Yoav Hammer

In light of the importance of culture for the autonomy, sense of identity, and self-respect of individuals, cultural minorities have a right that their cultures flourish. Since cultural minorities are frequently in a disadvantaged position in the cultural market-place, a commitment to equality implies that the state ought to take steps to assist these minorities in preserving their cultures. This Article examines the ways the mass media can assist cultural minorities in preserving their cultures. For instance, when the media present contents that relate to the cultures of minorities, individual members of the minority group are exposed to their culture; media designated for cultural groups facilitate dialogue between group members, thus enabling the cultural group to determine which parts of its culture to retain and which parts to change. With that said, contemporary media frequently provide insufficient cultural contents due to the influence of commercial operational logic. This Article examines why the motivation for profit leads to under-production of cultural materials for minorities and to insufficient inclusion of cultural minorities in the public discourse. It is argued that the inequality caused by the media—which provide minorities with too little of the cultural contents so pertinent to the realization of their right to culture—merits corrective intervention. The Article examines possible forms of State intervention with the media on behalf of cultural minorities, taking into consideration that such intervention is a sensitive issue, since it has ramifications concerning the scope of the freedom of the press. Accordingly, it is argued that the State ought to be permitted to create legislation which intervenes, mainly by means of subsidies and structural regulation, to improve the manner in which the media fulfill their roles in a multicultural democracy. In contrast, there should be sparse use of conditionality in the issue of licenses for media operators.

This dissertation looks at several arguments for toleration, which have been made by modern liberals. It examines the possibility of finding an argument for toleration, which will be universally applicable, i.e. will convince everyone. In the first essay the arguments of Thomas Nagel, John Rawls and J. S. Mill are discussed. I demonstrate how these arguments work only if a commitment to certain values, such as the importance of autonomous choice by individuals, is presupposed. ;In the second essay I relate the subject of toleration to the notion of the separateness of persons. I argue that a commitment to the importance of preserving that separateness will lead to a commitment to toleration. A discussion of the various ways in which utilitarianism fails to preserve that separateness follows. I suggest ways in which utilitarianism can be corrected so that it will preserve the separateness of persons and therefore will be committed to toleration. It is demonstrated how communitariam writers do not take seriously the separateness of persons and how this should lead them not to value toleration. ;In the third essay I consider the possibility of arguing for toleration on epistemological grounds. I discuss the relevance of Monism, Relativism and Pluralism, and conclude that neither can provide a universal argument for or against toleration, the reason being that neither of these doctrines is accepted by everyone. I then discuss the liberal requirement that the state should remain neutral between the various conceptions of the good held by its citizens. I ask whether neutrality is neutral, i.e. whether it will lead to a neutrality between various conceptions of the good and whether it is not grounded on a commitment to a certain value or idea of the good. These questions are examined in relation to the suggestions of Larmore, Rawls and Scanlon. I demonstrate how none of these writers can provide an argument for neutrality and toleration that does not presuppose a certain conception of the good.