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맹자의 성선설에 대한 통상적인 관점은 맹자의 본성 개념에서 생물학적 욕구를 제외시키고 인간만이 가진 고유한 가치인 도덕적 경향성만을 본성으로 강조해왔다. 이 글은 이러한 통상적인 관점을 비판적으로 검토하고, 고자와의 논변을 중심으로 맹자의 성선설이 담고 있는 의미를 재고찰한다. 맹자의 성선설은 인간 본성에 선한 경향성이 있다는 것으로, 이러한 주장이 인간의 본성에 생물학적 욕구가 있다는 점과 상충되지 않는다. 한 걸음 더 나아가 맹자에서 성선은 생물학적 욕구로서의 본성과 대립 관계에 있기보다 서로 긴밀한 관련성을 가진 포함 관계로 이해할 수 있는데, 이는 비유컨대 ‘물과 기름’의 불연속적 관계보다 두 대상이 서로 밀접하게 결합될 수 있는 ‘물과 소금’의 관계에 가깝다고 할 수 있다. 그리고 맹자의 본성 개념에서 도덕적 경향성과 생물학적 욕구를 대비시켜 이해하도록 하는데 중요한 기여를 한「고자 상」3장을 자세히 분석하면, 맹자와 고자의 인간 본성에 대한 이해가 도덕적 경향성의 측면에서는 달라지지만, 생물학적 욕구의 측면에서는 다르지 않을 수 있다는 점을 알 수 있다. 이러한 맹자와 고자의 논변에 대한 면밀한 분석은 맹자에 대한 올바른 이해를 가능하게 할 뿐만 아니라, 고대 중국의 인간 본성에 대한 논의를 포괄적으로 이해하는 데도 도움을 준다. 이러한 분석을 바탕으로 맹자의 본성론이 생물학적 욕구를 포함하더라도 성선악혼재설(性善惡混在說)과는 구별된다는 점을 밝히고, 마지막으로 맹자가 주요 변론의 대상으로 삼은 것은 성선악혼재설이 아닌 고자의 성무선무불선설(性無善無不善說)임을 밝힌다.

상고시대 ‘요순의 선양(禪讓)’은 군주가 덕이 있는 자에게 왕위를 물려주는 유가 정치의 이상으로 오랫동안 중심적인 위치를 차지해 왔다. 그러나 기존의 정치적⋅혈연적 위계를 전복한다는 점에서 선양론은 정치사상적으로 중대한 문제를 내포하고 있으며, 전국시대 묵가와 법가로부터도 날카로운 비판의 대상이 되었다. 본 논문은 『맹자』 ｢만장 상｣ 4장, 일명 ‘함구몽장(咸丘蒙章)’을 중심으로, 맹자가 이러한 사상적 도전에 어떻게 대응했는지를 분석한다. 특히 맹자가 강조한 독법인 ‘이의역지(以意逆志)’를 적용하여, ‘함구몽장’에 인용된 옛 기록을 『묵자』 ｢비유 하｣편 및 『한비자』 ｢충효｣편과 비교⋅검토하고, 이를 『맹자』 전체 맥락 속에서 해석함으로써 그의 독자적 정치철학을 규명한다. 이러한 분석에 의하면, 맹자는 요순의 선양을 단순한 예외적 사건이 아닌, 덕의 위계와 기존의 위계질서가 조화롭게 작동할 수 있는 다층적 구조로 재정립하였다. 이러한 사유는 정치와 윤리, 혈연과 공적 질서를 도덕적 원리에 따라 상호 조율하고 유기적으로 통합하는 도덕 정치의 정립을 위한 철학적 기획으로 평가될 수 있다.

