Yves Vende

This chapter focuses on the concepts of vulnerability and nature in Confucian and Taoist classics, addressing their contemporary relevance within the European context. It argues that traditional Western approaches to vulnerability and nature differ substantially from Chinese perspectives, which necessitates a hermeneutic strategy of "détour," as suggested by François Jullien. In Confucian thought, vulnerability manifests through emotions and relationships, managed through self-cultivation and cultural mediation. Confucius emphasizes naming and channeling emotional vulnerability via classical literature and ritual practice, aiming for moral and political self-improvement rather than mastery over nature. Conversely, Taoist texts, particularly the Daodejing, advocate "wuwei" (non-action), a principle aligning with spontaneous natural processes (ziran), suggesting humans should harmonize with nature's inherent dynamics rather than assert control. The paper underscores conceptual tensions and dialogues between these traditions, especially regarding the political implications of human and natural world's vulnerability. Through textual analysis, it traces the evolution of ideas about nature and vulnerability from early classical texts into systematic philosophical positions, notably through Mencius, who further integrates these themes in response to political and social challenges. Ultimately, the paper suggests that Confucian and Taoist frameworks offer significant philosophical resources for reconsidering modern European perspectives on nature and vulnerability, challenging dominant Western narratives about human exceptionalism and ecological governance. It invites contemporary reflection on intercultural dialogue's potential to enrich understanding and address environmental and ethical challenges.

This article explores the intersection of phenomenology and Chinese philosophy through the lens of intercultural dialogue and considers the inherent risks of violence in cross-cultural encounters. It first presents Bernhard Waldenfels’ phenomenological analysis of how encounters with the Other can lead to violence when boundaries are violated and otherness is pigeonholed into familiar categories. The second part traces historical examples of Chinese-Western philosophical exchange, from 17th-century Jesuit translations of Confucian classics to late 19th-century translations of Western works by Chinese scholars. These cases illustrate both the creative potential and violent risks of intercultural translation and interpretation. The final section shows how Mencius and Zhuangzi address violence differently: the former invites practising empathy and setting proper boundaries to prevent harm, while the latter criticises the violence inherent in categorisation and advocates preserving individual uniqueness. The article concludes by examining Iso Kern's phenomenological approach to Chinese philosophy, which offers a methodological alternative to static comparative philosophy.

This article explores the possibility and relevance of engaging Thomas Aquinas’s moral reflection in the Summa Theologica through a transcultural dialogue with Confucian thought to face contemporary crisis. It opens by examining the ongoing debate on whether Confucianism is best understood as a Virtue Ethics or a Role Ethics. Then it turns to Huang Yong’s work, which draws parallels between Aristotle, Aquinas, and Zhu Xi. Huang defends an interpretation of Confucianism as a form of Virtue Ethics, rooted in human nature and moral cultivation, and argues that Zhu Xi offers a model closer to the “ideal type” of Virtue Ethics than Aristotle. The interest of Zhu Xi’s reflection is indeed to put relational abilities and dispositions at the foundation of moral reflection. This is also what Li Yong establishes, although relying on Mencius and Aquinas. Interestingly, all the thinkers mentioned share a fundamental trust in the phenomena of tradition. The commentarial practices of Neo-Confucianism and Scholasticism embody a hermeneutical ethics that enables intergenerational transmission and innovation in moral reflection. This can also be observed in Aquinas’s definition of virtue, examining both its transcultural and teleological foundations. In this sense, transcultural VirtueEthics, built on the bridging of Scholasticism and Confucianism, as exemplified by several commentators, advocates for the pursuit of moral knowledge that integrates rational, emotional, and spiritual dimensions across philosophical traditions.

