•  71
    Escaping Zeno’s shadow: a defense of common knowledge
    Philosophical Studies 183 (6): 1793-1816. 2026.
    Two agents commonly know that p if they both know that p, they both know that they both know that p, they both know that they both know that they both know that p, etc. Is common knowledge ever possible? In this paper, I examine two influential arguments to the conclusion that common knowledge is impossible. I argue that they fail because they commit the Zeno Fallacy: the inference from the fact that something needs infinitely many steps to the conclusion that it’s impossible to do.
  •  115
    This paper provides a defense of the principle ‘avoid risk for others:’ when a person’s risk-attitudes are unknown, it is wrong to take, on their behalf, some of the risks that they could rationally choose to take.
  •  198
    This is a technical supplement for our paper Risk attitudes when choosing for others.
  •  632
    Knowing to infinity: Full knowledge and the margin‐for‐error principle
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 110 (3): 1083-1113. 2025.
    Let's say that I fully know that if I know that, I know that I know that, I know that I know that I know that, and so on. Let's say that I partially know that if I know that but I don't fully know that. What, if anything, do I fully know? What, if anything, do I partially know? One response in the literature is that I fully know everything that I know; partial knowledge is impossible. This response is in tension with a plausible margin‐for‐error principle on knowledge. A different response in th…Read more