Ying Lan

What makes something aesthetically valuable? The fitting-attitude (FA) theory famously answers: the appropriateness of the subject’s response. Yet this answer is increasingly under pressure, especially as renewed interest in aesthetic realism has called into question whether value depends on attitudes. This paper takes up this tension and explores how early phenomenological realism can reframe the FA theory in a new, dual-aspect light. On this view, emotional attitudes are not value-constituting but value-disclosing: they serve as normatively structured modes of responsiveness to values already inherent in the object. Rather than abandoning the FA approach, this model transforms it—preserving its normative insights while rejecting its ontological commitments. By integrating phenomenological distinctions between types of affect and modes of attention, this reconfiguration restores the epistemic and normative force of fitting attitudes without collapsing into subjectivism, offering a renewed foundation for thinking about normativity.

Hubert Dreyfus's philosophical methodology is deeply influenced by Heidegger, emphasizing the importance of interpreting philosophical texts within their historical context and uncovering the phenomena these texts elucidate. Dreyfus excels in engaging philosophical discussions to reveal the contemporary relevance of these texts. His approach is not only to understand their original meanings but also to clarify their contributions to ongoing philosophical dialogues. He contends that philosophical problems are shaped by historical conditions and are situated between faithful interpretation of historical texts and the resolution of abstract issues. Like Heidegger, Dreyfus considers understanding Being essential; however, he expands on this concept by emphasizing the role of background practices. He argues that these practices shape our understanding of Being, further influencing scientific realism, the philosophy of technology, and the nature of art. In aesthetics, artistic creation is viewed as a concrete configuration of the meaning of Being. Dreyfus's theory centers on background practices, which clarify the ontology and function of artistic practice; however, he should also acknowledge its limits: while Dreyfus may address the transformation of the history of Being and contemporary realities, he cannot guarantee the autonomy of art across broader art forms.

This paper examines the divergent views of Moritz Geiger and Edmund Husserl on emotional experience and its relationship to intentionality. While both philosophers emphasize affective intentionality, Geiger posits that emotional experience can exist independently of external objects, highlighting the internal, self-sufficient nature of feeling. Husserl, in contrast, defends the idea that feelings remain directed towards something, even when this relation is not immediately apparent. Through a detailed comparison of their theories, I argue that Geiger’s conception of emotional experience as an autonomous phenomenon provides a more nuanced understanding of the role of reflection and understanding in feelings. Finally, I contend that, despite Husserl’s critiques, Geiger’s realist perspective on emotions enriches our understanding of phenomenological intentionality.

The paper situates Heidegger’s account of authentic belief within debates on the ethics of belief. After outlining the Heideggerian notion of authentic belief, it examines two apparently opposed interpretations developed in the literature: Dreyfus’s view that authentic belief gains its intelligibility solely from the shared social world, and Crowell’s view that authenticity hinges on the believer’s first-person ownership. The paper argues that each interpretation risks collapsing into moral relativism and, to avoid this pitfall, proposes an alternative reading of authentic belief that integrates the insights of both views.

Geiger considers dilettantism as an aesthetic attitude (inner concentration) that undermines the subject's ability to truly perceive the essential value of the artwork and thus calls for outer concentration to actualize the justice of the work itself. Geiger's position suggests that we must pay equitable attention to artworks and that this attitude requires a theory of aesthetic perception -- phenomenological realism. However, the complexity of the aesthetic experience presents Geiger with several challenges, not least of which is the realisation of an attitude that bridges emotion and value in aesthetic experience. This paper will attempt to defend and develop the legitimacy of Geiger's position. First, I will clarify Geiger's critique of dilettantism and suggest how this critique distinguishes him from other aesthetic claims; second, I argue that Geiger argues for an aesthetic attitude that distinguishes everyday emotions and thus ensures the value of the work of art as its own; finally, I will complete Geiger's position by drawing on later phenomenology that answers the question of how we realise the perception of artworks.