Zakieh Azadani

In this article, I intend to examine an account of human free will suggested by one of the most prominent figures in religious institutions during the Safavid reign, which had a long-term effect on subsequent discussions on the subject. Muḥammad Bāqir Majlisī (1627–1699), a renowned theologian, muḥaddith, and jurist who played a significant role in shaping Shīʿism in Iran, emphasized human free will (ikhtiyār) in his various works. While he considers it a self-evident truth, Majlisī attempts to justify human agency in voluntary activities through his arguments. However, it appears that his emphasis on human free will is primarily aimed at demonstrating that individuals are legally bound. Due to the limitations of human intellect, Majlisī argues that humans cannot be considered competent to create the legal rules they must follow. Consequently, individuals are not authorized to determine their own obligations even though they are responsible for their actions. Thus, while Majlisī was determined to establish that humans possess free will, he believed that individuals were not allowed to exercise this freedom in the realm of social and political affairs.

This article aims to delve into the approach of Ḫwāǧa Naṣīr ad-Dīn Ṭūsī to a fundamental philosophical question concerning human agency: How can human free will coexist with a necessitating causal framework, where every effect is bound by its complete cause? Ṭūsī’s solution, which left a lasting impact on subsequent philosophical discussions on the issue, particularly within Shiite scholarly circles, revolves around the introduction of a differentiation between types of causes. I will examine Ṭūsī’s elucidation delineated in two of his works: Ǧabr wa Qadar in Persian and a concise Arabic text on Afʿāl al-ʿibād. Additionally, I will endeavor to uncover the historical origins and intellectual influences that may have shaped Ṭūsī’s approach to the question of human free will.