이 글은 『상서』의 성왕들에게 나타나는 구체적인 모습으로서의 겸손(謙遜)의 기원 또는 그 계기를 『상서』 내부에서 찾아본다. 이를 위해, 성왕들이 세상을 이해하는 방식을 복선화음(福善禍淫: 착한 사람은 복을 받고 나쁜 사람은 재앙을 받음)의 원리로 규정하고, 이를 ‘확신의 윤리(ethics of confidence)’라고 명명한다. 반면, 성왕들은 덕에 대한 특정한 이해, 왕이라는 정치적 지위와 책무, 자기 행위의 한계성으로 인해 자신의 덕에 대해 확신하지 못하는데, 이를 ‘불확신의 윤리(ethics of uncertainty)’라고 명명한다. 이런 불확신의 윤리는 확신의 윤리에서 비롯될 수 있는 자만과 교만, 그로 인한 방탕과 사치, 태만, 타인에 대한 부정적인 평가 등 같은 부작용으로부터 성왕들을 보호해주는 최선의 방책이 된다. 따라서, 성왕들은 세상에 대한 확신과 자신에 대한 불확신 사이의 긴장의 마음 상태를 성공적으로 유지하는 자들이라고 하겠다. 그리고 우리가 보통 미덕이라고 부르는 성왕들의 겸손은 바로 불확신의 윤리에서 비롯된 것임을 밝힌다.

성인들은 거짓말을 할까? 만약 성인이 거짓말을 한다면, 그러한 행위는 어떻게 정당화될 수 있을까? 유가 전통에서 성인의 거짓말과 관련하여 대표적으로 논의되는 사례는 『논어』｢양화｣ 20장에 등장하는 공자 일화와 『맹자』｢공손추 하｣ 2장에 등장하는 맹자 일화이다. 전통 주석가들 가운데 주희(朱熹)는 두 사례를 불설지교회(不屑之敎誨: 가르침을 철회하는 방식으로 이루어지는 교화)의 맥락에서 연결하여, 성인의 기만이 상대방에게 일정한 교화적 의미를 갖는 것으로 해석하였다. 폴 담브로시오(Paul D’Ambrosio)는 전통 주석에서 나타나는 이러한 교화적 해석을 성인의 기만이 더 큰 교육적 목적을 통해 정당화되는 일종의 결과주의적 해석으로 규정한다. 본 연구는 이러한 결과주의적 독법을 재검토하고, 엄성우의 ‘기만당하지 않을 권리에 대한 존중’으로서의 정직성 개념과 퀸 화이트(Quinn White)의 ‘관계 기반 정직성 이론’을 바탕으로 두 사례를 재검토한다. 이를 통해 두 사례가 단순히 교육적 효과를 목적으로 한 결과주의적 실천으로만 이해될 수 없으며, 서로 다른 관계의 성격과 목적에 따라 이루어진 상이한 의사소통의 실천임을 밝힌다. 나아가 두 사례에 대한 비교·분석을 통해 의사소통의 규범은 의사소통에 직접적인 대화 당사자들 사이의 관계뿐 아니라, 제3자를 포함한 더 넓은 관계적 맥락 속에서도 이해되어야 함을 논증한다.

Mencius is renowned for his doctrine of the goodness of human nature, emphasizing four innate moral inclinations that must be cultivated into full virtues to live a flourishing life. While scholars explore how to nurture these inclinations, they tend to focus on compassion–commiseration, often overlooking the others. To address this imbalance, this article turns to Yi Ik 李瀷 (1681–1763), a prominent Korean Confucian scholar, to explore his nuanced moral psychology. It identifies two distinct models of moral cultivation: the dongche (同體, forming-one-body) model and the mua (毋我, having-no-self) model. The dongche model promotes expanding the self to embrace others, thereby deepening compassion–commiseration. In contrast, the mua model emphasizes detaching from the self to impartially and objectively assess moral transgressions, sustaining shame and disdain. Together, these models offer a more comprehensive view of how different moral inclinations can be cultivated into corresponding virtues.

