Youssef Mohamed

PurposeThis study is justified by the economic importance of information on greenhouse gases, as well as the interest in the question of governance structure after the adoption of the objectives of the 2030 Agenda. The problem is also explained by the lack of research that has investigated the relationship between the best governance structure that contributes to achieving sustainability goals, including climate actions (SDG13) and clean energy adoption (SDG7) as part of the 2030 Agenda.Design/methodology/approachThe level of disclosure is measured on the basis of the carbon disclosure score calculated by the carbon disclosure project (CDP). The study sample consists of 387 US companies that voluntarily participated in the CDP survey from 2011 to 2018. The authors use panel data analysis based on multiple regression models.FindingsThe results confirm the influential role of board size, director independence, the presence of women on the board and the presence of an environmental committee on carbon disclosure. In terms of carbon disclosure, the results suggest that a better governance structure is likely to reduce carbon emissions and improve carbon performance practices. Similarly, the analyses show a different representation of the role of corporate governance in high-carbon sectors compared to low-carbon sectors.Research limitations/implicationsThis study has some limitations. First, the sample is only interested in US companies that responded to the CDP questionnaire during the period 2011–2018. Thus, the results cannot be generalized to countries with different governance structures. Second, the data from this study on carbon disclosure, specifically focuses on CDP reporting to determine the carbon disclosure score. In this sense, the findings on information disclosed do not necessarily address disclosures through other media, such as a company’s website or a press release.Originality/valueSustainability and commitment to the sustainable development goals (SDGs) are more likely to exist in companies that have good governance and, in particular, a better board. The research is inspired by the SDGs. The study aims to examine the relationship between carbon disclosure and corporate governance in the context of SDGs. Indeed, this research work contributes to achieving sustainability goals, including climate actions (SDG13) and clean energy adoption (SDG7).

Background Requirements for organ donation after cardiac or imminent death have been introduced to address the transplantable organs shortage in the United States. Organ procurement organizations increasingly use the Internet for organ donation consent. Methods An analysis of OPO Web sites available to the public for enrollment and consent for organ donation. The Web sites and consent forms were examined for the minimal information recommended by the United States Department of Health and Human Services for informed consent. Content scores were calculated as percentages of data elements in four information categories: donor knowledge, donor consent reinforcement, donation promotion, and informed consent. Results There were 60 Web sites for organ donation enrollment serving the 52 states. The median percent content scores of the Web sites for donor knowledge, donor consent reinforcement, and donation promotion were 33%, 79%, and 75%, respectively. The informed consent score was 0%. The content scores for donor knowledge and informed consent were significantly lower than donor consent reinforcement and donation promotion for all Web sites ( P Conclusion The Web sites and consent forms for public enrollment in organ donation do not fulfill the necessary requirements for informed consent. The Web sites predominantly provide positive reinforcement and promotional information rather than the transparent disclosure of organ donation process. Independent regulatory oversight is essential to ensure that Internet enrollment for organ donation complies with legal and ethical standards for informed consent.

BackgroundBioethics and law distinguish between the practices of "physician-assisted death" and "allowing the patient to die."DiscussionAdvances in biotechnology have allowed medical devices to be used as destination therapy that are designed for the permanent support of cardiac function and/or respiration after irreversible loss of these spontaneous vital functions. For permanent support of cardiac function, single ventricle or biventricular mechanical assist devices and total artificial hearts are implanted in the body. Mechanical ventilators extrinsic to the body are used for permanent support of respiration. Clinical studies have shown that destination therapy with ventricular assist devices improves patient survival compared to medical management, but at the cost of a substantial alteration in end-of-life trajectories. The moral and legal assessment of the appropriateness and permissibility of complying with a patient's request to electively discontinue destination therapy in a life-terminating act in non-futile situations has generated controversy. Some argue that complying with this request is ethically justified because patients have the right to request withdrawal of unwanted treatment and be allowed to die of preexisting disease. Other commentators reject the argument that acceding to an elective request for death by discontinuing destination therapy is 'allowing a patient to die' because of serious flaws in interpreting the intention, causation, and moral responsibility of the ensuing death.SummaryDestination therapy with cardiac and/or ventilatory medical devices replaces native physiological functions and successfully treats a preexisting disease. We posit that discontinuing cardiac and/or ventilatory support at the request of a patient or surrogate can be viewed as allowing the patient to die if--and only if--concurrent lethal pathophysiological conditions are present that are unrelated to those functions already supported by medical devices in destination therapy. In all other cases, compliance with a patient's request constitutes physician-assisted death because of the pathophysiology induced by the turning off of these medical devices, as well as the intention, causation, and moral responsibility of the ensuing death. The distinction between allowing the patient to die and physician-assisted death is pivotal to the moral and legal status of elective requests for death by discontinuing destination cardiac and/or ventilatory medical devices in patients who are not imminently dying. This distinction also represents essential information that must be disclosed to patients and surrogates in advance of consent to this type of therapy