Zheng Liu

This paper explores the implicit thought of the “body-network” in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body, drawing from both his earlier and later works. It demonstrates that, for Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenal body is inherently interconnected with the world through motor intentionality. Meanwhile, in his later concept of “flesh,” this interconnectedness deepens into a relationship of mutual reflection and chiasmic intertwining, where bodies and the world continuously mirror and permeate each other. The paper then introduces the Huayan Buddhist metaphor of Indra’s Net, along with Fazang’s interpretation of it. A detailed comparative analysis is conducted between Merleau-Pontian body-network and Fazang’s understanding of Indra’s Net. The paper argues for a profound resonance between the primordial characteristics of the Merleau-Pontian body-network—namely, relationality and reflectivity—and Fazang’s key concepts, such as “mutual identity” (相即), “mutual inclusion” (相入), and the contemplative idea that “the images of many bodies are reflected in one mirror” (多身入一鏡像觀). Despite their distinct cultural and philosophical vocabularies, both thinkers construct a relational ontology aimed at deconstructing entrenched dualisms. Through this in-depth comparative study using the Internet of Bodies (IoB) as a case study, this paper demonstrates that the IoB technology exhibits only superficial resemblances to the Merleau-Pontian body-network and Fazang’s interpretation of Indra’s Net. To address the ethical challenges posed by the IoB, it is imperative to integrate the shared philosophical insights of Merleau-Ponty and Fazang in constructing a critical techno-ethics capable of interrogating the ontological reduction and power asymmetries inherent in contemporary technological networks. Merleau-Ponty’s concept of reversible flesh inspires an ethics of contextual sensitivity and user agency, resisting the reduction of lived experience to data points. Meanwhile, Fazang’s Huayan Buddhism, with its principles of mutual identity and mutual inclusion, reveals the relational nature of data, challenging its treatment as neutral or absolute. Together, these philosophies advocate for a decentralized, reciprocal techno-ethics that prioritizes embodied meaning over surveillance and control.

Drawing on Heidegger and postphenomenology, this article examines how digital screens reshape human senses of place and world. Screens act as “focal devices” that structure daily perception, behavior, and lifestyle by capturing attention. Extending Meyrowitz, the article argues that screens induce not only placelessness but also worldlessness. The analysis distinguishes screen‐mediated from screen‐centered sense, where the latter traps perception within a closed loop, ultimately producing worldlessness. The tragic case of a young girl named Huang Yuanxin is analyzed to demonstrate the multidimensional manifestations of placelessness and worldlessness. Finally, invoking Heidegger and Arendt, the article demonstrates that screen‐induced worldlessness primarily erodes common sensibility (sensus communis). This erosion obscures and dissolves the public sphere, which relies on shared experience and discourse, as pervasive screens fragment it into isolated private realms.

This article presents a robust defense of the concept of ‘datafied enhancement’ as a subset of human enhancement. Firstly, the author notes that the widespread development of ICT and AI technologies has made it possible to collect and analyse human biometric data, thus integrating data into the concept of embodiment. Secondly, the author explores the cultural and intellectual history of datafied enhancement, highlighting the significant role that data has played in human evolution. Thirdly, the author examines the functional classifications of datafied enhancement, arguing that conversational, wearable, ingestible and embeddable technological devices can enhance physical, cognitive, emotional and moral capacities of individuals by collecting body data. Fourthly, the author underscores the importance of distinguishing datafied enhancement from dataism to avoid misconceptions. Finally, the author addresses potential ethical issues, such as data exclusivity, the uncontrollable data self, and privacy invasion. By acknowledging these risks, datafied enhancement can be guided to become a technology that respects human dignity and promotes the common good.

