•  52
    What Is Wrong With Agnostic Belief?
    In Agnosticism: Explorations in Philosophy and Religious Thought, . 2020.
  • Justification as a loaded notion
    Synthese 198 (5): 4897-4916. 2019.
    The problem of skepticism is often understood as a paradox: a valid argument with plausible premises whose conclusion is that we lack justification for perceptual beliefs. Typically, this conclusion is deemed unacceptable, so a theory is offered that posits conditions for justification on which some premise is false. The theory defended here is more general, and explains why the paradox arises in the first place. Like Strawson’s “ordinary language” approach to induction, the theory posits someth…Read more
  •  150
    Justification As A Loaded Notion
    Synthese 1 1-20. forthcoming.
    The problem of skepticism is often understood as a paradox: a valid argument with plausible premises whose conclusion is that we lack justification for perceptual beliefs. Typically, this conclusion is deemed unacceptable, so a theory is offered that posits conditions for justification on which some premise is false. The theory defended here is more general, and explains why the paradox arises in the first place. Like Strawson’s (Introduction to logical theory, Wiley, New York, 1952) “ordinary …Read more
  •  28
    Unicorn agnosticism
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (8): 818-829. 2021.
    ABSTRACT Atheists and agnostics have a vexed relationship. Atheists often regard agnostics as timid, or perhaps as disguised apologists. Agnostics often regard atheists as dogmatic hypocrites: they proclaim something on insufficient evidence, while accusing theists of this. This dynamic is familiar from the academic and popular literature. Here, I consider a more radical conflict between the two, based on Kripkean semantics for empty terms applied to atheism. Sorensen : 373–388) christened the K…Read more
  •  22
    The Nature and Limits of Skeptical Criticism
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (3): 183-205. 2019.
    Is there something wrong with the way we form beliefs about our surroundings? Most people assume not. But there is a character, the skeptic, who disagrees. What, exactly, is this skeptic claiming, and why should this concern us? We are, after all, just humans doing what humans do: forming beliefs on the basis of our faculties. In what sense could this be wrong, and how could it matter if it is? By considering the way in which the notions of vice and criticism can express these questions, we can …Read more
  •  24
    Annalisa Coliva, Danièle Moyal‐Sharrock : Hinge Epistemology . vi + 278, price €70.00 pb (review)
    Philosophical Investigations 41 (3): 366-370. 2018.
  •  30
    On What Does Rationality Hinge?
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (4): 246-257. 2017.
    _ Source: _Volume 7, Issue 4, pp 246 - 257 The two main components of Coliva’s view are Moderatism and Extended Rationality. According to Moderatism, a belief about specific material objects is perceptually justified iff, absent defeaters, one has the appropriate course of experience and it is assumed that there is an external world. I grant Moderatism and instead focus on Extended Rationality, according to which it is epistemically rational to believe evidentially warranted propositions and to …Read more
  •  137
    Mere faith and entitlement
    Synthese 189 (2): 297-315. 2012.
    The scandal to philosophy and human reason, wrote Kant, is that we must take the existence of material objects on mere faith . In contrast, the skeptical paradox that has scandalized recent philosophy is not formulated in terms of faith, but rather in terms of justification, warrant, and entitlement. I argue that most contemporary approaches to the paradox (both dogmatist/liberal and default/conservative) do not address the traditional problem that scandalized Kant, and that the status of having…Read more
  •  86
    Closure Reconsidered
    Philosophers' Imprint 12. 2012.
    Most solutions to the skeptical paradox about justified belief assume closure for justification, since the rejection of closure is widely regarded as a non-starter. I argue that the rejection of closure is not a non-starter, and that its problems are no greater than the problems associated with the more standard anti-skeptical strategies. I do this by sketching a simple version of the unpopular strategy and rebutting the three best objections to it. The general upshot for theories of justificati…Read more
  •  78
    How irrelevant influences bias belief
    with Dion Scott-Kakures
    Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1): 7-39. 2015.
  •  68
    On an Irrelevant Regress
    Theoria 82 (1): 81-88. 2016.
    In a recent article, Wilson argues that Cartesian Scepticism leads to a vicious regress that can only be stopped by rejecting Cartesian Scepticism. If she is right, Wilson has solved one of philosophy's enduring problems. However, her regress is irrelevant to Cartesian Scepticism. This is evident once the proposition that we should have doubts, the person who has doubts, and the person who thinks that we should have doubts are carefully distinguished
  •  103
    No Closure On Skepticism
    with Anthony Brueckner and Christopher Buford
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4): 439-447. 2011.
    This article is a response to an important objection that Sherrilyn Roush has made to the standard closure-based argument for skepticism, an argument that has been studied over the past couple of decades. If Roush's objection is on the mark, then this would be a quite significant finding. We argue that her objection fails
  •  253
    Hawthorne on the Deeply Contingent A Priori1
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1): 174-183. 2011.
  •  157
    An old problem for the new rationalism
    Synthese 183 (2): 175-185. 2011.
    A well known skeptical paradox rests on the claim that we lack warrant to believe that we are not brains in a vat. The argument for that claim is the apparent impossibility of any evidence or argument that we are not BIVs. Many contemporary philosophers resist this argument by insisting that we have a sort of warrant for believing that we are not BIVs that does not require having any evidence or argument. I call this view ‘New Rationalism’. I argue that New Rationalists are committed to there be…Read more
  •  133
    In Defense of Secular Belief
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 4. 2012.
  •  102
    Excuses for Hume's Skepticism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2): 264-306. 2016.