepiano, Beethoven indicates that mistakes on notes are ‘minor mistakes.’ At the same time, problems like ignoring dynamic marks are ‘much more serious’ (Gerig 2007: 95). What could ground his insistence on following the dynamic marks on the score? The normativity of the score-following rule as an aesthetic rule is at stake here. In this paper, I raise concerns about the Practice-Based view, which, as I shall argue, grounds the score-following rule in the same way as the rules of chess are grounded. As an alternative approach, I propose that the Genuine Performing Experience grounds the normativity of the score-following rule. My proposal not only offers a novel explanation of the normativity of the rule but also explains the meaningfulness of score compliance in classical music performance by highlighting its unique significance among other human practices.