Yoshiki Yoshimura

Principle-based theories, such as rule-consequentialism and Scanlonian contractualism, evaluate principles/rules first and then actions by those principles. The traditional form of principle-based theories is thought to evaluate principles only on the basis of what would happen if many people adhered to those principles. In some cases, they have advantages in vindicating some considered judgments because they consider such effects. However, it is criticized that the very feature sometimes makes those theories give counterintuitive verdicts. This poses the question of whether there is a form of principle-based theory that retains the advantages of vindicating some considered judgments while avoiding the problem of giving counterintuitive verdicts. This paper suggests that two resources found in contractualist literature, a way of making exceptions and the intrinsic significance of moral principles, can help contractualism retain advantages in vindicating some considered judgments while avoiding objections that arise from considering the effects of counterfactual adherence to principles.

Our practice of justification of action seems to be based on comparing agents’ and patients’ reasons for and against action. Standard Scanlonian contractualism, a theory that takes the idea of justifiability to be morally fundamental, evaluates the justifiability of actions on the basis of principles for the general regulation of behavior. In evaluating those principles, reasons for objecting to the widespread performance of acts of relevant types and reasons for objecting to the general authorization of such acts are taken into account. This might seem puzzling at first glance because it seems to differ from our ordinary practice of justification. This puzzlement poses the question of why contractualism employs such principles if it takes the idea of justifiability to be morally fundamental. I argue that the connection between contractualist justifiability and contractualist interpretation of respect for the value of persons provides a rationale for employing principles for the general regulation of behavior. For contractualism, regulating one’s own reasoning and behavior on the basis of contractualist justifiability enacts respect for the value of persons. Contractualists think that to respect the value of persons, we must recognize persons’ rational capacities. Employing principles for the general regulation in evaluating justifiability enables us to do it. In addition, I argue that appreciating contractualism’s two-level character shows that it is compatible with our ordinary practices because our practices do not imply that considerations, such as the general authorization of a type of act, are irrelevant in critical evaluations of grounds for justification. [If you do not have access, the link to Accepted Manuscript is on my personal website. I have added the link to my personal website to the external links in addition to the journal page.]