Zachary Bachman

Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright both distinguish two forms of warrant: entitlement and justification. But they use these terms in very different ways. Entitlement for Wright is a non-evidential, a priori rational right to claim knowledge against the skeptic. Wright’s project engages the skeptic. Entitlement for Burge is a truth-conducive good route to knowledge that does not involve reasons. Justification is the route that involves reasons. Burge’s project falls within moderate foundationalist, competence-based approaches to knowledge. Burge’s project examines the structure of knowledge. The chapters of the volume are introduced. The chapters in Part I engage Burge’s project. Part II engages and extends competence and moderate foundationalist approaches. Part II engages Wright’s project.

Recently, Christine Bratu and Mortiz Dittmeyer have argued that Christine Korsgaard’s constitutive project fails to establish the normativity of practical principles because it fails to show why a principle’s being constitutive of a practice shows that one ought to conform to that principle. They argue that in many cases a principle’s being constitutive of a practice has no bearing on whether one ought to conform to it. In this paper I argue that Bratu and Dittmeyer’s argument fails in three important respects. First, they fail to recognize the ways in which Korsgaard’s neo-Kantian view departs from more orthodox Kantian views. Second, they fail to recognize the respect in which Korsgaard’s view is a version of moral rationalism. Third, they overlook an important scope ambiguity in an important premise of their argument. A sensible way of resolving this ambiguity gives the constitutivist a reasonable response.