Yutang Jin

This essay focuses on Elena Ziliotti’s ‘agent-centered approach’ in her discussion of political leadership. In her view, ‘political leaders are a critical political agency.’ I advance three criticisms: one conceptual and two normative. First, it’s conceptually unclear whether her approach is ‘agent-centered.’ Second, a political leader may need to contravene instrumental virtues to uphold the virtue of public spiritedness. Third, it’s unrealistic to expect politicians to prioritize virtues when they conflict with the goal of gaining power and making a living from it.

Recently, Sungmoon Kim developed a theory of what he calls “Confucian democratic perfectionism” aimed at combining Confucianism, public reason, and democracy for contemporary East Asian societies. The primary question guiding this article is whether Kim's promotion of Confucian values is justified by a normative commitment to democratic constitution‐making. I see two specific difficulties with Kim's democratic constitution‐making, with the second more serious than the first. First, in terms of theoretical identity, the Confucian values promoted through a public reason‐based approach are not intelligible as Confucian. Second, Kim's democratic commitment is morally inadequate in two ways—it cannot make sense of substate peoples' right of self‐determination within a singular notion of Confucian democracy, and further, a fallback on the right to democratic participation conflicts with more inclusive standards of popular sovereignty.

In the spring of 2017, US-based Confucian philosopher Stephen C. Angle took part in a series of dialogues with Chinese Confucians in Beijing. The dialogues engage with topics like the relation between Confucianism and modernity; whether Confucianism should be understood as philosophy, religion, or chief ingredient in a distinctively Chinese culture; the status of pivotal modern Confucians like Kang Youwei and Mou Zongsan; and more generally, the prospects for what Angle calls “Progressive Confucianism.” The present book offers translations of those dialogues into English, together with epilogues by the two editors reflecting on what the dialogues tell us about the contemporary prospects for Confucianism.

Han Fei was a central figure in Chinese Legalism, which was a leading school of thought in the Warring States period of China, and which left a huge imprint on political culture in imperial China. This article examines the complex duality of public and private interests in Han Fei’s political thought, a crucial aspect of his thinking. I argue that Han Fei adopted a sophisticated statist approach to understanding public and private interests. For Han Fei, public interests are embodied in the state while private ones have dual functions. On the one hand, private interests threaten public ones by inviting corrupt material interests, personal morality, and knowledge, as well as human relationships. On the other hand, self-centered human psychology plays a dialectic role in strengthening the state.

This essay examines prominent New Confucian Mou Zongsan’s account of Confucian democracy by focusing on his key notion of “self-restriction.” According to Mou, true sage-kings would willingly respect ordinary people’s individual endeavors in the political realm and endorse democracy as a form of government. This move of self-restriction then aligns Confucianism with democracy in a way that fundamentally restructures traditional Confucian rulership. I make contributions on two fronts. First, I offer a reading of Mou’s self-restriction different from existing ones that can help to disambiguate many aspects of Mou’s political thought. Second, what is often left out of existing discussion on Mou is the narrative of political myth and distinctive personality types associated with it. For Mou, political leadership’s impetus for transcending rule-based order and the people’s aspirations for the “superman” run deep and lie in the lasting appeal of political myth. Invoking Nietzsche, I discuss the sense in which transforming traditional rulership is not only a question of ought—why Confucians ought to adopt self-restriction—but a question of how it is possible for self-restriction to fulfill its mission. Commentators on his thought have so far largely glossed over this second aspect of Mou’s thought, thereby selling short the complexity of the idea of self-restriction. My key argument is that Mou’s self-restriction shows an effort to revamp the superman’s politics of the extraordinary into a politics of the ordinary.

The established view in Confucian scholarship today is that Confucian political order serves to promote the material and moral well-being of ordinary people. Loubna El Amine turns this view on its head by arguing that Confucian political order revolves not around the interest of the people but the demands of security, stability, and prosperity. Min are expected to be virtuous only to the extent that they help to sustain such an order. As such, Confucian politics does not follow from ethics in any straightforward manner. In this article, I argue against her revisionist reading. I argue that her account not only lacks arguments for her core thesis of the ethics/politics division, but also goes against Confucians’ concern over the universality of humanity, popular welfare, and the integrity of Confucian thought. I also draw on discussion on political realism to flesh out the sense in which classic Confucianism is realist.

Tongdong Bai’s ambitious book, Against Political Equality: The Confucian Case, aims to not only draw on classic Confucianism to shed light on contemporary issues but also make Confucianism universally applicable to the human conditions widely shared around the globe. Bai’s Confucian political theory carries distinctive merits in both its innovative approach and comprehensive scope, but there are still ambiguities of which he owes us more explanation. In this review article, I offer a brief summary of Bai’s book and critically engage with three aspects of his account: (1) the acceptability of the Confucian hybrid regime, (2) its relationship with Confucian compassion, and (3) hierarchical international order. First, Bai’s pursuit of service to the people as an end result makes it difficult to apply to societies that champion political equality and participation. Second, neither the supremacy of the Confucian value of compassion nor the hybrid regime’s ability to carry it through is self-evidently clear. Third, the Confucian idea of unity among all-under-heaven undermines Bai’s advocacy of patriotic allegiance to a particular state and hierarchical inter-state order where the multiplicity of states, albeit unequal, is preserved.

For many contemporary Confucians today, an urgent task is to reflect on the challenges of modernity and look for what Mou Zongsan calls a "New Outer Kinghood."1 In the political realm, this task implies identifying ways in which Confucianism can meet the challenges of, and potentially reconcile itself with, liberal and democratic values. One of the most contested terrains that emerged out of the recent debate is the relationship between Confucianism and democracy. Theorists not only differ in their understandings of the specific weight and scope of Confucianism in the political framework, but also contest the status of democracy as seemingly the "only game in town."2 Quite recently, Joseph Chan offered systematic...

What kind of polity is justified by classic Confucian values? Adopting an interpretive approach, this paper explores the idea of leadership democracy being expressive of classic Confucian values by first introducing the models of leadership democracy associated with Weber and Schumpeter and second connecting Confucian elitist values to them. I argue that leadership democracy best realizes the Confucian emphasis on the people as the source of legitimacy and the ruler as the engine of good governance. The Confucian idea of people-rootedness is borne out by citizens behaving as democratic plebeians who are empowered to choose their leader but devoid of moral and intellectual capabilities for collective decision-making. The Confucian idea of rulership is expressed by democratic leaders displaying competent statesmanship and compensating for intra-elite tensions within the Confucian tradition.

Recent debates on Confucian meritocracy largely center around outright normative critiques rather than its textual basis. The unflattering upshot is the lack of attention to a mode of critique that scrutinizes Confucian meritocracy by questioning the way meritocrats invoke Confucian concepts and values. Focusing on three meritocrats—Bai Tongdong 白彤東, Daniel A. Bell, and Kang Xiaoguang 康曉光, this article ventures a text-based normative approach by examining continuities and ruptures between core meritocratic arguments they make, and the messages conveyed by Confucian masters. The core argument that I advance is that the meritocratic thesis about the political division of labor does not mesh with the classic Confucian understandings of voluntariness and political authority, which generates uneasy normative consequences for Confucian meritocracy. Ultimately, classic Confucianism does not provide a conceptually secure platform for the meritocratic part of Confucian meritocracy as its ardent advocates claim.