•  185
    It is time to bring the rich resources of these traditions into the contemporary debate about the nature of self. This volume is the first of its kind.
  •  154
    Self and other: from pure ego to co-constituted we
    Continental Philosophy Review 48 (2): 143-160. 2015.
    In recent years, the social dimensions of selfhood have been discussed widely. Can you be a self on your own or only together with others? Is selfhood a built-in feature of experience or rather socially constructed? Does a strong emphasis on the first-personal character of consciousness prohibit a satisfactory account of intersubjectivity or is the former rather a necessary requirement for the latter? These questions are explored in the following contribution
  •  147
    When it comes to understanding the nature of social cognition, we have— according to the standard view—a choice between the simulation theory, the theory-theory or some hybrid between the two. The aim of this paper is to argue that there are, in fact, other options available, and that one such option has been articulated by various think- ers belonging to the phenomenological tradition. More specifically, the paper will con- trast Lipps’ account of empathy—an account that has recently undergone …Read more
  • Kroppen i transcendentalfænomenologisk perspektiv
    Philosophia 22 (3-4): 25-42. 1993.
  •  66
    Varieties of self-awareness
    In K. W. M. Fulford (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry, Oxford University Press. pp. 221. 2013.
    This chapter argues that explicit self-conscious thinking is founded on an implicit form of self-awareness built into the very structure of phenomenal consciousness. In broad strokes, the argument is that a theory denying the existence of pre-reflective or minimal self-awareness has difficulties explaining a number of essential features of explicit first-person self-reference, and that this will impede a proper understanding of certain types of psychopathology. The chapter proceeds by discussion…Read more
  •  49
    Reply: A Phenomenology with Legs and Brains
    Abstracta 4 (3): 86-107. 2008.
    We first want to express our thanks to the commentators for their close and critical readings of The Phenomenological Mind. We would like to treat their comments and challenging questions as a productive opportunity to clarify and to make our positions more precise. Before we address the specific points raised by our colleagues, we do want to say that the intersection between phenomenology and the cognitive sciences is a rich one, and growing richer as collaboration and research continues. Our b…Read more
  •  166
    This was originally written and presented at the National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar for College Teachers on Folk Psychology vs. Mental Simulation: How Minds Understand Minds, run by Robert Gordon at the University of Missouri - St. Louis, June-July 1999. It has been only lightly revised since, and should be considered a rough draft. Needless to say, the ideas herein owe a lot to what I learned at the seminar from Robert Gordon and the other participants, particularly Jim Garson…Read more
  •  49
    Introduction: Subjectivity in the center or back to basics (review)
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (3): 229-234. 2004.
  •  22
    À propos de la neutralité métaphysique des «Recherches logiques»
    Revue Philosophique De Louvain 99 (4): 715-736. 2001.
  •  94
    Comment: Basic Empathy and Complex Empathy
    Emotion Review 4 (1): 81-82. 2012.
    In my short commentary, I dwell on the distinction between basic and complex empathy, and suggest that a basic perception-based form of empathy might point to the existence of a type of social understanding that is more direct and more fundamental than the types of social cognition normally addressed by simulation theory and theory theory
  •  12
    Self-Awareness, Temporality, and Alterity: Central Topics in Phenomenology (edited book)
    Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1998.
    Focusing on the topics of self-awareness, temporality, and alterity, this anthology contains contributions by prominent phenomenologists from Germany, Belgium, France, Japan, USA, Canada and Denmark, all addressing questions very much in the center of current phenomenological debate. What is the relation between the self and the Other? How are self-awareness and intentionality intertwined? To what extent do the temporality and corporeality of subjectivity contain a dimension of alterity? How sho…Read more
  •  29
    Intentionality and Phenomenality: Phenomenological Take on the Hard Problem
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (sup1): 63-92. 2003.
    In his bookThe Conscious MindDavid Chalmers introduced a now-familiar distinction between the hard problem and the easy problems of consciousness. The easy problems are those concerned with the question of how the mind can process information, react to environmental stimuli, and exhibit such capacities as discrimination, categorization, and introspection. All of these abilities are impressive, but they are, according to Chalmers, not metaphysically baffling, since they can all be tackled by mean…Read more
  •  2
    This volume commemorates the centenary of Logical Investigations by subjecting the work to a comprehensive critical analysis. It contains new contributions by leading scholars addressing some of the most central analyses to be found in the book.
  • Body and nature
    Husserl Studies 20 89-97. 2004.
  •  277
    Husserl's noema and the internalism‐externalism debate
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 47 (1): 42-66. 2004.
    In a number of papers, Hubert Dreyfus and Ronald McIntyre have claimed that Husserl is an internalist. In this paper, it is argued that their interpretation is based on two questionable assumptions: (1) that Husserl's noema should be interpreted along Fregean lines, and (2) that Husserl's transcendental methodology commits him to some form of methodological solipsism. Both of these assumptions are criticized on the basis of the most recent Husserl-research. It is shown that Husserl's concept of …Read more
  •  3
  •  68
    Faces and ascriptions: Mapping measures of the self
    Consciousness and Cognition 20 (1): 141-148. 2011.
    The ‘self’ is increasingly used as a variable in cognitive experiments and correlated with activity in particular areas in the brain. At first glance, this seems to transform the self from an ephemeral theoretical entity to something concrete and measurable. However, the transformation is by no means unproblematic. We trace the development of two important experimental paradigms in the study of the self, self-face recognition and the adjective self ascription task. We show how the experimental i…Read more
  •  1030
    Two takes on a one-level account of consciousness
    PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12. 2006.
    My presentation will discuss two one-level accounts of consciousness, a Brentanian and a Husserlian. I will address some of the relevant differences
  •  106
    Manfred Frank and Niels Weidtmann (Eds.): Husserl und die Philosophie des Geistes Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s10743-011-9101-2 Authors Dan Zahavi, Center for Subjectivity Research, Department of Media, Cognition and Communication, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark Journal Husserl Studies Online ISSN 1572-8501 Print ISSN 0167-9848
  •  227
    The uncanny mirror: A re-framing of mirror self-experience
    with Philippe Rochat
    Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2): 204-213. 2011.
    Mirror self-experience is re-casted away from the cognitivist interpretation that has dominated discussions on the issue since the establishment of the mirror mark test. Ideas formulated by Merleau-Ponty on mirror self-experience point to the profoundly unsettling encounter with one’s specular double. These ideas, together with developmental evidence are re-visited to provide a new, psychologically and phenomenologically more valid account of mirror self-experience: an experience associated with…Read more
  •  295
    In his recent book ‘Kant and the Mind’ Andrew Brook makes a distinction between two types of selfawareness. The first type, which he calls empirical self-awareness, is an awareness of particular psychological states such as perceptions, memories, desires, bodily sensations etc. One attains this type of self-awareness simply by having particular experiences and being aware of them. To be in possession of empirical self-awareness is, in short, simply to be conscious of one’s occurrent experience. …Read more
  •  173
  •  24
    The Phenomenological Mind is the first book to properly introduce fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. Key questions and topics covered include: What is phenomenology? naturalizing phenomenology and the empirical cognitive sciences phenomenology and consciousness consciousness and self-consciousness, including perception and action time and consciousness, including William James intentionality the embodied mind action knowledge of other minds situated and e…Read more
  •  51
    Expression and empathy
    In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed, Kluwer/springer Press. pp. 25--40. 2007.
  •  7
    Thompson, Evan
    Husserl Studies 25 (2): 159-168. 2009.