Zoheir Bagheri Noaparast

Belief in malevolent global conspiracies is often treated as a defeater for philosophical seriousness. Engaging with Lee Basham's defense of conspiracy theorizing and Genia Schönbaumsfeld's critique, I make two claims. First, we must distinguish the ambitious multi-institutional schemes of non-total malevolent global conspiracies, which nevertheless remain evidentially vulnerable, from conspiracy theories that are self-sealing. Only the latter are epistemically vacuous. Second, properly understood, Cartesian doubt is a norm-governed temporary device for re-ordering reasons, a standing commitment to the view that everything can be doubted. The assumed kinship between radical skepticism and self-sealing conspiracy theories, therefore, overstates their structural similarity. Keywords: conspiracy theories, Descartes, epistemology, malevolent global conspiracy, radical skepticism, Wittgenstein

Building on Drew Johnson’s Radical Relativist Hinge Epistemology, this paper argues that deep disagreements between theistic and naturalistic epistemic systems are best understood as instances of epistemic incommensurability. I critique Duncan Pritchard’s quasi-fideism by focusing on his claim that a content-invariant überhinge, articulated as the commitment that we are not radically and fundamentally mistaken, can alleviate relativist concerns by supporting only a weak form of relativism. I contend that this strategy is ineffective. On theistic frameworks, the commitment that we are not globally mistaken is secured by antecedent hinges that locate cognitive reliability in divine design and providence; on naturalistic frameworks, it is secured by antecedent hinges that locate reliability in evolutionary origins and the norms of empirical inquiry. Accordingly, the commitment lacks cross-framework uniformity in role and priority, and so cannot be the universal codifying hinge Pritchard requires. Therefore, the appearance of a shared über-hinge is superficial, and quasi-fideism lacks the resources to neutralize epistemic relativism.

Open-mindedness requires us to be receptive to new evidence that contradicts our own views. Laurie Paul (2021) argues that there are situations in which we should, in fact, avoid exposure to putative evidence, as it may undermine our rational abilities. One example she discusses is the sensus divinitatis (SD) as a transformative experience. If an atheist agrees to be exposed to this experience, he may become a theist and, by his pre-transformation atheistic standards, irrational. Paul contends that we have valid reasons to avoid encountering putative evidence in these circumstances. This paper will argue that there are rational strategies to help us determine whether to expose ourselves to transformative experiences like the SD.

In contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, the evil God challenge has been developed by several authors as a parody argument. Proponents of this challenge contend that, given the goods in our world, the hypothesis of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnimalevolent God or the Evil God is absurd. Similarly, they argue, we should conclude that the hypothesis of a good God is also absurd due to the evils present in our world. This paper argues that, with the aid of this challenge and other contemporary debates in the philosophy of religion, one can make the case that a reintroduction of Manichaeism into philosophy of religion is worthwhile. This argument will propose that, considering our total evidence, the Good-God and the Evil-God demonstrate a similar level of support. Additionally, under a reconstructed Manichaean hypothesis, good and evil are seen as mutually explanatory. Furthermore, the natural order can be understood within this framework. Therefore, the Manichaean hypothesis could serve as a viable alternative to monotheistic theism; it can account for the coexistence of good and evil and is compatible with the observed order in nature.

All atheists think that the central claims of religion are false, but not all atheists think that religion is useless. Some believe that, despite its falsehood, religious language and rituals are pragmatically valuable because they lead to goods worth getting. However, it is not easy for an atheist to engage in religion to obtain these goods because they can feel intellectually or morally insincere in saying and doing things they consider false or faulty. Religious fictionalism aims to address this by claiming that atheists can take part as they would in a fictional game of make-believe, and as they do so knowingly, they do so sincerely. We examine religious fictionalism from a Wittgensteinian perspective, which holds religious language as not in the business of asserting factual beliefs and religious rituals as not methods for achieving things. This leads to two challenges that indicate prima facie incompatibility between Wittgenstein and religious fictionalism: religious fictionalists are usually presented as atheists who think religious beliefs are false and are motivated to participate in religion because they believe it remains useful. We conclude with some responses to each challenge, showing that hermeneutic fictionalism is the most promising form of fictionalism from a Wittgensteinian view.

