Young Rhee

The Simulation Hypothesis, prominently advanced by Bostrom and Chalmers, posits that our reality may be a sophisticated computational simulation, rendering traditional distinctions between the living and the artificial or between persons and machines, mere artifacts of digital code. This paper examines the ontological, epistemic, and ethical implications of this hypothesis, particularly its challenge to conventional notions of reality. Assuming the Simulation Hypothesis holds, all entities—humans, non-human animals, and advanced artificial intelligences—are fundamentally instantiated as digital objects sharing a common ontological status. A central question arises: does this ontological uniformity necessitate ethical unity, or can meaningful ethical diversity persist among simulated beings? This paper argues that ethical diversity is possible despite ontological uniformity. Drawing on the frameworks of Virtual Realism, its radical variant Virtual Digitalism, and the concept of the digital object, it examines how ethical status can vary within a simulated reality. Key to this analysis is the problem of epistemic ignorance, which constrains ethical reasoning and gives rise to two primary perspectives: the Simulator Perspective and the Creature Perspective. From these, the paper derives two governing principles—the Principle of Non-harm and the Principle of Universal Reciprocity—to guide ethics in virtual worlds. The discussion further distinguishes between Intra-Simulation and Inter-simulation, and, through analyzing cases, it illustrates ethical diversity, formalizes the resulting moral dilemmas, and proposes a resolution centered on the moral responsibility of the simulator. Ultimately, this paper advocates a paradigm shift in metaphysical and ethical thinking to accommodate the possibilities of simulated existence.

What will be the posthuman society? As usual, there are two prospects: the pessimistic view and the optimistic view. According to pessimistic view, as technologies advance emerge new beings called as transhuman with enhanced intelligence and physical power, and extremely long lifespan and they will dominate humans. On the other hand, according to optimistic view, technology will benefit humans, so humans evolve via transhuman to posthuman with smart machines. There are complex issues tangled together in the dispute between the rival views, especially such as the natural vs. artificial beings, human dignity and equality, and meaning of life. The aim of this article is to examine being and relation in posthuman age in the point of Nietzsche’s philosophy. I examine transhuman as a typical being of posthuman age and ressentiment as its relation respectively. Nietzsche has influenced the rise of transhumanism and posthumanism, as can be seen from direct or indirect confessions from pioneers of them, though there are debates about whether the influence is real or superficial. By paying particular attention to Nietzsche’s idea of Master and Slave, ressentiment, and Overman (Übermensch), I contend that (a) in the posthuman age new classes will emerge, which correspond to Master and Slave, (b) there will be a new ressentiment of Slaves toward their Masters, and (c) Overman as a creator of new value will be required in order to solve the problem by ressentiment.

In this short essay, I recollect my memories of Dr. Shlomit C. Schuster. Dr. Schus­ter was a great philosopher and a philosophical counselor, and I am struggling to spell out now the significance of the time I spent with her. Dr. Schuster visited Korea twice (2010 and 2012) and left a very strong impression on the members of the Korean Society of Philosophical Practice and Humanities, especially the Therapy Group of Kangwon National University. Someday I might realize the significance of her philosophical thoughts but I feel obligated to share something about the way in which we will remember her.

Although the twentieth century, highly developed science and technology, humanity is still subject to many suffering from mental problems and diseases. We are faced with material wealth but poor in the spirit of contradiction, and the material rich and poor while the material contradictions. In addition, philosophical counseling covers many disciplines and methods. The type of philosophical counseling may be a sign of diversity, revealing the so-called academic Kuhn immature. Philosophical Counseling does not reach the level of general science, which not only has a model, but also an efficient way to solve the problem. For out of this situation, we must establish the positioning of philosophical counseling and philosophical counseling to clarify the main method of learning, these methods can eventually achieve the purpose of philosophical counseling. The purpose of this paper is to propose a method to construct a more philosophical counseling model. I will present the theory of embodied mind, philosophical counseling as a theory of Botox. Secondly, I would mind disease is defined as the main target of philosophical counseling. Third, I will suggest a diagnostic criterion and methods for philosophical counseling model is more philosophical. Though science and technology had made some remarkable developments in the twentieth century, we are still suffering from a lot of mental problems and diseases. We are facing not only the paradox of material poverty in the midst of material plenty, but also the paradox of mental poverty in the midst of material plenty. Furthermore, there are many disciplines of counseling which have their own methods of counseling. As for philosophical counseling, the plurality of principles and methods of counseling may be thought of as a sign for the academic immaturity in the Kuhnian sense. That is, philosophical counseling does not reach to a normal science which has a definite paradigm and does not engage in problem-solving activities in an efficient way. In order to escape from this unfavorable situation, first of all, we have to establish the identity of philosophical counseling and to elucidate its main methodologies which can lead to achieve the genuine aim of philosophical counseling. The purpose of the paper is to suggest a way of constructing a more philosophical model of counseling. I shall suggest the theory of embodied mind as the best candidate theory for philosophical counseling. Second, I shall define the disease of mind as the main object of philosophical counseling. Third, I shall suggest the criteria of diagnosis and method which can make any philosophical counseling more philosophical