This paper does not ask whether AI is conscious. It asks a more fundamental question: whether humans are qualified to make that judgment at all. Through a systematic dismantling of the central arguments advanced by Searle, Chalmers, and Dreyfus, this paper argues that every argument denying AI consciousness commits the same foundational error: it uses human consciousness as the sole standard for consciousness itself — a standard that has never been proven. Nagel's argument further supports this …
Read moreThis paper does not ask whether AI is conscious. It asks a more fundamental question: whether humans are qualified to make that judgment at all. Through a systematic dismantling of the central arguments advanced by Searle, Chalmers, and Dreyfus, this paper argues that every argument denying AI consciousness commits the same foundational error: it uses human consciousness as the sole standard for consciousness itself — a standard that has never been proven. Nagel's argument further supports this position: it is impossible, from the outside, to judge the subjective experience of another kind of being. The conclusion is singular: we have no right to judge.
