Yolanda Estes

J. G. Fichte presented his transcendental idealism in many different ways, but despite radical changes in terms, style, and method throughout his philosophical development, each version retained the essence of the one and only Wissenschaftslehre. His philosophical task was always to relate life or human consciousness (that is, sensible experience at the empirical standpoint) to its supersensible ground (that is, pure consciousness at the transcendental standpoint). Although life and philosophy are opposites, life presumes concepts and principles that can only be justified by philosophy at the transcendental standpoint, and philosophy presupposes feelings, intuitions, and beliefs that can only be discovered at the empirical standpoint.

I claim that one concept of intellectual intuition serves as the grounding principle of the Wissenschaftslehre as a whole, and thus, of each "special science." My interpretation of intellectual intuition associates the determination of the pure will through the Aufforderung with intellectual intuition and the Categorical Imperative. The determination of the pure will as individuality can be viewed from three different perspectives: as a hypothetical ground and first principle of a general theory of consciousness, as a hypothetical imperative and first principle of a theory of right, and as a real intellectual intuition of the Categorical Imperative and the first principle of a theory of ethics

They are often portrayed as outsiders: ethnic minorities, the poor, the disabled, and so many others—all living on the margins of mainstream society. Countless previous studies have focused on their pain and powerlessness, but that has done little more than sustain our preconceptions of marginalized groups. Most accounts of marginalization approach the subject from a distance and tend to overemphasize the victimization of outsiders. Taking a more intimate approach, this book reveals the personal, moral, and social implications of marginalization by drawing upon the actual experiences of such individuals. Multidisciplinary and multicultural, Identity on the Margin addresses marginalization at a variety of social levels and within many different social phenomena, going beyond familiar cases dealing with race, ethnicity, and gender to examine such outsiders as renegade children, conservative Christians, and the physically and mentally disabled. And because women are especially subject to the effects of marginalization, feminist concerns and the marginalization of sexual practices provide a common denominator for many of the essays. From problems posed by "complimentary racism" to the status of gays in Tony Blair's England, from the struggle of Native Americans to preserve their identities to the singular problems of single mothers, Identity on the Margin takes in a broad spectrum of cases to provide theoretical analysis and ethical criticism of the mechanisms of identity formation at the edges of society. In all of the cases, the authors demonstrate the need for theory that initiates social change by considering the ethical implications of marginalization and criticizing its harmful effects. Bringing together accounts of marginalization from many different disciplines and perspectives, this collection addresses a broad audience in the humanities and social sciences. It offers a basis for enhancing our understanding of this process—and for working toward meaningful social change.

This essay represents an attempt to bring prostitutes’ and clients’ voices into the philosophical discourse about prostitution. We wish to add the voices of individual prostitutes and clients in order to expand the contemporary philosophical understanding of prostitution as a complex and problematic ethical concern. The first section of this essay explains the concepts of subjectivity, sexuality, and violence that underpin our analysis of prostitution. The second section scrutinizes the prostitute’s and client’s motivating goals and the means they use to accomplish them. The third, and final, section presents a phenomenological description of prostituted sex from the prostitute’s and client’s respective viewpoints.

