Yvonne Raley

Ideal for students with little or no background in philosophy, Ethical Choices: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy with Cases provides a concise, balanced, and highly accessible introduction to ethics. Featuring an especially lucid and engaging writing style, the text surveys a wide range of ethical theories and perspectives including consequentialist ethics, deontological ethics, natural and virtue ethics, the ethics of care, and ethics and religion. Each chapter also includes compelling case studies that are carefully matched with the theoretical material.

Terrorism, ethnocentrism, religious tension, competition over limited resources, war - these are just a few of the problems and challenges that have emerged in today's global economy. Globalization both implies and requires economic interdependence; and this should bring with it a heightened sense of the interconnectedness of the participating societies. But unfortunately, as recent events indicate, rather than our having formed a global community, today's society is more fragmented than ever. In light of this, education faces some formidable new challenges. How do we prepare future citizens for the world they will live in? How do we teach future generations to embrace the paradox of accepting the value of multiculturalism despite the conflicts it has produced? How do we instill religious tolerance in a time when fundamentalism has become inextricably tied with terrorism? How do we promote economic growth in the face of overpopulation and its depletion of resources? The authors of this collection of essays explore these and related challenges, and they suggest some novel ways of dealing with them.

Azzouni draws a distinction between criteria for what exists and criteria for the ontological commitments of a discourse. The former is a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for what exists, the latter reads ontological commitments from statements. The most influential criterion for identifying the ontological commitments of a discourse is that of Quine: we look at what its bound variables range over. Azzouni (1998, 2004) proposes that ontological commitment be carried by a predicate instead. The authors believe that Azzouni's approach is an important alternative to Quine's. Unfortunately, Azzouni never develops the predicate approach any further in his own work. He provides some examples, but no actual applications of his approach. As we show, this is a missed opportunity. This paper takes the predicate approach beyond Azzouni's own brief remarks. The authors develop a strategy for applying the predicate approach, and they identify its more promising implications. The most important, and most useful, of these implications is that - in contrast to Quine's approach - it allows us to accept a theory as true without our having to be committed to the existence of something we don't actually believe exists. © 2011 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

Yet, he also says that it is philosophically indeterminate which criterion for what exists is correct. Nominalism is the view that certain objects ( i.e ., abstract objects) do not exist, and not the view that it is philosophically indeterminate whether or not they do. I resolve the dilemma that Azzouni's claims pose: Azzouni is a non-factualist about what exists, but he is a factualist about which criterion for what exists our community of speakers has adopted. It is in the latter sense only that Azzouni can call himself a nominalist. My thanks to Jody Azzouni and to an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?

Ontological naturalism is the view that our best construal of what there is, is what science says there is. This paper argues that while such a doctrine is very appealing, unfortunately, determining what there is, is neither as simple, nor as straightforward, as ontological naturalism would have it seem. Determining what there is, it is claimed, involves three steps. First, one must decide which part of scientific discourse should be taken as true. One must then regiment that part of scientific discourse, and finally, one has to apply a criterion for ontological commitment to that regimented discourse. This paper will concentrate on the first and third of these tasks. It is argued that resolving the tasks these steps put before us requires the employment of philosophical maneuvers, that is, maneuvers that neither originate within, nor are ratified by, the practice of science. But these are maneuvers that the ontological naturalist is not entitled to. Thus, ontological naturalism is not a feasible doctrine.

To augment the consumption of the ever growing production of processed foods, food companies are specifically targeting children with their advertisements. Advertising has even infiltrated the educational system in the form of corporate sponsored “educational materials.” This paper discusses the effects such aggressive forms of advertising have on the development of personal autonomy, or self-governance. I argue that the bad reasoning skills such advertisements promote undermine the development of the very abilities children need to become adults capable of making rational choices. A detailed look at several types of food advertisements aimed at children supports this claim.

