Yusuf Daşdemir

This article discusses the application of the Avicennan theory of demonstrative science on taṣawwuf, or the Divine Science (al-ʿilm al-ilāhī), by members of the Akbarian tradition, particularly Ibn ʿArabī’s (d. 1240) stepson and most influential disciple, Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī (d. 1274), and his commentators, among whom the most prominent was Mullā Muḥammad b. Ḥamza al-Fanārī (d. 1431). It aims to find out what kind of relationship was developed between Avicennan logic and Sufism by the two members of the Akbarian school in the post-classical Islamic thought. It also seeks to show that the convergence between different currents of Islamic thought—Sufism and philosophy in this case—led to some adaptation problems and internal inconsistencies for these currents.

This paper undertakes an in-depth examination of the intriguing argument for the existential import of negative propositions by the fifteenth-century Ottoman scholar Hatibzâde Mehmed (d. 1496) and the counterarguments by his disciple, Taşköprizâde Kâsım (d. 1513). It argues that this discussion is a significant example of Ottoman scholars engaging in long-standing disputes concerning the nature and ontological ground of negative propositions, which date back to Plato and Aristotle. It is also intended to underline the need for considering not only logic texts but also works primarily associated with other disciplines in order to attain a comprehensive picture of logical discussions in the post-classical period of Islamic thought.

This paper explores a neglected category of propositions in Arabic logic, propositions with negative predicates (sālibat al-maḥmūl), by addressing two pivotal questions concerning this propositional form: first, whether it is possible to defend it as distinct from metathetic and simple negative propositions and second, whether affirmative instances of these propositions have existential import. The paper argues for the existence of two distinct and conflicting theories of existential import frequently implicit in the views of Arabic logicians: one centered on the copula and the other on the predicate.

This paper undertakes an in-depth examination of the intriguing argument for the existential import of negative propositions by the fifteenth-century Ottoman scholar Hatibzâde Mehmed (d. 1496) and the counterarguments by his disciple, Taşköprizâde Kâsım (d. 1513). It argues that this discussion is a significant example of Ottoman scholars engaging in long-standing disputes concerning the nature and ontological ground of negative propositions, which date back to Plato and Aristotle. It is also intended to underline the need for considering not only logic texts but also works primarily associated with other disciplines in order to attain a comprehensive picture of logical discussions in the post-classical period of Islamic thought.

RésuméCet article traite d’une solution au tristement célèbre paradoxe du menteur, généralement connu dans la littérature arabe sous le nom de Maġlaṭat al-ǧaḏr al-aṣamm. La solution est donnée dans un traité ottoman du XVe siècle attribué, entre autres, à Ḫaṭībzāde Muḥyiddīn Efendī. L’article la compare également à la solution du philosophe persan contemporain, Ǧalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī. Le court traité consacré au paradoxe est l’un des rares ouvrages des Ottomans sur le sujet et il aborde de manière exhaustive le paradoxe sous ses deux formes. En tant qu’analyse de la solution offerte par le traité au paradoxe, l’article fait connaître à l’érudition contemporaine les discussions ottomanes sur le menteur, et il contribue à combler le vide évident dans la littérature sur le paradoxe dans la pensée islamique.

Nazariyat, Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences, issued twice a year in English and Turkish (Nazariyat İslam Felsefe ve Bilim Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi), is a refereed international journal. It publishes original studies, critical editions of classical texts and book reviews on Islamic philosophy, kalām, theoretical aspects of Sufism and the history of sciences. The goal of Nazariyat is to contribute to the discovery, examination and reinterpretation of the theoretical traditions in the history of Islamic thought, by giving special attention to the post-classical period of it. **ISSN: 2148-8088 E-ISBN: 2547-9415**

This study deals with the sceptical arguments by one of the most important figures in the philosophical Sufi tradition (the Akbarian school) and the foremost disciple of Ibn ʿArabī, Ṣadr al‐Dīn al‐Qūnawī. Though not a sceptic in the strict sense, Qūnawī employs sceptical arguments from relativity of rational knowledge and disagreement among philosophers to prove inefficacy of reason and rational procedures of knowledge in terms of achieving certain knowledge of metaphysical matters, namely of God and the ultimate principles of things. The paper questions Qūnawī's implicit assumption that, if there is disagreement on a proposition p, then p is relative and thus cannot provide certain knowledge. It aims to philosophically analyse and assess his scepticism as well as to shed light on the largely unknown terrain of scepticism in the mediaeval Islamic world.