Maria Mejia

This volume contains Constant's remarkable speeches to the Tribunal, published after all available sources, including the minutes of the sessions, with records of all his interventions and of a lost speech, fragments of an uncompleted work »De la possibilité d'une constitution républicaine dans un grand pays«, edited on the basis of all the manuscripts, a number of other texts from the same period, and a partial copy of »Des circonstances actuelles« by Mme de Staël, which left its mark on the uncompleted work and is essential to an informed understanding of the initial foundations of Constant's political thinking. This rich collection of texts presented from an unwonted perspective is rounded off, as always, by a chronology, bibliographic resources, and an index of proper names.

In this paper I put forth three criticisms against McDowell account of the idea that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. I argue that McDowell’s account fails as a defense of Kant’s doctrine for at least three reasons. First, McDowell claims that agents can appeal to experience in order to formulate and recognize categorical imperatives. However, Kant strongly disagrees with this claim, explicitly claiming that moral requirements cannot be derived from experience. Second, McDowell argues that the virtuous agent will not experience inner conflict when motivating herself to act virtuously, but inner conflict plays a central role in Kant’s picture of moral motivation and virtue. Third, McDowell does not account for how the moral law serves as a necessary incentive to moral action through the a priori feeling of respect. Finally, I suggest that my criticisms cast doubt on the validity of McDowell’s account, and provide insights into some criteria that an account must meet if it is to be a proper defense of Kant’s doctrine of moral requirements as categorical imperatives.