This dissertation focuses on the question of whether or not we can adjudicate between competing criteria for what exists. A criterion for what exists provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for what sorts of entities are real. It tells us which property, or which set of properties, an entity must possess to count as existing. Example: an entity exists if and only if it has causal powers. ;My thesis, in this project, is that we are not in a position to adjudicate between competing criteria for what exists. A criterion for what exists is philosophical bedrock, and it isn't possible for us to slide any justification underneath it. ;The first chapters of the dissertation focus on four candidate criteria for what exists: the causal criterion , the criterion of causal explanation , the criterion of best explanation , and the criterion of indispensability . My purpose is not to defend any of these criteria, nor to work out what exactly falls under them, but to get a good statement of each criterion, so that we have a set of possible candidates to adjudicate between. ;I then move to defend my main thesis. To this end, I examine four groups of arguments that might be used to defend a criterion for what exists: arguments from Quine's criterion, epistemic arguments, inductive arguments, and metaphysical arguments. I then try to show that each type of argument has to fail

Ideal for students with little or no background in philosophy, Ethical Choices: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy with Cases provides a concise, balanced, and highly accessible introduction to ethics. Featuring an especially lucid and engaging writing style, the text surveys a wide range of ethical theories and perspectives including consequentialist ethics, deontological ethics, natural and virtue ethics, the ethics of care, and ethics and religion.Each chapter of Ethical Choices also includes compelling case studies that are carefully matched with the theoretical material. Many of these cases address issues that students can relate directly to their own lives: the drinking age, student credit card debt, zero tolerance policies, grade inflation, and video games. Other cases discuss current topics like living wills, obesity, human trafficking, torture "lite," universal health care, and just-war theory. The cases provide students with practice in addressing real-life moral choices, as well as opportunities to evaluate the usefulness and applicability of each ethical theory. Every case study concludes with a set of Thought Questions to guide students as they reflect upon the issues raised by that case.Ethical Choices is enhanced by several pedagogical features. These include summaries at the end of each section, lists of key terms, questions For Reflection and Discussion at the end of each chapter, Guidelines for a Case Study Analysis, and suggestions For Further Reading that include Internet sources. Starred sections indicate more advanced material that may be included at the instructor's discretion. A companion website at www.oup.com/us/burnor contains additional resources for both students and instructors: chapter outlines, flashcards of key terms, sets of Helpful Hints to further aid students in mastering the material, and an additional chapter on our Moral Obligations Towards the Future.

This paper focuses on an argument against the existence of mathematical objects called the “Makes No Difference Argument” (MND). Roughly, MND claims that whether or not mathematical objects exist makes no difference, and that therefore, we have no reason to believe in them. The paper analyzes four different versions of MND for their merits. It concludes that the defender of the existence of mathematical objects (the mathematical Platonist) does have some retorts to the first three versions of MND, but that no adequate reply is possible to the fourth, and most crucial, version of MND. That version argues that mathematical objects make no difference to our epistemic processes: they play no role in the process of obtaining mathematical knowledge.

This paper argues that, contrary to the views of Nancy Cartwright and Brian Ellis, explanations are factive: if a statement is taken to be an explanation, it also has to be accepted as true. Taking explanations to be true, in turn, seems to imply that all the entities posited in explanations are real. But this is precisely what some philosophers, such as Cartwright and Ellis, want to deny. What these philosophers do not want to deny, however, is that such statements do explain. As a result, they see themselves forced to reject the facticity of explanation, a strategy that is unacceptable in my view. In order to avoid the further conclusion that all of the entities explanations posit exist, I propose to separate truth from ontology: explanations can be true, but the truth of these explanations alone does not commit us to the entities that these explanations posit. To determine where the ontological commitments of our statements lie, we must instead start with a criterion (a necessary and sufficient condition) for what exists. For instance, if all and only entities with causal powers are real, then this tells us that the only entities our true statements are committed to are entities with causal powers.

For Quine, the ontological commitments of a discourse are what fall under its (objectual) quantifiers. The recent literature, however, is beginning to move away from this picture. There are direct challenges to Quine's criterion, and there are also attempts to provide alternatives. Azzouni suggests that the ontological commitments of a discourse should be determined by an existence predicate instead. The availability of this alternative forces an adjudication between Qune's criterion and the predicate approach to ontological commitment. I argue that to adjudicate between these criteria for ontological commitment, we need first to adjudicate between criteria for what exists