In her exposition of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2004) elaborates on Wittgenstein’s conception of certainty and doubt to argue that Cartesian skeptical doubt involving the evil genius is not a real doubt, does not influence our practices and actions, and it is a category mistake. This paper will argue that if we take Descartes in his historical context, we will realize that Cartesian doubt qualifies the conditions Moyal-Sharrock sets for genuine cases of doubt. In general, within specific theistic frameworks, such doubts are possible and pass the test of genuine doubt proposed by Moyal-Sharrock. Although such doubts are not genuine within the Wittgensteinian framework, this should not lead to the conclusion that Wittgensteinian arguments and considerations about genuine doubts are valid in all frameworks. This paper concludes that taking the Wittgensteinian idea of framework seriously leads to the conclusion that meaningful and genuine skeptical doubts are framework-dependent.

Some philosophers of religion are attracted to Wittgenstein’s claim of approaching religion in a descriptive and non-revisionary manner because they desire greater plurality and diversity of religions in their study. However, Wittgenstein’s account of religious beliefs as never based on evidence (i.e., non-evidentialism) and rituals as never performed as a means to an end (i.e., non-instrumentalism) results in a prescriptive conception of religion that impedes the plurality and diversity of religions apt for study. Moreover, since he thinks scientific beliefs are evidential and scientific practices are instrumental, he effectively dichotomizes religion from science. After demonstrating this, we counter that: (i) many religious beliefs are based on evidence; (ii) many religious practices are means to an end; (iii) not every society that has a religion separates it from science; (iv) Wittgenstein’s approach gaslights many religious believers.

Following Robert Fogelin’s “The Logic of Deep Disagreement” (2005), the Wittgensteinian idea of deep disagreement has gathered considerable attention. Philosophers have mostly engaged with the implications of deep disagreement in epistemological discussions. Religious beliefs are usually used as examples in discussions of deep disagreement. This paper will focus on deep moral disagreement between theistic and atheistic frameworks. Three ways deep moral disagreement between theists and atheists could be accounted for will be identified. Deep moral disagreements could take place because of moral hinges or non-moral hinges or could be accounted for in meta-ethical terms. Given the interconnectedness of hinges, singling out a moral hinge and discussing the deep disagreement between theists and atheists based on that hinge could be misleading. To make this point, I will focus on the idea of moral certainty presented and discussed by Nigel Pleasants (2008, 2009, 2015). Finally, the account of moral certainty presented by Pleasants will be challenged by examining divine command theory.

Can we rationally choose between philosophical hinge commitments if they resist argument and evidence? At first glance, such choices seem arbitrary. Coliva and Palmira (2020, 2021) and Coliva and Doulas (2022) argue, however, that adopting a constitutivist account of hinges allows for rational choice through what Coliva terms ‘extended rationality’. They claim that accepting the hinge ‘there are physical objects’ is constitutive of epistemic rationality. This paper challenges that view, arguing that the idealist hinge is misrepresented in their work and that this particular hinge may not ground rational belief. The paper shows that constitutivism, though promising, faces a criterion problem in philosophical hinge disagreements. It concludes that while constitutivism and extended rationality can explain belief rationality, they must be supported by independent criteria for selecting between competing hinges.

This paper seeks to examine the transformations of faith as a result of experiencing pain and suffering or what is referred to as ‘natural’ and ‘moral evils’ in the problem of evil. Relying on Wittgenstein’s philosophical remarks, I will argue that transformation of faith does not occur because of rational arguments but based on certain experiences. Our experiences in life touch us so deeply at times that it leads to transformation of our beliefs, feelings, and worldviews. Going through pain and suffering in this world can be one of those experiences that transform us, our feelings and how we perceive the world. Belief and disbelief in God both provide possibilities for individuals to interpret the pain and suffering they go through. However, there are some evils that we go through in our lives that destabilize the religious or irreligious beliefs themselves. In the face of such experiences some believers would abandon their faith and some atheists would convert to theism.

