Zain Ali

This Chapter aims to address two dilemmas of divine forgiveness by drawing on the tradition of Islamic theism. The first dilemma relates to whether God or human beings have the standing to forgive. The second dilemma relates to the tension between God's justice and mercy, namely; is there a place for divine mercy, if justice requires punishment of wrongdoing? In response to these dilemmas, I maintain that God as well as human beings have a standing to forgive, I also contend that divine justice can be tempered with mercy.

Is it correct to think of God as a perfectly good personal agent? Not so, argue John Bishop and Ken Perszyk. Bishop and Perszyk, in their most recent work, God, Purpose, and Reality: A Euteleological Understanding of Theism (2023), outline a series of challenges that bring into question this concept of God—i.e., as a perfectly good personal agent, who is unique, unsurpassably great, all-powerful, and all-knowing. I aim to critically evaluate one of these challenges, namely the Normatively Relativised Logical Argument from Evil (NRLAFE). The NRLAFE has God’s perfect goodness as its target. Bishop and Perszyk argue that people who are committed to certain values about what constitutes right relationship amongst persons, might reasonably judge God as lacking perfect goodness. They also contend that the relevant values will likely be endorsed by theists. My aim in this paper is twofold: first, I aim to assess the Bishop-Perszyk argument from evil, in light of the tradition of Islamic Theism. The tradition of Islamic Theism is as broad as it is deep, and within the tradition there are a variety of ways in which God has been conceptualised. This includes debates as to whether we can view God as a personal agent. Second, I contend that we have available to us, from within and beyond the tradition of Islamic Theism, a set of resources that: (a) permit us to understand God as being a personal agent; and (b) allow us to resist the NRLAFE while endorsing the value commitments that Bishop and Perszyk have in mind. The perspective I bring to this paper is that of a reflective Muslim—i.e., a person of the Islamic faith who acknowledges that people of other religious and non-religious persuasions are as educated and concerned with seeking truth and avoiding error as they themselves are.

This paper aims to engage with J. L. Schellenberg’s problem of divine hiddenness. While there has been considerable discussion on this topic, few responses incorporate a Muslim perspective. I aim to fill this gap by engaging with the argument from the perspective of a reflective Muslim. To this end, I draw on the tradition of Islamic Theism to critically evaluate the first premise of Schellenberg’s argument, namely: if a perfectly loving God exists, then there exists a God who is always open to a personal relationship with any finite person. There are several reasons to doubt this premise, and drawing on the Quran, I argue that consent may also have a role to play. I contend that finite persons may consent to divine hiddenness, thus allowing God to limit openness to personal relationship.

This article explores the various ways in which Muslims, in the past and the present, think about God. The article canvasses a range of views on questions and puzzles pertaining to the essence and attributes of God, the basis of God's Justice, the transcendence of God, and our ability to know and understand God. We encounter a diverse, and at times radically divergent range of views on how best to understand divinity within the tradition of Islam. Given the various conceptions of divinity, available within the tradition, I develop an argument for the view that God is best understood as love. The view that God is love, I contend, emerges directly from the Quran, which is a document that sits at the very heart of the Islamic tradition.

William Lane Craig has recently formulated a set of arguments that aim to undermine the rationality of Islamic theism. This paper will consider seven arguments that Craig deploys against Muslim belief. The seven arguments can be summarised as follows: (1) the Quran makes an egregious historical error by denying the crucifixion of Jesus; (2) the Quran contains legendary stories about Jesus; (3) the Quran is mistaken about the self-understanding of Jesus; (4) the Quran misunderstands the Trinity; (5) the Islamic concept of God is morally deficient; (6) the Islamic concept of God is less plausible than a Trinitarian concept of God; and (7) the Muslim doctrine of salvation compromises God’s holiness and proves to be unattainable. I contend that Craig’s arguments, when examined closely, do not undermine the rationality of Islamic theism.

In this paper, I argue that Islamic theism is best explained by the hypothesis of Divine Commission, whereby Muhammad is viewed as being divinely commissioned to serve the overall salvific purposes of God. To this end, I present three observation reports relating to Islamic theism and evaluate HDC against an alternative hypothesis, the hypothesis of Non-Commission whereby Muhammad is not viewed as being divinely commissioned. I argue that the probability of the observation reports is greater on the assumption that HDC is true than on the assumption that NC is true. Accordingly, this gives us reason to prefer HDC as a better explanation of Islamic theism.

In this paper, I argue that love is best explained by the hypothesis of theism (HT)—i.e., there is a God who is all-loving, all-powerful, and all-knowing. To this end, I present four observations relating to love, namely: (O1) We live in a world with beings who have a conceptual understanding of love; (O2) we live in a world with beings who have an affective experience of love; (O3) we live in a world with beings who can respond to love; and (O4) we live in a world in which love has immense transformative potential. Given these observations, I evaluate HT against an alternative hypothesis, the hypothesis of naturalism (HN)–i.e., there is no God; there are only natural causes, beings, and forces, all of which are located within the natural world. I draw on the tradition of Islamic theism and argue that the probability of the four observations is greater on the assumption that HT is true than on the assumption that HN is true. Accordingly, this gives us reason to prefer HT as a better explanation of love. This argument is open to several philosophical and theological challenges. I outline three of these challenges and respond to them by drawing on the resources available within the tradition of Islamic theism. I also consider whether this argument lends weight to Islamic theism.