Zeyu Chi

Kit Fine has put forward a new argument for the coincidence between a statue and a clay, according to which the two differ in numerous sortalish properties that are non-modal. In this paper I offer a one-thinger response to Fine’s argument. The key to my response is the notion of sortal counterparts. Just as in the modal case we can relegate the conflicting modal properties of the statue and the clay to distinct modal counterparts, in the non-modal case we should relegate the conflicting simple sortalish properties to distinct sortal counterparts. Sortal counterparts, I argue, aren’t just the conceptual tool that we need for resolving the puzzle over conflicting sortals, they also help to shed light on the idea of a sortal paradigm and how sortal generalizations can survive recalcitrant exceptions.

In this paper I argue for an alternative reading of the humanity formula that Kant presents in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. The standard reading takes “humanity” to mean the capacity for setting ends. I suggest this reading is problematic for it does not offer a satisfactory explanation for what it means to use humanity as mere means. My reading considers “humanity” as the capacity for appraising one’s maxims from the perspective of pure practical reason. On this reading, to use humanity as mere means is to look at one’s maxims from the wrong perspective, i.e., the perspective of happiness. Further, I argue that it is mistaken to take Kant’s claim about an end in itself as a claim about any ultimate value. Instead, the claim should be construed as a claim about the role of pure practical reason in moral appraisal, which should be understood in terms of Kant’s metaphysics of the mind.

In this paper I propose a notion of propria inspired by Aristotle, on which propria are non-essential, necessary properties explained by the essence of a thing. My proposal differs from the characterization of propria by Kit Fine and Kathrin Koslicki: unlike Fine, the relation of explanation on my account can’t be assimilated to a notion of logical entailment. In disagreement with Koslicki, I suggest that the explanatory relation at issue needs not be necessary. My account of essence is conceptually parsimonious: it illuminates the contribution of essence to explanation without relying on obscure notions such as Aristotelian form or identity.