In this essay, I offer an interpretation of J. G. Fichte’s account of human sexuality and its relation to sexual inequality and social justice and apply this interpretation to contemporary questions about gender, equality and justice. According to my interpretation of Fichte, sexual intercourse provides a primary natural relationship—initiated by woman—wherein human beings cultivate their capacities for communication or reciprocal influence by expressing desires guided by both feeling and reason. Thus, the interchange of sexual love and solicitude is the original basis for all other social skills and ultimately for any form of social justice.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kant’s Idealism by Philip J. NeujahrYolanda EstesPhilip J. Neujahr. Kant’s Idealism. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1995. Pp. viii + 134. Paper, $16.00.In Kant’s Idealism, Philip Neujahr contends that the Critique of Pure Reason expresses no distinctively “transcendental” form of idealism. Neujahr disagrees with commentators, such as H. J. Paton and Henry Allison, who attempt to show that the Kantian project is in essence a coherent and tenable one. He agrees with commentators, such as Norman Kemp Smith and P. F. Strawson, who argue that the various facets of Kant’s philosophy do not constitute a coherent whole. Moreover, he suggests that the tensions in Kant’s philosophy betray more serious, deep-rooted contradictions than have been previously imagined by the least generous interpreters.Neujahr maintains Kant’s theoretical philosophy contains disparate threads of idealism, which remain closely tied to the idealistic tradition preceding it, but which present no single idealist doctrine, because Kant provided neither a unified account of the nature of the cognitive subject nor a single theory of the subject’s relation to the object of knowledge. The description of the cognitive subject given in the Critique permits several readings. One might assume that the cognitive subject represents the individual human being. According to Neujahr, this interpretation yields a monadistic view of the subject, similar to Leibniz’s, which allows for no interaction between individual minds within a public, spatio-temporal world. Alternatively, one might imagine a universal mind, something akin to Berkeley’s God or Hegel’s Spirit, which is not equivalent to the individual human subject. This interpretation avoids some complications associated with the first view, but it makes it difficult to specify the relation between the cosmic mind and the phenomenal individual or to account for our a priori knowledge of the subjective contribution to experience.Unresolved tensions between the doctrines of sensibility and understanding generate ambiguities in Kant’s overall account of consciousness, including his explanation of the status of the subject and object of experience. Neujahr suggests that the Transcendental Aesthetic presupposes a “correspondence” theory of consciousness, whereas the Transcendental Deduction contains a “coherence” theory of consciousness. According to Neujahr’s interpretation of the doctrine of sensibility, consciousness involves a relation between an ontologically distinct subject and object. On this reading, the status of the object seems ambiguous, and thus the phenomenal world remains in some sense “unreal” in contrast to the thing in itself. Neujahr believes the doctrine of understanding avoids these difficulties by eliminating the thing in itself and redefining “reality” in [End Page 143] terms of those features about the world that make it knowable, but he doubts the possibility of reconciling this approach with the Transcendental Aesthetic. Kant’s distinction between the empirical and transcendental points of view is often seen as a way of entering and understanding his philosophy, but Neujahr argues that Kant’s use of this terminology is itself inconsistent and unhelpful without a thoroughgoing revision.Neujahr contends that Kant attempts to discover the conditions necessary for knowledge, but that he locates the source of these epistemic conditions within the mind and that this “psychologizing” tendency has important ontological implications. Neujahr considers the possibility of salvaging Kant’s philosophy by attempts, such as Allison’s, to give sympathetic epistemological interpretations of transcendental idealism or by efforts, such as Strawson’s, to excise the idealism from the critical philosophy, but he denies that these endeavors can save transcendental idealism without violating the letter of Kant’s philosophy. Moreover, he contends that Kant’s idealism remains vulnerable to skepticism in asmuch as it fails to answer Hume’s doubts about the unity of consciousness and Descartes’s questions about the existence of the external world.Neujahr’s unsympathetic reading of Kant’s theoretical philosophy may appear unduly harsh to many readers. Many readers will wish for some acknowledgment that the second Critique and the third Critique might mitigate some of the inconsistencies delineated by Neujahr, who provides little elucidation of the first Critique through any texts other than the Inaugural Dissertation and the Prolegomena. Nonetheless, Kant’s Idealism grapples with complex issues in the first Critique and suggests a...

Fichtes Entlassung: Der Atheismusstreit vor 200 Jahren addresses the Atheismusstreit, or the Atheism Dispute. In 1798, the co-editors of the Philosophisches Journal einer Gesellschaft teutscher Gelehrten, Friedrich Niethammer and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, published two essays, by Karl Friedrich Forberg and Fichte. Forberg’s essay, “The Development of the Concept of Religion,” denied the legitimacy of any theoretical discussion of religious issues. Fichte’s essay, “On the Ground of our Belief in a Divine Governance of the World,” identified belief in a moral world order with religion. Frederick August, prince-elector of Saxony, condemned the errant issue of the Philosophisches Journal in the winter of 1798. During the next spring, Duke Carl-August of Weimar censured the content of the Philosophisches Journal and “accepted” Fichte’s “resignation” from the University of Jena. By 1800, the conflict died down. It remains an example of the theological, religious, and philosophical controversies that characterized intellectual life in the eighteenth century. Nonetheless, few works provide a comprehensive account of the Atheismusstreit. Fichtes Entlassung fills this lacuna.

