Leveraging the reform of China’s one-child policy and insights from the ‘dark side’ of socioemotional wealth (SEW), this study examines whether family firms are more likely to be involved in securities fraud. The one-child policy reform, which allows families to have more children, may influence the transgenerational succession intentions in family businesses. To ensure the successful succession of a family business to future generations, family owners need to maintain control over the firm. Thi…
Read moreLeveraging the reform of China’s one-child policy and insights from the ‘dark side’ of socioemotional wealth (SEW), this study examines whether family firms are more likely to be involved in securities fraud. The one-child policy reform, which allows families to have more children, may influence the transgenerational succession intentions in family businesses. To ensure the successful succession of a family business to future generations, family owners need to maintain control over the firm. This necessity may drive them to prioritize the family control dimension of SEW over other dimensions, potentially leading to an increase in securities fraud in family firms. Using a difference-in-differences design, our study reveals that, compared with non-family firms, family firms are more likely to be involved in securities fraud in the period following the one-child policy reform. This tendency is particularly pronounced when family firms are experiencing unfavorable financial conditions such as negative performance feedback and financial constraints. Our research contributes to the literature on family firms by specifically addressing their impact on securities fraud through the lens of the ‘dark side’ of the SEW perspective.