This article explores the possibility and relevance of engaging Thomas Aquinas’s moral reflection in the Summa Theologica through a transcultural dialogue with Confucian thought to face contemporary crisis. It opens by examining the ongoing debate on whether Confucianism is best understood as a Virtue Ethics or a Role Ethics. Then it turns to Huang Yong’s work, which draws parallels between Aristotle, Aquinas, and Zhu Xi. Huang defends an interpretation of Confucianism as a form of Virtue Ethics, rooted in human nature and moral cultivation, and argues that Zhu Xi offers a model closer to the “ideal type” of Virtue Ethics than Aristotle. The interest of Zhu Xi’s reflection is indeed to put relational abilities and dispositions at the foundation of moral reflection. This is also what Li Yong establishes, although relying on Mencius and Aquinas. Interestingly, all the thinkers mentioned share a fundamental trust in the phenomena of tradition. The commentarial practices of Neo-Confucianism and Scholasticism embody a hermeneutical ethics that enables intergenerational transmission and innovation in moral reflection. This can also be observed in Aquinas’s definition of virtue, examining both its transcultural and teleological foundations. In this sense, transcultural VirtueEthics, built on the bridging of Scholasticism and Confucianism, as exemplified by several commentators, advocates for the pursuit of moral knowledge that integrates rational, emotional, and spiritual dimensions across philosophical traditions.

Le présent ouvrage vise à faire dialoguer des contributions sur ce que Michel Foucault a désigné des techniques de soi dans L’Herméneutique du Sujet, terme qui depuis vise un ensemble de pratiques où une transformation “spirituelle” du sujet est en œuvre. Ces dernières années aux USA et en Chine (voir mon article dans International Studies on Confucianism), plusieurs auteurs soulignent l’importance d’envisager la philosophie non seulement comme une recherche de vérité, mais aussi comme un travail sur soi-même et ses dispositions intérieures. Ce processus peut être vécu au travers d’exercices respiratoires, de la lecture de textes dits classiques (précisément parce qu’ils permettent le processus) et la méditation. Cette perspective résonne avec “le travail sur soi” (self-cultivation) tel qu’abordé par les traditions orientales notamment le Bouddhisme, l’Hindouisme et le Confucianisme. Cependant, peu d’ouvrages en langues occidentales abordent cette question en revisitant la tradition biblique et chrétienne qui pourtant ne manque pas de réflexions et d’outils sur cette question. Les présentes contributions peuvent dont être regroupées en trois pôles, l’un se centre sur les notions de souffle, de méditation et lecture de textes dans la tradition biblique et dans la tradition chrétienne, le deuxième sur les pratiques analogues dans les traditions indiennes et chinoises. Le troisième groupe de textes regroupe des exemples de croisement entre traditions depuis le XVIIe siècle.

This paper examines the multifaceted concept of friendship in Chinese Confucian thought through three interconnected dimensions. First, I analyze how the Analects presents friendship through both moral and political lenses: as a means of self-cultivation and as an instrument of political reform. For Confucius, friendship serves as essential mediation in the work of self-transformation, fundamentally connected to the cultivation of ren (仁, humanity or benevolence). Second, I explore how the Mencius develops this Confucian framework in two significant directions. Hermeneutically, it establishes criteria for engaging with classical texts as a form of befriending wisdom itself. Cosmologically, it emphasizes the fundamental interconnectedness of all living beings, expanding the scope of relational ethics beyond human friendship. Third, I examine how Jesuit missionaries appropriated Confucian friendship discourse from the Analects and Mencius during a period when Confucian scholars were themselves deeply engaged in conversations about friendship. This cross-cultural encounter illuminates a distinctive feature of Confucian friendship—whether with fellow scholars or with classical texts: it is fundamentally oriented toward transformation, wherein the disciplined effort of study cultivates greater loyalty, sincerity, and empathy in the reader-disciple.

Behind the provocation of its title, this article investigates a difficulty that always emerges when two traditions come into contact with each other. When philosophers read foreign texts, they always risk interpreting those texts according to their categories. Here lies a problem: how to imagine a communication process with another tradition that does not imply forcing the thinking of the other into one’s concepts? According to the article’s author, Levinas’ perspective can help in this problem as for him, to communicate with the other means to be responsible for him. There is no dialogue without responsibility for the other and the process of communication. Consequently, acknowledging and valorizing the unicity and alterity of each tradition constitutes a condition of the possibility of exploring some resonances between Levinas’ thought in Totalité et Infini and the Chinese tradition.

