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254Resolving to Believe: Kierkegaard’s Direct Doxastic VoluntarismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research. forthcoming.According to a traditional interpretation of Kierkegaard, he endorses a strong form of direct doxastic voluntarism on which we can, by brute force of will, make a “leap of faith” to believe propositions that we ourselves take to be improbable and absurd. Yet most leading Kierkegaard scholars now wholly reject this reading, instead interpreting Kierkegaard as holding that the will can affect what we believe only indirectly. This paper argues that Kierkegaard does in fact endorse a restricted, sop…Read more
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234Kierkegaard on the Relationship Between Practical and Epistemic Reasons for BeliefPacific Philosophical Quarterly 105 (2): 233-266. 2024.On the dominant contemporary accounts of how practical considerations affect what we ought to believe, practical considerations either encroach on epistemic rationality by affecting whether a belief is epistemically justified, or constitute distinctively practical reasons for belief which can only affect what we ought to believe by conflicting with epistemic rationality. This paper argues that Søren Kierkegaard offers a promising alternative view on which practical considerations can affect what…Read more
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511Belief, blame, and inquiry: a defense of doxastic wrongingPhilosophical Studies 180 (10-11): 2955-2975. 2023.According to the thesis of doxastic wronging, our beliefs can non-derivatively wrong others. A recent criticism of this view claims that proponents of the doxastic wronging thesis have no principled grounds for denying that credences can likewise non-derivatively wrong, so they must countenance pervasive conflicts between morality and epistemic rationality. This paper defends the thesis of doxastic wronging from this objection by arguing that belief bears distinctive relationships to inquiry and…Read more
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506Kierkegaard on Belief and CredenceEuropean Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes Climacus famously defines faith as a risky “venture” that requires “holding fast” to “objective uncertainty.” Yet puzzlingly, he emphasizes that faith requires resolute conviction and certainty. Moreover, Climacus claims that all beliefs about contingent propositions about the external world “exclude doubt” and “nullify uncertainty,” but also that uncertainty is “continually present” in these very same beliefs. This paper argues that these apparent contradictions…Read more
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571A Permissivist Alternative to EncroachmentPhilosophers' Imprint. forthcoming.As a slew of recent work in epistemology has brought out, there is a range of cases where there's a strong temptation to say that prudential and (especially) moral considerations affect what we ought to believe. There are two distinct models of how this can happen. On the first, “reasons pragmatist” model, the relevant prudential and moral considerations constitute distinctively practical reasons for (or against) belief. On the second, “pragmatic encroachment” model, the relevant prudential and …Read more
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Princeton UniversityUniversity Center for Human Values and Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International AffairsPostdoctoral Research Associate In Philosophy and Religion
Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Value Theory |
19th Century Philosophy |