The main aim of this paper is to illustrate human–nature relations from a comparative study of the contexts of later Merleau-Ponty and the Zhuangzi. I argue that the Zhuangzi has its own phenomenology of the natural world, which is worth comparing to Merleau-Pontian later phenomenology. To compare the arguments on human–nature relations in the contexts of later Merleau-Ponty and the Zhuangzi in detail, first, I briefly compare the cultural philosophies of nature in ancient Greece and China and their possible influences on our contemporary understanding of nature. Second, I compare the concept of “flesh” of Merleau-Ponty with the concept of “vital energy” in the Zhuangzi and point out the main roles of these concepts in their respective theories of the natural world. Third, I use the “reversibility thesis” created by Merleau-Ponty to analyze the ontological significance of illness in the arguments of Merleau-Ponty and the Zhuangzi. Fourth, inspired by Merleau-Pontian and Zhuangzian ideas about language and expression, I expound on a view of illness as a primordial language of nature and its possible role in mediating human–nature relations. Ultimately, I conclude that the comparative study of thoughts on human–nature relations in the literatures of later Merleau-Ponty and the Zhuangzi can help us reconsider and readjust our main attitudes toward nature, illness and nonhuman beings in the contemporary postpandemic era.

This article discusses the datafied embodiment of the Internet of Bodies (IoB) technology by applying the methodology of postphenomenology. Firstly, the author claims that the boundaries of dual distinction between real and virtual, online and offline, and embodiment and disembodiment have become increasingly blurred. Secondly, the author argues that postphenomenology can help us to study today’s emerging technologies’ mediating role in human–world relations. Thirdly, the author analyses the implication of embodiment from phenomenological and postphenomenological perspectives and then demonstrates in what sense the data collected from the IoB devices can constitute our embodiment and selfhood. Fourthly, the author elucidates how the IoB devices are datafying our bodies and the whole lifeworld and how these devices mediate and transform our religious practices and experiences. Fifthly, the author points out that the Quantified Religion as the possible new religious model would smooth out the differences and diversities between religions and then create homogeneous religious data selves, which will mediate, reshape, constitute and even replace our physical selves. Ultimately, the author argues that responsible designing of the IoB devices and establishing the ownership of personal religious data can be seen as significant measures in the face of the risk of our quantified religious future. Contribution: This article contributes to understanding the potential religious transformations caused by the IoB technology. This article analyses the mediating role the IoB technology plays in the relationship between humans and the world through a postphenomenological perspective, thereby explaining how body data harvested from the IoB devices can datafy and constitute our embodiment and selfhood. The article argues that the Quantified Religion as a new religious model will emerge in the future IoB era, and it will mediate, constitute and shape our religious practices and experiences through personal data harvesting and analysis.

Technological mediation theorists (such as Don Ihde and Verbeek) believe that human beings’ moral actions can be transformed through technological artefacts to constitute a “good life”. This paper, however, critically analyses two understandings of technological mediation, (1) technological mediation is something between humans and the world (prominent in Don Ihde), and (2) technological mediation is a direct constitutive effect (prominent in Verbeek), which will inevitably lead to the problem of “moral suspension” that I define. In the first understanding (following Zygmunt Bauman), the causal relations between moral actions and actual consequences are distanced from each other because of the “interval” effects of technological artefacts. In the second understanding (following Jean Baudrillard), designers are just “simulating” moralities in specific use and design contexts. Thus, moral realities are ultimately replaced by moral “simulacra”. Then, I argue that to overcome the problem of “moral suspension,” rather than distancing actions from their consequences or simulating moralities in specific scenarios, two possible approaches may be needed, the Way of Zhuangzi who declined to use any adroit technology to improve efficiency, thereby clarifying the relationship between moral actions and consequences; and the attitude of Bauman, who motivated our moral consciences and moral sensitivities, thereby reflecting the side effects of technological mediations and systems. In the end, I conclude that both of these two approaches are too difficult to universally apply, and the most viable approach is to use what Confucius called “the Doctrine of the Mean,” i.e., seeking a balance between the two approaches. That is, while we should acknowledge that technologies intervene our lifeworld and constitute our thinking and moralizing ways, we also need to break away from technological trivialities to think about and pursue long-term moral goals.