Dieser Beitrag soll zeigen, inwiefern Wittgensteins Sichtweise auf Technologie eine Herausforderung für die Digitalisierung der Bildung darstellt. Zu diesem Zwecke wird hier die kulturelle Interpretation von Wittgensteins Sichtweise auf Technologie herangezogen, wonach Technologien, wie Wörter, vor einem Hintergrund von Sprachspielen und Lebensformen verstanden werden müssen – und nicht umgekehrt. Ausgehend von Wittgensteins Annahme eines gemeinsamen Hintergrundes menschlicher Lebenswelten wird eine paradigmatische Auffassung vom Verhältnis zwischen modernen technologischen und primitiven Gesellschaften, gemeinsam mit der Idee tief gehender Meinungsverschiedenheiten, zurückgewiesen. Gemäß der kulturellen Interpretation stellt dieser Beitrag klar, dass sich die Digitalisierung der Bildung den Risiken mechanischer Ansätze bewusst sein sollte. Eine Wittgensteinsche Herangehensweise an diese Risiken erfordert, dass wir die Probleme erkennen, die durch die Verwechslung kultureller und mechanischer Verwendungen von Wörtern entstehen, und diese lösen, indem wir zu den ursprünglichen alltäglichen Verwendungen jener Wörter zurückkehren.

Drawing on Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, Duncan Pritchard argues for a position he calls quasi-fideism. Quasi-Fideism is the view that hinge commitments such as “God exists” are exempt from rational scrutiny within the language game of religion. However, other religious beliefs, which are not part of the framework of hinge commitments, can be rationally assessed and evaluated. This view is to be contrasted with pure fideism, in which all aspects of religion are exempt from rational scrutiny. The success of quasi-fideism depends on demonstrating that “God exists” is, indeed, a hinge commitment. In this paper, I will review and criticize some of Pritchard’s reasons for arguing that God’s existence should be considered a hinge commitment. Additionally, I will offer reasons why “God exists” cannot be a hinge commitment. Considering the rational problem of evil, single and multiple divine attributes, and the emotional problem of evil, I will show that the non-circular rational criticism of God’s existence is possible. Following the distinction between subjective and objective certainty in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, I will suggest that a more fruitful line of inquiry for Wittgensteinians is to examine God as a subjective certainty.

Noah McKay ( 2023 ) has proposed a novel argument against naturalism. He argues that while theism can explain our ability to arrive at a body of moral beliefs that are generally accurate and complete’, naturalism fails to do so. He argues that naturalism has only social and biological grounds to account for our moral beliefs, which means that naturalism can only claim pragmatic value for our moral beliefs. McKay dedicates his paper to arguing against naturalism. This paper will focus on theism and examine whether theism can explain what naturalism cannot. Theism could rely on guided evolution or the miraculous intervention of God. In contrast to naturalism, theism has revelatory and supernatural grounds for our moral beliefs. This paper will demonstrate some of the challenges that these grounds would encounter. Finally, McKay’s argument implies a dichotomy between unguided evolution and theism, which rests on a problematic assumption about evolutionary theory; by abandoning the assumption, the dichotomy also dissolves.

In “The evolutionary argument against naturalism: a Wittgensteinian response,” DeVito and McNabb (Int J Philos Relig 92(2):91–98, 2022, 10.1007/s11153-022-09832-3) propose a Wittgensteinian argument against Alvin Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism. In their paper, they seek to establish symmetry between a component of Plantinga’s premise and the premise of the radical skeptic. The first premise of Plantinga’s argument assumes the possibility of doubting the reliability of our cognitive abilities. The Radical skeptic doubts we have rational grounds to refute being brains in vats. DeVito and McNaab use hinge epistemology and Pritchard’s strategy against the radical skeptic to undermine Plantinga’s premise. This paper offers an alternative argument based on hinge epistemology against Plantinga’s argument. Relying on the various types of certainties Wittgenstein discussed, I argue that some scientific facts are among our certainties and hinges. Evolution (i.e., the theory of evolution by natural selection) is a well-established scientific fact and a hinge. As a result, in Plantinga’s first premise, we have two hinges: evolution and the reliability of our cognitive abilities. I will argue that given that hinges cannot trump one another, we can have these two hinges in place, and therefore, by endorsing hinge epistemology, there is another argument that shows why Plantinga’s argument cannot undermine naturalism if one accepts evolution.