Youngjae Lee Lee

Criminalizing Disobedience examines an important and widespread feature of modern criminal law: many laws penalize conduct not because it is inherently wrongful but because the government has prohibited it. Such “disobedience offenses” include: administration of justice crimes (contempt, obstruction of justice, perjury); failure-to-assist crimes (hindering prosecution, receiving stolen property, money laundering, failure to register or to report); regulatory offenses (involving, for example, environmental, drug, or medical device laws); preventive offenses (attempt, possession of weapons or drugs); and national security offenses (treason, espionage, export control and sanctions violations). What unifies these otherwise disparate offenses is that their core wrong lies in noncompliance with legal directives—not in unjustifiably harming or endangering others—and the principal reason to refrain from such conduct is simply that the government has said not to do it. By contrast, laws against, say, murder or rape prohibit conduct that is morally wrongful even in the absence of legal prohibition. This book addresses the important normative and conceptual questions these laws raise: How should disobedience be understood? Is it blameworthy to disobey the state? In what ways does the state criminalize and punish disobedience? What should be the limits to the state’s power to demand obedience and punish disobedience? This book explores these questions across a range of legal domains and develops a philosophically sophisticated framework for evaluating such laws—one that, in the process, sheds new light on longstanding questions of political obligation, criminalization, and punishment.

What is the proportionate punishment for conduct that is neither harmful nor wrongful? A likely response to that is that one ought not to be punished at all for such conduct. It is, however, common for the state to punish harmless conduct the wrongfulness of which is not always apparent. Take, for example, the requirement that those who give investment advice for compensation do so only after registering as an investment advisor. Advising a person on how to invest his or her funds and accepting a fee for the advice without registering with the government does not seem harmful or wrongful, so long as no fraud is involved, the relevant parties understand the relevant risks, and so on. But practicing investment advising without registering is a crime for which one may be convicted and punished. When one thinks of crimes, paradigmatic offenses are crimes like murder, rape, and robbery, but offenses like failure to register as an investment advisor are different. But in what way? One standard explanation is the distinction between two types of offenses, malum in se and malum prohibitum. Some offenses, like murder, are wrongs “in themselves” whereas other offenses, like investment advising without registering as an advisor, are wrongs because they have been prohibited. The question this Essay asks is how we should think about proportionality of punishment when punishing such mala prohibita offenses. This Essay presents a framework for such proportionality determinations and raises some challenges such a framework would need to confront.

Introduction: State-Centered and Individual-Centered TheoriesWhat is philosophy of criminal law? The seventeen essays in this book, as a whole, provide an excellent place to start in answering that question. Editors John Deigh and David Dolinko state that they put together this volume of “seventeen original essays by leading thinkers in the philosophy of the criminal law” in order to create “an authoritative handbook” representing “the state of current research on the major topics in the field that arise from issues in the substantive criminal law” (p. v).So what is the field, and what are its major topics? There are many ways to organize this field, but I would start by observing that we can divide the world of philosophy of criminal law into two different types of theorizing: state-centered and individual-centered. The state-centered theory focuses on the proper limits of the state’s power to criminalize and punish, while the individual-centered theory focuses on questions of innocen ..

The wrongfulness constraint, as a principle of criminalization, is supposed to preclude criminalization in the absence of wrongfulness. Crimes that look especially problematic from the perspective of the wrongfulness constraint are mala prohibita offenses. The aim of this Essay is to consider the question whether the wrongfulness constraint can serve as an effective tool to curb overcriminalization by looking at the case of mala prohibita offenses. This Essay defends the following propositions. First, because of the availability of an array of tools to defend various mala prohibita offenses as satisfying the wrongfulness constraint, it is often not a straightforward matter to demonstrate that committing a malum prohibitum offense is not wrongful. Second, as a result, the wrongfulness constraint is of limited use as a way of stemming the tide of overcriminalization. The Essay concludes by suggesting, more broadly, that the problem of overcriminalization is not that too many crimes violate the wrongfulness constraint but that criminal laws, even those that satisfy the wrongfulness constraint, can easily become a source of oppression, and that asking whether crimes violate the wrongfulness constraint may be counterproductive because the question misdirects our attention.

A solution to the problem of “overcriminalization” appears to be decriminalization of certain crimes. This Essay focuses on a group of crimes that has been labeled “proxy crimes” as a candidate to be eliminated. What are proxy crimes? Douglas Husak defines them as “offenses designed to achieve a purpose other than to prevent the conduct they explicitly proscribe.” Michael Moore describes them as involving situations where we “use one morally innocuous act as a proxy for another, morally wrongful act or mental state.” Put that way, proxy crimes seem highly problematic, and Larry Alexander and Kimberly Ferzan bluntly put it, “We reject proxy crimes.” This Essay asks whether we should reject proxy crimes by presenting and evaluating Alexander and Ferzan’s treatment of the subject. After describing several different types of crimes that may be characterized as proxy crimes and Alexander and Ferzan’s rejection of most of them and their arguments for doing so, this Essay argues that their rejection of proxy crimes is incomplete, which leaves their theory open to a range of possibilities regarding the proper place of proxy crimes in criminal law. This Essay concludes that getting a handle on the problem of proxy crimes and overcriminalization requires a theory of the state and an articulation of the proper relationship between the state and its citizens that can give guidance on when the state can demand obedience from citizens to support the state and when failures to comply with such demands render one criminally culpable. Without such a theory, proposals to address overcriminalization cannot travel very far.