This chapter discusses the Confucian concern for transmitting cultural objects, practices, and attitudes as a link between past and present. Confucian thought idealized a golden past, where practices (Confucius), Classics (Mencius), and rituals (Xunzi) established by the Sages-King held specific lessons for the present. Whether for Classical Confucianism or Neo-Confucianism (Zhu Xi), cultural mediations inherited from the past are integrated into self-cultivation: the attempt to become a superior person (Junzi君子), someone able to be in charge of public government because of a moral and intellectual lineage.

One of the recurrent questions asked of Mencius by rulers who come to visit him, is how to gain the authority over all under Heaven (tianxia, 天下) and to unify the entire China under one sovereign power? How can a small kingdom rule over all under Heaven? According to Mencius, this question relates not to the size of a territory but to the behavior of its ruler. If the ruler behaves like an authentic King and runs a benevolent government then all under Heaven will be willing to follow his leadership. Repartitioning available land and formulating rules for its use affords each individual the opportunity to satisfy his/her needs, while making the world more humane. In Plato’s Laws, the protagonists discuss a similar question, which is how to deal with issues relating to good governance. The goal is not to unify all of Greece but to create a colony in Crete, so as to make it an exemplary city. For that purpose, the city must not be too close to the sea (because ports bring business and business attracts all kinds of morally depraved people). Territorial repartition should be carried out according to the size of the population in order to avoid conflicts among citizens. Therefore, an important aspect of this organization of space is agriculture. In both Mencius and Plato’s Laws, to divide land properly and to be strict on boundary issues is part of “good” government, whether the final objective is to unify China or to establish an exemplary city. For both classics, space is humane when it is politically organized, and this first requires a well-divided space.

This article explores the specific role of courage in the context of the Anthropocene’s moment; it first examines Aristotle’s conception of virtues, focusing on courage, before comparing it to Confucian thought and analyzing the historical dialogue between Western and Chinese traditions on ethics through the works of François Noël (1651–1729). Aristotle views moral cultivation as a social process wherein habits shape inner dispositions; in his view, courage is linked to other virtues, such as temperance and justice. For Aristotle, courage implies the appropriate balance between extremes and must be directed toward a worthy end, such as promoting positive change within a community. This Aristotelian perspective was later incorporated into a biblical framework by Aquinas and Suarez, emphasizing dichotomies between body and soul, as well as between humans and other living beings. These dichotomies must be challenged in the face of the Anthropocene’s emergencies. The second part of this contribution proceeds to a detour examining Confucian ethics, which rests on a different anthropology, emphasizing continuities rather than discontinuities. Like Aristotelian thought, Confucian thought also underscores moral education within a community; it prioritizes humanity, embodied through empathy and loyalty. In the Analects, courage is balanced by a sense of rituals and righteousness. Mencius further distinguishes several types of courage, stressing self-cultivation and the ruler’s responsibility to make empathetic, appropriate decisions for the community’s sake. From this perspective, courage is understood as the continuous perseverance in self-cultivation, coupled with a firm intention oriented toward the good of the community. Zhu Xi’s comments on Zilu’s courage in the Analects extend this Confucian tradition. Finally, this article highlights how a dialogue between Aristotelian and Confucian ethics began four centuries ago, particularly through Noël’s Philosophia Sinica, which combined these traditions. This inter-religious approach to ethics, enriched by figures such as Aquinas, Suarez, Zhu Xi, and neo-Confucian thinkers, requires re-evaluation because the understanding of personal ethics and nature has evolved. The modern naturalistic approach, with its emphasis on dichotomies, has contributed to a mechanistic view of nature, fostering its exploitation, and a devaluation of the body. This contrast highlights the urgent need for renewed dialogue between Western and Chinese ethical traditions to address contemporary challenges, with François Noël serving as a historical witness of these exchanges.

In 1711, François Noël s.j. (1651-1729) published in Pragua two books related to Chinese philosophy, the Philosophia Sinica — a systematic presentation of Confucianism according to an Aristotelian framework divided into three treatises — and the Sinensis Imperii libri classici sex — a translation of the six Confucian Classics. In these two books, François Noël, who spent more than fifteen years in China, exemplifies how a European missionary has been transformed by reading Confucian Classics and their commentaries. Although his writings were caught up in the Rites controversy, German philosophers like Christian Wolff were in contact with them. They used them in a debate where the autonomy of rationality in the field of ethics was at stake. Even if Noël’s assumptions and hermeneutical methods are no longer academically valid, his testimony shows that engaging with Confucian classics can change one’s framework, especially practically. Noël’s works are also an invitation to reconsider the modern split between systematic philosophy and philosophy as a practice, an opinion already formulated in the works of Pierre Hadot. In that sense, Noël’s attempt to bridge Aristotle with Confucius is a witness of a larger movement of interweaving symbolic tools belonging to different traditions to answer human existence issues.

