Zhili Xiong

Brandom recently criticized the existing interpretations of Hegel’s chapter Sense-Certainty as committed to a “bad argument” that rests on a confusion between three kinds of repeatability (epistemic authority of sensuous deliverance, types of indexical, and properties). As a stronger alternative, he offers two arguments with respect to two new kinds of repeatability (classificatory and recollective repeatability). In this article, I argue that Brandom’s criticism of the “bad argument” is a straw man argument. It rests on an unwarranted assumption that types of indexicals are universals only by analogy with properties. As Koch and Heidemann suggest, types of indexicals can be universals in terms of Fregean sense or Kaplanian character. I go on to point out that Hegel’s argument in the chapter “Sense Certainty” only concerns types of indexicals; the other two kinds of repeatability are unnecessary for his argument. Meanwhile, Brandom’s two alternative arguments have difficulties of their own in interpreting Hegel’s text.

Hegel’s theory of indexicality appears in the first chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Sensuous-Certainty (SC). Current interpretations of the meaning of the universals that Hegel attributes to indexicals diverge from one another. Such interpretations can be divided into three groups: the universals as Fregean senses, as properties expressed by predicates in complex demonstratives, and as contrastive and recollective repeatability. I argue that all three exegeses face difficulties. Fregean senses, as referent-dependent modes of presentation, are particulars rather than universals. The interpretation that appeals to predicates in complex demonstratives confuses referential indeterminacy with context sensitivity. The view of universals as contrastive and recollective repeatability misses the point of Hegel’s relevant arguments regarding universals. I propose to understand the universal in question as an indexical expression type akin to David Kaplan’s character (linguistic rules for expression use). In SC, Hegel argues for an expression/reference distinction by appealing to the context sensitivity of indexicals.

Woran liegt es, dass trotz Hegels Behauptung, die spekulative Logik sei die eigentliche Metaphysik, ein Zwiespalt zwischen der metaphysischen Lesart und der nicht-metaphysischen bzw. transzendentalphilosophischen Lesart der Wissenschaft der Logik in der Hegelforschung zum Vorschein gekommen ist? Was für eine systematische Untersuchung der Wissenschaft der Logik wird methodologisch Hegels metaphysischem Anspruch gerecht? Anhand eines Überblicks über Hegels gesamte logische und enzyklopädische Philosophie versucht Zhili Xiong sowohl eine begleitende Lektüre für Hegel-Anfänger als auch eine erweiterte epistemische Lesart der Hegelschen Metaphysik für Hegel-Kenner anzubieten.

Recent discussions concerning the beginning problem of Hegel’s Logic have reached the agreement that any promised interpretation of the beginning of the Logic must reject opposition between the immediacy and mediation and embrace their unity instead. It is how this unity is understood that divides interpreters. Either the mediation precedes the immediacy and justifies it first, or a somewhat one-sided immediacy occurs first and waits to be mediated later in a circular justification. However, both concepts are confronted with their own difficulties. To avoid these difficulties, I propose that the pure immediacy or pure being is justified to be the Logic’s beginning in virtue of its alternativelessness. Only it can measure up to the rigorous requirement implied by the nature of the beginning.