Yudai Suzuki

This paper aims to put forward an alternative to the standard theory of action (STA), which I call “the teleological theory of action (TTA)”. I also examine the main argument for STA and maintain that there is a possibility to deny two premises of the argument. Each denial is called the disjunctivism of bodily movement and the disjunctivism of intention. TTA implies that an intention in action is (part of) a bodily movement, and this in turn implies the two disjunctivisms. TTA is supported by the causal dispositionalism which takes dispositions as basic and understands causation in terms of them.

This paper applies the perspectival framework developed in the previous installments of this series to the philosophy of mind. It first introduces four central debates concerning phenomenality, intentionality, and the relation between them, and argues that these debates can be understood in terms of the opposition between perspectivalism and non-perspectivalism. Based on positions taken within these four debates, the paper then arranges five major views along a single spectrum according to the degree to which they adopt a perspectival approach. From the most perspectival to the most non-perspectival, these are: naïve dualism, idealism, independent dualism, intentionalist materialism, and independent materialism. By situating major theories of mind within this framework, the paper proposes perspectival coherence as a new dimension for evaluating theories in the philosophy of mind.

This paper develops a perspectival approach to knowledge and perception. It argues that two central debates in epistemology—internalism vs. externalism and disjunctivism vs. the common-factor theory—can be understood as opposing forms of perspectivalism and non-perspectivalism. On this basis, the paper situates three major epistemological positions—direct (naïve) realism, idealism, and indirect realism—within a spectrum between perspectival and non-perspectival approaches, showing how they arise from different combinations of these two axes. This framework aims to clarify the structure of contemporary epistemological debates and to illuminate the role of perspective in cognition.

This paper develops a perspectival approach to space, time, and possible worlds, treating them as systems of positions in which entities, events, or states of affairs are located and related. It argues that two central questions—whether positions exist independently of their occupants and whether there is a privileged center—underlie major debates such as relationalism versus substantivalism, presentism versus eternalism, and actualism versus possibilism. By examining these debates within a unified framework, the paper clarifies both their similarities and differences, and highlights an important asymmetry: the question of a privileged center arises in time and possible worlds but not in space.

This paper develops a perspectival approach to the philosophy of space and time. It argues that major debates—such as the A-theory versus B-theory of time and relationalism versus substantivalism about space and time—can be understood in terms of a contrast between perspectival and non-perspectival standpoints. On this interpretation, the A-theory and relationalism emphasize perspective-dependent features, whereas the B-theory and substantivalism appeal to structures that are independent of any particular standpoint. The paper further distinguishes different forms of perspectival commitment and shows that these positions involve importantly different ways of rejecting non-perspectival descriptions. By clarifying these distinctions, the paper proposes a unified framework for understanding debates about space and time and illustrates the broader philosophical significance of perspectival analysis.