The disvalue objection from pain is a key objection against perfectionistic views of well-being. In response, perfectionists have attempted to develop refined versions of perfectionism that circumvent the disvalue objection. One recent novel attempt is by Antti Kauppinen, who develops what he calls “Telic Perfectionism.” Kauppinen argues that negative experiences like painful experiences have a “formal aim,” viz., to eliminate the negative experiences themselves. This formal aim is an internal s…
Read moreThe disvalue objection from pain is a key objection against perfectionistic views of well-being. In response, perfectionists have attempted to develop refined versions of perfectionism that circumvent the disvalue objection. One recent novel attempt is by Antti Kauppinen, who develops what he calls “Telic Perfectionism.” Kauppinen argues that negative experiences like painful experiences have a “formal aim,” viz., to eliminate the negative experiences themselves. This formal aim is an internal standard contained within our human capacities to have positive or negative experiences. Kauppinen thinks that the frustration of this formal aim (i.e., the subject continuing to have negative experiences) is in fact robustly bad. This would thus allow the badness of pain to be accounted for in perfectionistic terms. In this reply, I argue that Kauppinen’s attempt is unsuccessful due to an asymmetry present within his framework.