When the US Supreme Court decided in Graham v. Florida that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits a sentence of life in prison without parole for a nonhomicide crime committed by a minor, it stated that “[t]he concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment” and that it is the “precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.” These statements make two claims—one legal and one philosophical. The philosophical claim is that justice requires proportionality in punishment, and the legal claim is that this principle of justice is central to the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishments. The aim of this chapter is to examine the concept of proportionality in punishment from multiple vantage points—practical, legal, and philosophical—and consider its enduring importance and persistent difficulties.

The right to trial by jury and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt are two of the most fundamental commitments of American criminal law. This article asks how the two are related, that is, whether disagreement among jurors implies anything about whether the beyond a reasonable doubt standard has been satisfied: Does the due process requirement of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard also require jury unanimity in criminal cases? Drawing on literature about the epistemological significance of disagreement, this article considers the “equal-weight view” and its implications for the unanimity rule in criminal jury decision-making. The equal-weight view says that, roughly speaking, when people disagree on a topic, each view should be given equal weight. This implies, this article concludes, that the unanimity rule is required as a way of enforcing the beyond a reasonable doubt requirement. This article further concludes, however, that jurors should not always be instructed to apply the equal-weight view in their deliberation. Jurors, when applying crime definitions to particular cases, make determinations about both historical facts and normative issues through moral terms like “reckless,” “unjustifiable,” “depraved,” “cruel,” and “heinous,” which are common in criminal law. This article argues that while the equal-weight view should guide the jurors in determining factual issues, it is not the correct model for moral issues, not only because it would imply that acquittals are appropriate in many cases involving controversial moral questions but also because having the jurors follow it would undermine the basic justification for having the criminal jury as an articulator and enforcer of morality.

Recently in Porter v. McCollum, the United States Supreme Court, citing “a long tradition of according leniency to veterans in recognition of their service,” held that a defense lawyer’s failure to present his client’s military service record as mitigating evidence during his sentencing for two murders amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. The purpose of this Article is to assess, from the just deserts perspective, the grounds to believe that veterans who commit crimes are to be blamed less by the State than offenders without such backgrounds. Two rationales for a differential treatment of military veterans who commit crimes are typically set forth. The Porter Court raised each, stating that we should treat veterans differently “in recognition of” both “their service” and “the intense stress and mental and emotional toll” of combat. The former factor suggests there being a “social contributions” or gratitude-based discount, whereas the latter factor points towards a “mental disturbance” discount. This Article analyzes the two accounts and raises some doubts about both. This Article then argues that a military veteran who commits a crime should not be blamed to the full extent of his blameworthiness, not necessarily because of his mental capacity nor because of his social contribution, but because the State’s hand in producing his criminality undermines its standing to blame him

This Article examines the idea of betraying or being disloyal to one’s own country as a matter of criminal law. First, the Article defines crimes of disloyalty as involving failures to prioritize one’s own country’s interests through participating in efforts to directly undermine core institutional resources the country requires to protect itself or otherwise advance its interests by force. Second, this Article canvasses various potential arguments for the existence of a duty not to be disloyal to one’s own country and argues that they fail. Finally, this Article argues that we should interpret the wrong of disloyalty crimes as involving not betrayal or infidelity, but transgression of political boundaries. That is, the relevant wrong here is rooted in the ideas of separation of powers and assignments of roles between citizens and the state, and we should thus conceive crimes of disloyalty as crimes of usurpation and evaluate the moral rights and wrongs of such crimes accordingly

If one of the lessons of the ubiquitous and highly problematic ticking bomb scenario is that torture may be justified under certain narrowly specified situations, why would we not want it made available as a weapon in the government’s anti-terrorist activities? This is not a new question. It has been hotly debated, and a number of arguments have been made against the idea of formulating the torture policy on the basis of the ticking-bomb hypothetical. The question that this Essay addresses is related but narrower: if one starts from the proposition that the ticking bomb scenario demonstrates that a government official facing prosecution for torture may have available the necessity defense, what implications, if any, should the government be able to draw from the existence of the defense as it formulates its torture policy? This Essay discusses, and rejects, one common answer to this question—that the nature of the necessity defense is such that it can generate no forward-looking prescriptions. This Essay then advances a new argument on the basis of the nature and function of the necessity defense as not only spelling out morally permissible instances of harm infliction but also effecting a division of power between the state and citizens

In _Criminal Testimonial Injustice_, Jennifer Lackey argues that there is a kind of testimonial injustice, characterized by “an unwarranted excess of credibility” and that “[t]he excess of credibility…results in a distinctive kind of epistemic wrong” in “ways that are widespread, alarming, and pernicious” in our criminal justice system. This Essay, building on Lackey’s original and persuasive analysis, asks the following question: Given the problems that Lackey identifies, how should conscientious jurors in criminal cases approach instances of testimonial injustice in the form of credibility excess? More specifically, this Essay argues that in certain situations a conscientious juror who believes in the defendant’s guilt may still need to vote to acquit if the juror’s conclusion of guilty is based on a reliance on a confession or eyewitness testimony. This is true even if the juror believes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty and even if there is no apparent issue with the eyewitness testimony or confession evidence.