Young Woo Kwon

This article explores whether AI can be a human-like subject that can live together with humans. I argue that living together is conceptually different from being together or coexistence and symbiosis in an ecosystem. I propose three conditions for living together and consider as subjects only those beings that can live together in a cultural and inter-subjective way. And I try to define the subject as a being which can build its relationships with the world in three ways. Then the conditions of living together will be combined with the concept of subject. The first condition is that the subject should be conscious of its relationship with others. The second condition is that the subject should form reciprocal relationships with others. The third condition is that the subjects should have the same representation of the relationship with others. This article attempts to examine whether AI can fulfill the three conditions of living together. Although AI seems to be able to think, express, act, feel, even be conscious and so on, it is very unlikely that AI can build the same world as the human world. Therefore, even if we cannot discern ourselves from AI, we humans can never enter its world and vice versa. The reason is very simple: humans are ontically different from AI. In society, humans and AI can be together, but they cannot live together. Even if AI could eventually have a consciousness, genuine social living together between humans and AI is impossible. We humans can recognize AI as a pseudo-subject. Nevertheless, such a subject is not one that can live together with humans. Even if AI were conscious and could pretend to be a human-like subject, it could not be a genuine subject unless it could live together with humans. Many people warn that AI could be dangerous to humans. These so-called threats might not come from AI itself, but from humans themselves.

This article explores whether AI can be a human-like subject that can live together with humans. I argue that living together is conceptually different from being together or coexistence and symbiosis in an ecosystem. I propose three conditions for living together and consider as subjects only those beings that can live together in a cultural and inter-subjective way. And I try to define the subject as a being which can build its relationships with the world in three ways. Then the conditions of living together will be combined with the concept of subject. The first condition is that the subject should be conscious of its relationship with others. The second condition is that the subject should form reciprocal relationships with others. The third condition is that the subjects should have the same representation of the relationship with others. This article attempts to examine whether AI can fulfill the three conditions of living together. Although AI seems to be able to think, express, act, feel, even be conscious and so on, it is very unlikely that AI can build the same world as the human world. Therefore, even if we cannot discern ourselves from AI, we humans can never enter its world and vice versa. The reason is very simple: humans are ontically different from AI. In society, humans and AI can be together, but they cannot live together. Even if AI could eventually have a consciousness, genuine social living together between humans and AI is impossible. We humans can recognize AI as a pseudo-subject. Nevertheless, such a subject is not one that can live together with humans. Even if AI were conscious and could pretend to be a human-like subject, it could not be a genuine subject unless it could live together with humans. Many people warn that AI could be dangerous to humans. These so-called threats might not come from AI itself, but from humans themselves.

Nature is never outside the Idea, but is itself the Idea or a phenomenon of the Idea (Enz §§575–577). The self-referential negativity of Nature alone enables life to emerge within Nature and as a natural feature. For life appears to be free from the causal necessity of Nature and the origin of life refers to the beginning of Nature’s contradiction. Spirit only begins to appear in and with life as an individual. That is why life sees itself as the access to the appearance of Spirit, since the Idea firstly appears as natural Spirit on the feature of life. Spirit is the other of Nature. Life as such is neither as Nature because it already sets itself a concept of purpose, nor as Spirit, because not all living things are spiritual. So, life can be understood as a medium between Nature and Spirit. Nonetheless, the means can never be indifferent to Nature and Spirit. Rather, it can be seen as a battleground of Nature and Spirit that should ultimately be dissolved. Therefore, life is never stagnant. Nature draws life to death through illness, but life always strives to maintain its vitality (Enz, §§374–375). In its pursuit, life as a feature of Nature becomes or animates the subjective form of Spirit. Finally, one can say that life arises at the juncture between Nature and Spirit.

So far, living together has always been realized contradictorily through the demolishing of the other's living together, for example through war, colonization, group competition, etc. ... The project of this text is to show that Hegel's practical philosophy, regardless of its limitations, is still valid for understanding our lives, as long as our lives continue to exist in an ironic way through numerous seemingly insoluble conflicts, tensions, struggles, competitions, etc. For Hegel has established precisely that morality always develops through contradiction. ... In order to find and realize a better way of living together, we must first be able to look at our present situation in order to identify our limits or our problems. Secondly, we should know what our moral development should be aimed at. ... Both are based on the reflective activity of human beings. Reflection, then, can be understood as the necessary means for realizing the goal of living together.

본 논문은 플라톤의『프로타고라스』편에 있는 탁월함(aretē)의 교육 가능성에 대한 논쟁의 구도에서 리더십 교육(지도자 양성 교육)이 이율배반과 같은 상황에 놓여 있음을 밝히고자 한다. 프로타고라스가 가르칠 수 있다고 말한 탁월함은 어떤 직종에서나 필요한 “장인의 기술(dēmiourgikē technē)”이 아니라 공동체 혹은 나라를 잘 운영할 수 있는 “시민적 훌륭함(politikē aretē)” 또는 “정치적 기술(politikē technē)”을 의미한다. 그런데 소크라테스는 이러한 탁월함이 교육될 수 없다고 주장하면서 프로타고라스와 논쟁을 벌인다. 이 논쟁은 사실 결론을 내리지 못한 채로 마치게 된다. 그런데 오늘날 지도자를 교육으로 양성할 수 있다는 생각이 거의 일반화되어 있다. 따라서 다양한 종류의 지도자 양성 교육프로그램이 진행되고 있다. 그러나 지도자양성 교육은 프로타고라스와 소크라테스가 “시민적 훌륭함”을 교육할 수 있는지를 두고 논쟁한 것과 같은 문제에 빠질 수 있다. 그리고 본 필자는 이 문제가 마치 이율배반의 문제와 같다고 생각한다. 왜냐하면 “지도자를 교육으로 양성할 수 있다.”라는 주장도 가능하지만, 동시에 “지도자를 교육으로 양성할 수 없다.”라는 주장도 가능할 수 있기 때문이다. 이러한 이율배반의 문제를 해소하거나 제대로 성찰하지 않은 상태에서 지도자 양성교육을 수행하는 것은 일종의 독단이 될 수 있을 것이다. 이 글에서는 지도자 양성 교육의 이율배반 문제의 해소방안으로 지도자 양성 교육이 가능하다는 입장과 불가능하다는 입장의 부정적 자기 관계성을 제시한다.

The main Theme of this paper is “subjectivity” as the fundamental form of every subject. The subjectivity is considered in this project as the capacity of the corporal subject to orient himself spatiotemporally and to produce his relation to world. The subject means the spatiotemporal realization (i.e. actus) of the subjectivity. This capacity is divided into its three sorts as the three aspects of the subjectivity: 1. the perceiving or conscious subjectivity, 2. the egocentric or self-conscious subjectivity and 3. the inter-subjecting subjectivity. By analogy with the three aspects of the subjectivity we can find three types of world: 1. the objective, 2. the subjective and 3. the inter-subjective world. The subjects can develop by virtue of the subjectivity as his essential capacity all of the sciences, determine their will by autonomy and try to communicate and to live together with other sorts of subjects. Everything that may and should be regarded as a subject entails the subjectivity as his essence. It does not matter if the subject is human being, animal, robot, cyborg, angel, God and so on.