La spiritualité est aujourd’hui devenue une quête intégrée de sens. Cette perspective écarte parfois les ressources occidentales traditionnelles au nom du primat qu’elles donnent à l’intellect. Cependant, la mise en résonance des Classiques confucéens et des Écritures chrétiennes, par l’intermédiaire de la notion d’expérience transformatrice contenue dans la philosophie grecque, montre que la lecture d’un canon de textes peut être le lieu d’une transformation spirituelle. C’est ce qu’illustrent des personnages paradigmatiques dans leur rapport aux Classiques/Écritures. Pour Jésus, comme pour Confucius, la lecture du canon des Classiques/Écritures permet d’interpréter son identité tout autant qu’elle donne une grille d’interprétation de leurs projets.

The contribution begins by giving an account of the Jesuits’ relationship to philosophy – a relationship nourished by Thomism but not solely dependent on it. The Jesuit perspective is concerned with maintaining a balance between, on one hand, a unified vision of knowledge and human life, and an openness to developments in the world; and on the other hand, emphasizing the link between knowledge effort and moral transformation. This approach, anchored in the Greek tradition, guided the Jesuits in their encounter with Confucianism in the 17th century, leading to notable developments and particularly a “conversion” with neo-Confucianism. This interpretive framework was also applied against Marxism, involving various evaluations of the non-Thomist tradition. The remainder of this article explains how a historian of Chinese thought and comparative philosopher, Henri Bernard-Maître, developed an interpretation of Marxism as a resource meeting the expectations of Chinese youth in the 1930s. His successor, Octave Brière, adopts a more critical tone, whether describing the history of Chen Duxiu, the Communist Party, or the effects of Marxist thought with the central role of propaganda. Brière highlights the importance of characters, laws of evolution of history, practice, and the anthropological limits of the Marxist position. The last part of this article provides a counterpoint to the theoretical reflections with field reports from several missionaries present in Shanghai or in rural areas of the North. Ultimately, in the Jesuits’ engagement with Chinese Marxism, the main point of friction reveals itself to be the room left for the possibility of personal spiritual experience.

Chinese military culture is mainly known to the general public through the Sunzi, a work translated into French in the 18th century by Joseph Amiot. However, in his presentation of the Sunzi, Amiot places this work in the broader context of imperial Confucianism: the Sunzi must be interpreted in the context of debates between Confucian and Taoist schools. From this point of view, a careful reading of the Analects, the Mencius, the Daodejing (and the Sunzi) highlights a point common to all these schools: in the ancient Chinese world, the ideal is to win the war without fighting it. Thus, for Confucius and his followers, a government according to humanity/benevolence (ren 仁) will meet the needs for peace and unity in Chinese society. This perspective resonates with the Catholic tradition as interpreted in the 20th century by the magisterium. Both Confucian and Catholic traditions indeed rule out a priori justifications for the use of violence, if not against tyrants, and will tend to support international structures.

The history of the philosophical exchanges between China and the West is the history of the translations between the two traditions. On the western side, after the Jesuits, the range of translators became gradually broader. On the Chinese side, many intellectuals introduced Western classics in their language in the twentieth century. This led several historians to argue that Chinese philosophy took off with the translation-comparison of both traditions. However, not all comparisons are of equal value. Thus, translation in philosophy implies comparing concepts or arguments and considering all the cultural references involved. This means taking a risk and accepting a limit. A risk is to be taken because translating interprets a “foreign thought” according to one’s context. This implies disclosing one’s presuppositions. There is a limit because transitioning from one set of references to another implies welcoming a part of “untranslatable” that always remains. According to Ricoeur’s words, “linguistic hospitality” is required here. This article first presents two interpretations of the translation-comparison processes. In the last part, it describes the necessity of linguistic hospitality in the context of Comparative Philosophy.