Zhihan Li

Mental agency has recently become a prominent theme in the philosophy of mind. One of the most debated issues within this field is doxastic agency, which especially centers on whether we can believe at will. There are three typical positions on this issue. (1) Doxastic ballistic theory holds that agency is only involved in the preceding acts that lead to beliefs, while beliefs themselves lack agency. (2) Doxastic particularism argues that beliefs involve a sui generis form of agency distinct from the agency in everyday actions. (3) Doxastic voluntarism maintains that beliefs are subject to direct voluntary control. However, all three positions are unsatisfying in certain respects. This paper proposes an alternative approach: “doxastic spontaneism”, which offers a solution to the problem of doxastic agency. At its core lies Sartre’s account of the “spontaneity of consciousness”. Spontaneity is not mere instinct or automatic behavior, but pre-reflective self-determination directed toward certain ends. It constitutes the foundation of the will (which is reflective self-determination), representing a more fundamental form of mental agency than the will. Although beliefs are often beyond the direct control of the will, they nonetheless involve agency in the form of spontaneity.

G. E. M. Anscombe famously argues that our self-knowledge of intentional action (“practical knowledge”) is both non-observational and yet concerns happenings in objective reality. This combination seems to present a strong tension. Recently, Adrian Haddock offered a novel account of the role of observation in practical knowledge, claiming that such knowledge is a unity of self-knowledge (non-observational) and other-knowledge (observational), both of which are indispensable. Yet Haddock’s view faces several problems. This paper suggests that Sartre’s phenomenology resonates deeply with Haddock’s account and provides a rich resource for addressing his problems. Through Sartre’s discussions of self-consciousness, intentionality, and perception-action unity, we gain a deeper understanding of how observation functions within practical knowledge. This account shows that observation is not merely an aid (as Anscombe suggests) but a constitutive part of practical knowledge.

Anscombe famously argues that ‘I’ is not a referring expression, otherwise, a ‘Cartesian Ego’ would inevitably appear. She thinks the form of self-consciousness expressed in ‘I’ is ‘subjectless’: it is consciousness that does not involve a self-object (or Ego). Sartre’s theory of consciousness offers a strikingly parallel and mutually illuminating framework. He similarly denies the presence of the Ego within consciousness, arguing instead that the Ego is a transcendent object constructed through reflection. For both of them, the fundamental form of self-consciousness is pre-reflective. I argue that Anscombe’s position encounters two difficulties: (1) how the non-referential ‘I’ can express subjectivity, and (2) how self-consciousness is about an embodied subject. I propose that Sartre’s accounts of (1) the ‘fundamental ipseity’ and (2) the ‘lived body’ offer a phenomenological framework that helps to respond to Anscombe’s difficulties.