Zhenyu Cai

Many scholars consider Avicenna’s theory of cognitive forms a theory of representation, which raises two questions. First, why does a cognitive form represent a particular object instead of another? This issue is known as the determination problem. Second, what is the nature of intentionality of the cognitive form? This is known as the nature problem. This paper examines Avicenna’s theory of cognitive forms and focuses on how he would address the two problems. I argue that Avicenna offers a pluralistic approach to the determination problem: depending on the type of representation, the object of representation is determined differently. Additionally, Avicenna views the nature of intentionality as a referential relation towards the object that can be attributed to the representation in virtue of the object somehow existing in the subject immaterially.

Avicenna is well-known for rejecting Aristotle’s dichotomy between perception and the intellect by introducing the so-called estimative power, which connects perception and the intellect. The estimative power is similar to sensory cognition because what is estimated is always mixed with the sensibles. Additionally, the proper object of estimation is the individualised ma c nā, which seems similar to the object of the intellect as the intelligible ma c nā. Given the special role of estimation, scholars have recently begun debating whether Avicenna has a conceptualist theory of perception. This article contributes to that debate by focusing on Avicenna’s discussions about the perception of externals in Al-ta c līqāt. I argue for a reading that steers between Mohammad Azadpur’s conceptualist reading and Luis Farjeat’s anti-conceptualist reading. For Avicenna, the presence of the sensible form in a sensory power is non-conceptual, but the perceptual judgement exhibits a weak epistemic conceptualism.