Mencius is renowned for his doctrine of the goodness of human nature, emphasizing four innate moral inclinations that must be cultivated into full virtues to live a flourishing life. While scholars explore how to nurture these inclinations, they tend to focus on compassion-commiseration, often overlooking the others. To address this imbalance, this paper turns to Yi Ik李瀷 (1681-1763), a prominent Korean Confucian scholar, to explore his nuanced moral psychology. It identifies two distinct models of moral cultivation: the dongche (同體, forming-one-body) model and the mua (毋我, having-no-self) model. The dongche model promotes expanding the self to embrace others, thereby deepening compassion-commiseration. In contrast, the mua model emphasizes detaching from the self to impartially and objectively assess moral transgressions, sustaining shame and disdain. Together, these models offer a more comprehensive view of how different moral inclinations can be cultivated into corresponding virtues.

This paper aims to construct a comprehensive theory of royal succession of Mencius. Basically, there are three distinct modes of royal succession described in the Mencius: abdication, hereditary succession, and revolution. Abdication involves the voluntary transfer of power by the incumbent ruler to a virtuous minister. Hereditary succession entails the transmission of power to the son of the incumbent ruler. Revolution marks the foundation of a new dynasty by deposing the incumbent ruler. What are their exact relationships? In contrast to hereditary succession, which represents “rule by heredity,” abdication and revolution are often categorized together as “rule by virtue,” which became the backbone of the Confucian virtue politics. However, Mencius' writings, especially 5A5 and 5A6, suggest his clear intention to establish a coherent, or at least, compatible relationship between abdication and hereditary succession. This paper analyzes Mencius' discussions on royal succession to elucidate how he perceived the connection between abdication and hereditary succession, and to explore why he considered revolution as a separate category. In this study, I refer to the former as the “entrenched‐trust model” and distinguish the latter as “anticipated‐trust model.” The final section of the paper compares the three modes of royal succession in terms of the nature of the people's trust, the susceptibility of the people's approval, and the candidate's disinterest in power.

This paper examines the thoughts of two prominent Korean Confucians of the late Goryeo 高麗period, Yi Saek 李穡 and Jeong Do-jeon 鄭道傳. Although they were both renowned as followers of Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucianism, they held differing views on several important issues. One of these issues was the royal successions of King U 禑王 and King Chang 昌王. Yi Saek considered them to be legitimate rulers of Goryeo, while Jeong Do-jeon denied their legitimacy and accused those involved in their enthronements of treason. In order to conceptualize their differences, I first explain the distinction between the ownership conception and the service conception of political authority introduced by Joseph Chan. Based on this philosophical framework, I analyze and compare the thoughts of Yi Saek and Jeong Do-jeon. My conclusion is that they based political legitimacy on different grounds: for Yi Saek, legitimacy is based on the founder’s achievements in setting up the cultural and political foundation of Goryeo, whereas for Jeong Do-jeon, it is based on the founding king himself, who established the dynasty in 918. Accordingly, I call their views the “founding service” conception and the “founder’s ownership” conception of political authority, respectively. I hope this analysis and comparison of their differing conceptions of political authority can contribute to a better understanding of their political thoughts and the development of the concept of political legitimacy in Korean history.

Mozi’s 墨子 doctrine of impartial care has been interpreted predominantly through the lens of Mengzi 孟子, that is, as “love without distinctions” versus “love with distinctions.” However, I think Mengzi saw only half of the picture, as his focus was exclusively on the difference between Confucianism and Mohism in regard to the scope, intensity, and sequence of love. In this essay, I argue that Mozi’s impartial care is also characteristically different in kind from the Confucian notion of humaneness. My analysis and comparison of their usage of the word ai 愛 shows that Mozi’s ai is material-oriented care, while the Confucian ai is emotion-oriented care. I further argue that Mozi had this particular understanding of care largely because he held a quite negative view of human emotions. For him, human emotions are unreliable and harmful for the practice of care.

One of the core doctrines of Mozi 墨子 is his teaching on jian'ai 兼愛, and this is discussed primarily in the three chapters bearing this term in their title.1 The term "jian'ai" and its theme also appear scattered throughout the Mozi, such as in chapters like "Standards and Rules" and the "Intention of Tian." Jian'ai has been translated into English as "Universal Love," "Inclusive Care," "Impartial Care," and other similar phrases. As these various translations suggest, there is not yet a prevailing consensus on the exact meaning of jian'ai.2Despite his renowned clarity and simplicity and his skill at argumentation, those who try to pin down Mozi's teaching on jian'ai soon encounter difficulties. I think there are...