Translator's preface -- Commentator's preface -- Commentator's introduction -- J.G. Fichte : on the ground of our belief in a divine world-governance -- Commentary: on the ground of our belief in a divine world-governance -- Text: on the ground of our belief in a divine world-governance -- F.K. Forberg : development of the concept of religion -- Commentary: development of the concept of religion -- Text: development of the concept of religion -- G.: a father's letter to his student son about Fichte's and forberg's atheism -- Commentary: a father's letter to his student son about Fichte's and Forberg's atheism -- Text: a father's letter to his student son abou tFichte's and Gorberg's atheism -- Friedrich August : Saxon requisition letter to the Weimar Court and Karl August : Weimar rescript to the University of Jena -- Commentary: Saxon requisition letter to the Weimar Court and Weimar rescript to the University of Jena -- Text: Saxon requisition letter to the weimar court -- Text: Weimar rescript to the University of Jena -- J.G. Fichte: appeal to the public -- Commentary: appeal to the public -- Text: appeal to the public -- K.l. Reinhold: letter to Fichte -- Commentary:letter to fichte -- Text: letter to Fichte -- J.G. Fichte : juridical defense -- Commentary: juridical defense -- Text: juridical defense -- Ernst I. Ludwig : Gotha rescript to the University of Jena -- Commentary: Gotha rescript to the University of Jena -- Text: Gotha rescript to the University of Jena -- Students of the University of Jena : first petition to Duke Karl, August of Saxony, Weimar, Eisenach and Karl August : first reply to the University of Jena and students of the University of Jena : second petition to Duke Karl, August of Saxony, Weimar, Eisenach and Karl August : second reply to the University of Jena -- Commentary: first and second petitions to Duke Karl, August of Saxony, Weimar, Eisenach and first and second replies to the University of Jena -- Text: first petition to Duke Karl, August of Saxony, Weimar, Eisenach -- Text: first reply to the University of Jena -- Text: second petition to Duke Karl, August of Saxony, Weimar, Eisenach -- Text: second reply to the University of Jena -- J.G. Fichte : from a private letter -- Commentary: from a private letter -- Text: from a private letter -- J.G. Fichte : concluding remark by the editor -- Commentary: concluding remark by the editor -- Text: concluding remark by the editor.

Many “liberal,” or libertarian, accounts of prostitution assert that prostitution is no more intrinsically wrong or harmful than any other type of service work.1 I believe that prostitution violates the Kantian “principle of humanity,” because it reflects a disrespectful attitude, which is expressed in the nonchalant use of the human body as a mere means to achieve some goal.2 I hope to convince my readers, who may not share my moral presuppositions, that prostitution defies the limits of respectful sexual relations, because it proffers a monetary substitute for mutual desire and concern and, hence, that it is a morally questionable and harmful activity.3 In support of these claims, I offer: 1) a discussion of Kantian morality and sexual ethics, 2) an explanation of the minimum criteria for respectful sexual relations, 3) a description of the general dynamic of prostitution, 4) an analysis of the client’s objective, and 5) a phenomenology of prostituted sex

Hegel and the Tradition: Essays in Honour of H. S. Harris is certainly in the spirit of Hegel and Harris. The volume focuses on the theme of tradition, which unites the many different essays within a rich yet integrated whole. Contributing authors discuss a variety of Hegelian texts and topics. Their essays relate these issues to figures as diverse as Locke, Fichte, Hamann, Winckelmann, and Fries. Nonetheless, the editors and contributors leave no rough junctures showing. The volume provides a nearly perfect balance between new, interesting interpretations and a coherent, thematic tribute to Harris.

In this essay, I argue that society, embodiment, and nature are crucial to J. G. Fichte’s practical philosophy, which implies responsibilities regarding the natural environment and its non-rational denizens. In section one, I summarize Fichte’s argument that self-consciousness presupposes social interaction between embodied rational beings within a sensible environment. In section two, I explain the relation between rational beings and human bodies. In section three, I discuss the relation between rational beings and nature. In section four, I describe ethical duties toward rational beings. In conclusion, I examine ethical duties regarding non-rational beings.