Yu Yang

Conceptual improvements are a significant dimension through which local moral progress occurs, both at the individual and societal levels. Michele Moody-Adams (1999) offers a narrow view of moral progress, suggesting that only a deepened understanding of complex, existing moral concepts can constitute moral progress. Consequently, she views the role of moral philosophy as limited to constructing deeper accounts of these concepts. We broaden Moody-Adams’s (1999) account by identifying three distinct types of conceptual improvements that can constitute moral progress: deepening the understanding of existing concepts, creating new concepts, and enhancing the ability to apply concepts. We support this typology with historical examples where such improvements constituted moral progress. Based on this typology, we argue that the role of moral philosophy extends beyond developing and refining moral theories to include the active creation of new concepts and the facilitation of conceptual application.

Scholars have recently debated whether deep brain stimulation (DBS) threatens personal identity. Françoise Baylis advances a relational identity-constitution framework, asserting that the purported threat of DBS to personal identity becomes problematic when identity is viewed through dynamic, narrative, and relational lenses. This paper offers a more nuanced perspective. While we acknowledge the significance of Baylis’s relational identity-constituting framework, we contend that her conclusion warrants further examination. Our analysis reveals that DBS can indeed pose significant challenges to personal identity, specifically by compromising the narrative subject’s capacity to construct their relational identity. From the perspective of the relational identity-constituting approach, we demonstrate that the fundamental issue lies in the disruption of the equilibrium between self-perception and social recognition. Specifically, DBS can disrupt the balance between self-ascription and ascription by others. To address potential identity disruptions caused by DBS, we proposed that identity restoration should focus on two key aspects: enhancing patients’ capacity to construct and internalize coherent life narratives, and strengthening their capacity to engage in meaningful dialogue with others to foster mutual understanding and recognition.