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13A Separability Principle, Contrast Cases, and Contributory DispositionsSouthwest Philosophy Review 36 (1): 35-44. 2020.The aim of this paper is to clarify the use of contrast cases—which are pairs of cases in which the feature under examination is varied and all else is held fixed—in ethical methodology. In another paper, I argue that we must reject a separability principle which is thought to allow one to use contrast cases to infer truths about intrinsic value. Here I offer a different criticism that has a positive upshot about what we are licensed to infer from contrast cases. This provides clarification abou…Read more
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39Bare-Difference Methodology and a Problematic Separability PrincipleJournal of Value Inquiry 54 (4): 553-570. 2020.
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35Violent Deaths, Vicious Preferences, and Bare-Differences: A Reply to HillAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1): 196-201. 2021.ABSTRACT Hill [AJP, 2018] argues that Rachels’s famous bare-difference argument for the moral irrelevance between killing and letting die fails. In this paper, I argue that certain features in Hill’s cases might lead our intuitions astray. I propose new cases and suggest that they support the conclusion that, in itself, intentional killing is morally equivalent to intentional letting-die.
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12Implications from Jaworska’s Account of Autonomy and Self for Dementia and Psychedelic ResearchAmerican Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 14 (2): 142-144. 2023.Peterson et al. (2023) write that there’s “a rich philosophical debate on the nature of authenticity in dementia” involving the relationship of identity and autonomy. I explore this with Jaworska’s...
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19Bare‐difference methodology and the scientific analogyRatio 34 (3): 171-182. 2021.The bare‐difference methodology is considered to be a powerful tool in ethical reasoning. The underlying idea is that we can identify the intrinsic evaluative significance of some feature by constructing contrast cases or bare‐difference cases, i.e., two cases that hold everything constant but for the feature of interest. While this popular methodology has been challenged by prominent philosophers such as Kagan, Thomson, and Kamm, it is intuitively appealing because, as Perrett identifies, the m…Read more
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18Violent Deaths, Vicious Preferences, and Bare-Differences: A Reply to HillAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1): 196-201. 2021.ABSTRACT Hill [AJP, 2018] argues that Rachels’s famous bare-difference argument for the moral irrelevance between killing and letting die fails. In this paper, I argue that certain features in Hill’s cases might lead our intuitions astray. I propose new cases and suggest that they support the conclusion that, in itself, intentional killing is morally equivalent to intentional letting-die.
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42Value Invariabilism and Two Distinctions in ValueEthical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1): 45-63. 2021.Following Moore, value invariabilists deny that the intrinsic value of something can be affected by features extrinsic to it. The primary focuses of this paper are (i) to examine the invariabilistic thesis and expand upon how we ought to understand it, in light of contemporary axiological distinctions, and (ii) to argue that distinguishing between different kinds of invariabilism provides resources to undermine a prominent argument against variabilism. First, I use two contemporary axiological d…Read more
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10Good Arguments, Wrong Target: Equivalence and the Compatibilist ViewAmerican Journal of Bioethics 15 (10): 51-53. 2015.
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10Off on the Wrong Foot: Sentience and the Capacity for Painful or Pleasurable Experiences as Distinct ConceptsAmerican Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 6 (2): 46-48. 2015.
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21Problems of Specificity: An Indirect Argument for Chwang's PositionAmerican Journal of Bioethics 14 (12): 19-20. 2014.
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8Predictive Brain Implants: Advance Directives with a Mechanical TwistAmerican Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 6 (4): 44-46. 2015.