Yip Fai Tse

This commentary responds to Coghlan and Parker's commentary on our paper "AI Alignment: The Case for Including Animals" (2025). We clarify that our emphasis on "basic" alignment with animal welfare in large language models reflected pragmatic constraints rather than principled limits. Consequently, we agree that it is valuable to aim for varying degrees of alignment with animal welfare depending on the context of the AI application. We argue that adequate consideration of animals' interests entails an incrementalist requirement: advancing beyond basic alignment wherever possible. Recent developments, including the incorporation of animal welfare into Claude's constitution, suggest that such progress is both feasible and desirable.

AI alignment efforts and proposals try to make AI systems ethical, safe and beneficial for humans by making them follow human intentions, preferences or values. However, these proposals largely disregard the vast majority of moral patients in existence: non-human animals. AI systems aligned through proposals which largely disregard concern for animal welfare pose significant near-term and long-term animal welfare risks. In this paper, we argue that we should prevent harm to non-human animals, when this does not involve significant costs, and therefore that we have strong moral reasons to at least align AI systems with a basic level of concern for animal welfare. We show how AI alignment with such a concern could be achieved, and why we should expect it to significantly reduce the harm non-human animals would otherwise endure as a result of continued AI development. We provide some recommended policies that AI companies and governmental bodies should consider implementing to ensure basic animal welfare protection.