This paper examines the Confucian concept of tian, conventionally translated into English as “Heaven.‘ The secondary literature on tian has primarily focused on the question of what tian is: e.g., whether tian is an anthropomorphic deity or a naturalistic force, or whether tian is transcendent or immanent. Instead, this paper locates tian with respect to the ethical life of human beings, and argues that the two conflicting concepts of “moral economy‘ and “contingency‘ are main characteristics of tian. This paper further investigates these characteristics in Kongzi’s and Mengzi’s ethical thought: how they conceptualized moral economy and contingency, and how their different conceptualizations shaped their respective ethical programs: Kongzi’s ethics of faith and Mengzi’s ethics of confidence.

This essay examines the role of virtue and the status of non-moral goods in conceptions of the good human life through an exploration of the thought of Confucius and Mencius. Both Confucius and Mencius lived in quite similar worlds, but their conceptualizations of the world differed from each another. This difference led them to hold different views on the role of virtue and the status of non-moral goods. On the one hand, Confucius highlighted the self-sufficiency of virtue, but he acknowledged and appreciated the intrinsic and instrumental value of non-moral goods. On the other hand, while Mencius underscored the role of virtue as the best means to the best ends, he tried to depreciate the value of non-moral goods. As a consequence, even though their conceptions of the good life were essentially predicated on virtue, they parted company concerning the status of non-moral goods in human life.

One significant feature of Jeong Yakyong’s丁若鏞 thought is his deconstruction of Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 moral universe based on li 理 and qi 氣. For Zhu Xi, the world in its entirety was a moral place, but Jeong Yakyong distinguished nonmoral domains from the moral domain. One question that follows in pursuing a comparison of their philosophies on this topic is what each thinker meant by ‘moral’ and, in particular, whether they meant the same thing. In this paper, I delve deeper into this topic by comparing their respective perspectives on whether nonhuman animals are moral. Interestingly, they held exactly opposite views: Zhu Xi believed that certain actions on the part of nonhuman animals manifest moral values, whereas Jeong Yakyong claimed that none of the actions of nonhuman animals has moral value. In comparing their views, I introduce Mark Rowlands’ distinction between ‘moral subjects’ and ‘moral agents.’

Edward Y. J. Chung's A Korean Confucian Way of Life and Thought is great news to the field of Korean philosophy. It has been some twenty years since Chung, one of the few experts on Korean Confucianism in English-speaking academia, published his first monograph on Yi Hwang and Yi Yi in 1995,1 and now we are able to see and savor another fruit of Chung's lifelong scholarship. This time, by providing an English translation of T'oegye's own work, Chung lays a stepping-stone for readers to gain direct access to the scholarly life of T'oegye.Given this purpose, I think Chung's choice of the Chasŏngnok 自省録 is not only critical, because this work has not...

This essay examines the Ru 儒 notion of ming 命, usually translated into English as “fate,” with an emphasis on the thought of two prominent Ru thinkers, Zhu Xi 朱熹 of Song 宋 China and Jeong Yagyong 丁若鏞 of Joseon 朝鮮 Korea. Although they were faithful followers of the tradition of Kongzi 孔子and Mengzi 孟子, they held very different views on ming. Zhu Xi saw the realm of fate as determined by contingent movements of psychophysical force, whereas Jeong Yagyong believed it to be utterly contingent upon the unfathomable deity, Shangdi 上帝. These differences have important consequences for their conceptions of the good human life as well as the development of their respective cultivation programs. In conclusion, I argue that their differences are directly related to their different stances on the goal of Ru study. Zhu Xi, in confrontation with Buddhism, tried to put all people on the road to becoming a sage, while Jeong Yagyong aimed at the actual attainment of sagehood even if only some people could do so.