Yoon Choi

This chapter explores what Kant means by “life”, the “feeling of life”, the “feeling of the promotion of life”, and related notions, such as the idea of a “vital power”, through the contrast between Kant’s account of the beautiful and his account of the sublime. We argue that it is significant that Kant characterizes the feeling of the beautiful as a feeling of the promotion of life but the feeling of the sublime in terms of vital powers. We account for this difference by showing that in experiences of beauty, we are aware of ourselves as rational but embodied human beings, as part of nature. In the feeling of the sublime, by contrast, we are aware of ourselves as pure rational beings. This entails that in the beautiful, we experience nature as deeply life-promoting, while in the sublime, we experience the independence of our supersensible vocation from nature.

According to some influential readings of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, the view presented there of the kind of spontaneity we are conscious of through theoretical reason and the significance of such self-consciousness is irremediably at odds with the Critical theory, and thus roundly and rightly rejected in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason. This paper argues, on the contrary, that the Groundwork can be read as articulating for the first time the account of self-consciousness and spontaneity that Kant goes on to develop in the B-Critique, especially the B-Transcendental Deduction.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kant’s Critique of Taste: The Feeling of Life by Katalin MakkaiYoon ChoiKatalin Makkai. Kant’s Critique of Taste: The Feeling of Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Pp. viii + 209. Hardback, $99.99. Paperback, $29.99.This monograph offers a bold and original interpretation of Kant’s theory of reflective judgment, focusing on judgments of taste (hereafter “aesthetic judgments”) and the special problem that Kant takes such judgments to raise. In Makkai’s preferred terms, the problem is that aesthetic judgments are normative—they demand universal agreement—but also subjective (14). How are such judgments possible? Though the problem may seem clear enough, Makkai suggests that a closer look is in order; indeed, her “main focus is on working out a proper understanding of the problem” (15). Makkai undertakes this task over the course of five relatively short chapters, introducing several interpretive theses that come together to transform the problem of aesthetic judgment in illuminating, sometimes surprising, ways. [End Page 509]Chapter 1 introduces Kant’s theory of judgment, arguing that it is primarily about what Kant calls the “power of judgment” (44). This is the power exercised in the activity of “adopting a stance,” an activity that is not only identificatory but also evaluative, that reveals something about the judging subject as well as the object judged (63). Though aesthetic judgment is one way in which the power of judgment is exercised, there is something special about it, as Kant himself flags (KU AA 5:193, quoted on 37). For aesthetic judgment “models” an “essential aspect” of the power of judgment in a way that no other kind of judgment does (38). One of Makkai’s interpretive aims is to make sense of this claim; she accordingly returns to it in her conclusion.Chapter 2, however, turns to aesthetic judgment, focusing on the Second Moment of the Analytic (KU AA 5:211–19). In this section, Kant introduces the much-discussed claim that aesthetic judgment involves the “free play” of imagination and understanding (KU AA 5:217). According to Makkai, it is significant that Kant introduces the idea of “universal communicability” along with the idea of “free play” (KU AA 5:217). Communicability, in Makkai’s view, is underwritten by the activity of “making [one’s thoughts and feelings] communicable,” an activity that is involved not just in communicating one’s thoughts and feelings, but in knowing what one is thinking and feeling in the first place, and indeed in making aesthetic judgment possible, as Makkai goes on to argue (81). For when I have an “aesthetic encounter,” I come across a beautiful object, and though I “cognize it,... there is ‘something else’ there in my experience of it that I find I want to articulate” (90). In the activity of trying to “make communicable” what this “something else” is, the imagination and understanding are brought into free play, a state “characterized,” according to Makkai, by the “exercising” of my “capacity for rendering (something) communicable” (89; emphasis in original). The profound pleasure that accompanies this state, Makkai adds, arises from being “animated” by the beautiful object to this heightened activity in which my faculties are in “attunement” with each other and with the object; it is the feeling of being “brought to life” that Makkai refers to in her title (100–101).It is a central part of this view that to experience an object as beautiful is to respond to the way the object really is. As Makkai puts it, “a condition of the possibility of performing a judgment of taste is a prior fact of the object being beautiful” (125). But in what sense, then, is aesthetic judgment subjective? Makkai addresses this question in chapter 3, arguing that whereas cognitive judgment asserts, aesthetic judgment “acknowledges” (136). And to acknowledge a beautiful object, it is not enough to identify a beautiful object correctly. It is necessary to experience the object as beautiful: to encounter it and take pleasure in it (136). Aesthetic judgment thus has an “essentially first-personal character” (127). As Makkai puts it later, in such a judgment, I represent “my experience of the object, my pleasure in it”—that is...

Philosophical inquiry that delves into the intriguing connections between media technology and leisure may assist us in understanding how we might consider the goodness of using media technology for leisure. Specifically, philosophical discourses of Aristotle and Heidegger can be used to help identify and clarify the roles of media technology and leisure. Therefore, in this paper, we provide a philosophical examination of connections between media technology and leisure by exploring perspectives and linkages of writings by Aristotle [2004. The Nicomachean ethics. Translated and edited by J. A. K. Thompson. New York: Penguin Group] and Heidegger [1977. The Question Concerning Technology. Translated and edited by W. Lovitt. New York: Harper & Row]. We use the writings of these philosophers to organize and describe recent research focusing on media technology and leisure experiences. The relationship between media technology and leisure is complex and multifaceted and it seems that this relationship is reciprocal, in that media technology influences leisure expression and, simultaneously, leisure experiences shape the use of media technology.

The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 includes provisions to deny reunification services under specified conditions and gives states latitude to develop any number of additional "aggravated circumstances" in which parents need not be offered services. California legislators have developed a relatively large number of conditions enabling agencies to bypass reunification services. Based upon a case record review involving 55 parents, this study attempts to identify the proportion of parents eligible for a reunification bypass, the proportion recommended to the courts, and the proportion of parents who were denied reunification services, and examines the characteristics of parents associated with reunification bypass recommendations. Based upon focus groups and interviews with child welfare and judicial personnel in six counties, the study also examines the implementation of reunification bypass provisions. Implications for public policy and practice are provided.