Youssef Aguisoul

In hinge epistemology, our beliefs ultimately rest on hinges, i.e., what we ordinarily do not call into question, such as “one plus one equals two” and “there is a past.” The standard method of studying hinges consists of analyzing their nature holistically, regardless of context. This method has recently been questioned by Fairhurst (2025a; 2025b). He ascertains that it leads to a stalemate: each holistic theory that says hinges are X and Y soon encounters hinges that are X but not Y; so we are unable to choose a holistic theory. To break the stalemate, he proposes a new method he calls piecemeal hinge epistemology, or “PHE”, where context is reinstated and hinges are analyzed case by case, with due attention to both their qualitative similarities and their differences, and grouped together under a familyresemblance view. I recently argued (2025) that PHE does not succeed in displacing the standard method on the grounds that it ends up doing something similar, namely, favoring a holistic characterization of hinges. In return, Fairhurst (2025b) offered a reply that is meticulous and generous, and which rectified several of my misunderstandings about PHE. Even in light of those corrections, however, I am not persuaded that the difficulty I am raising has been removed, and I hope that what I say on the present occasion may be of some use to Fairhurst. Before turning to his response, I shall briefly restate my argument, what he has, helpfully, called the Threat of Hypocrisy.

In hinge epistemology, our belief system has two levels: a non-fundamental level of ordinary beliefs and a fundamental level of hinges. This creates a problem concerning hinges. If beliefs require justification, then hinges, as the ground of the system, are unjustified and fail to qualify as genuine beliefs. If hinges are justified, they become ordinary beliefs rather than hinges. This is what I shall call the Hinge-Justification Problem (HJP). One common response is the “No-Justification Response”: hinges are unjustified. Some interpret them as “instinctive actions” rather than beliefs; others treat them as beliefs still, but only in a “minimal” sense. I raise challenges to these and sketch a novel response to HJP under what I call the “Justification Response”: hinges are justified. My proposal appeals to a lesser-known metaphor for hinges: “substrata.” Taking this idea seriously, I systematically connect hinge epistemology to D.M. Armstrong’s substratum theory of objects, and propose that ordinary beliefs are constituted by hinges and epistemic properties such as being justified, so that while ordinary beliefs are justified internally, hinges are justified externally.

The problem of destructive change comprises two interrelated questions: (1) is there destructive change? (2) If there is, what underlies it? Classical hylomorphists argue that there is destructive change, understood as the change of primary substances, and that what underlies it is prime matter. Insofar as there is destructive change, I agree with classical hylomorphists. But there are reasons to doubt that prime matter is the underlying substratum, so I disagree with them with respect to (2). Alternatively, I propose a new version of classical hylomorphism, according to which what underlies destructive change, understood as the change of what I term “rigid-kooky” objects, is primary substance. My proposal has at least two perks. Compared to the classical account, it is relatively tolerant because it denies the historically contentious and ambiguous notion of prime matter. It is also economical because, unlike the classical account, which admits two constituency levels—one pertaining to primary substances and one to kooky objects—it admits only one constituency level, pertaining to kooky objects.

Some properties come necessarily clustered. Something, a clustering device, must necessarily keep them clustered. Compresence is one candidate, and it is unclear how to understand it. I discern two aspects of it: compresence as simultaneity and compresence as co-location. Then I clarify certain issues over it, particularly regarding whether or not it is transitive and whether or not it figures in the bundle. Contrary to popular belief, I argue that compresence, under the two-aspectual reading, is transitive and constitutive of the bundle.

The summativists generally analyze group belief in terms of belief of the majority. The non-summativists counterargue that it is possible for a group to believe that p even if “none” of its members believes that p. In doing so, they usually appeal to hypothetical cases in which groups are “structured” groups like committees, research groups, governments, as opposed to “collective” groups like Finns, America, Catholic Church. In this paper, I raise the objection that non-summativist cases involve summativism. While most contemporary objections to non-summativism tend to be rejectionists, i.e., showing that non-summativist cases involve group acceptance rather than group belief, my objection is newfangled in that it grants non-summativist cases group belief but shows that group belief in such cases is majority belief.

Are finally valuable states of affairs intrinsically good (good in themselves) or extrinsically good (good for us)? G.E. Moore argues that finally valuable states of affairs are intrinsically good. I do not believe that this is the case. Against Moore, I argue that finally valuable states of affairs are good for us on the grounds that states of affairs involving human beings have a function, namely, to ‘place’ human beings into certain relations with the spatiotemporal world, and that the good state of affairs is that which places the involved individual into certain relations with the spatiotemporal world in a good way, in a way that is beneficial to the individual. Therefore, finally valuable states of affairs are beneficially good, good for us, rather than good in themselves.