•  38
    Basic Empathy and Complex Empathy
    Emotion Review 4 (1): 81-82. 2012.
    In my short commentary, I dwell on the distinction between basic and complex empathy, and suggest that a basic perception-based form of empathy might point to the existence of a type of social understanding that is more direct and more fundamental than the types of social cognition normally addressed by simulation theory and theory theory.
  •  226
    Husserl's phenomenology
    Stanford University Press. 2003.
    It is commonly believed that Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), well known as the founder of phenomenology and as the teacher of Heidegger, was unable to free himself from the framework of a classical metaphysics of subjectivity. Supposedly, he never abandoned the view that the world and the Other are constituted by a pure transcendental subject, and his thinking in consequence remains Cartesian, idealistic, and solipsistic. The continuing publication of Husserl’s manuscripts has made it necessary to r…Read more
  •  84
  • A Fenomenologia eo Desafio do Naturalismo
    Phainomenon: Revista de Fenomenologia 16 (315-334): 315-334. 2010.
  •  453
    On many standard readings, shame is an emotion that in an accentuated manner targets and involves the self in its totality. In shame, the self is affected by a global devaluation: it feels defective, objectionable, condemned. The basic question I wish to raise and discuss is the following: What does the fact that we feel shame tell us about the nature of self? What kind of self is it that is affected in shame?
  •  288
    The time of the self
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1): 143-159. 2012.
  •  6
    The past decade has witnessed a notable turn in philosophical orientation in the Nordic countries. For the first time, the North has a generation of philosophers who are oriented to phenomenology. This means a vital rediscovery of the phenomenological tradition as a partly hidden conceptual and methodological resource for taking on contemporary philosophical problems. The essays collected in the present volume introduce the reader to the phenomenological work done in the Nordic countries today. …Read more
  •  280
    Phenomenological Psychopathology and Schizophrenia: Contemporary Approaches and Misunderstandings
    with Louis Sass and Josef Parnas
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (1). 2011.
    The phenomenological approach to schizophrenia has undergone something of a renaissance in Anglophone psychiatry in recent years. There has been a proliferation of works that focus on the nature of subjectivity in schizophrenia and related disorders, and that take inspiration from the work of such German and French philosophers as Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, and such classical psychiatrists as Minkowski, Blankenburg, and Binswanger (Rulf 2003; Sass 2001a, 2001b). This trend includes p…Read more
  •  178
    One of Michel Henry’s persistent claims has been that phenomenology is quite unlike positive sciences such as physics, chemistry, biology, history, and law. Rather than studying particular objects and phenomena phenomenology is a transcendental enterprise whose task is to disclose and analyse the structure of manifestation or appearance and its very condition of possibility.
  •  28
    The Oxford handbook of contemporary phenomenology (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2012.
    The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology presents twenty-eight essays by some of the leading figures in the field, and gives an authoritative overview of the type of work and range of topics found and discussed in contemporary phenomenology. It is the definitive guide to what is currently going on in phenomenology, and offers a rich source of insight and stimulation for philosophers, students of philosophy, and for people working in other disciplines of the humanities, social sciences, …Read more
  •  13
    Intentionalität und erfahrung
    Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2): 299-318. 2005.
    Seit der Veröffentlichung von Chalmers einflussreichem Werk The Conscious Mind war es üblich, die philosophischen Probleme des Bewusstseins in zwei Gruppen zu teilen. Während sich das sogenannte „schwere Problem des Bewusstseins“ auf die Natur des phänomenalen Bewusstseins und die Perspektive der ersten Person bezieht, befasst sich das „leichte Problem des Bewusstseins“ vor allem mit dem Begriff der Intentionalität. Doch es stellt sich die Frage, ob es tatsächlich möglich ist, Intentionalität ei…Read more
  •  134
    _The Phenomenological Mind_ is the first book to properly introduce fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. Key questions and topics covered include: • what is phenomenology? • naturalizing phenomenology and the cognitive sciences • phenomenology and consciousness • consciousness and self-consciousness • time and consciousness • intentionality • the embodied mind • action • knowledge of other minds • situated and extended minds • phenomenology and personal ide…Read more
  •  79
    Phenomenology of self
    In Tilo Kircher & Anthony S. David (eds.), The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry, Cambridge University Press. pp. 56--75. 2003.
  •  321
    Empathy and Other-Directed Intentionality
    Topoi 33 (1): 129-142. 2014.
    The article explores and compares the accounts of empathy found in Lipps, Scheler, Stein and Husserl and argues that the three latter phenomenological thinkers offer a model of empathy, which is not only distinctly different from Lipps’, but which also diverge from the currently dominant models
  •  348
    Thompson, Evan. Mind in life: Biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind (review)
    Husserl Studies 25 (2): 159-168. 2007.
    Thompson, Evan. Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s10743-009-9057-7 Authors Dan Zahavi, University of Copenhagen Center for Subjectivity Research Njalsgade 140-142 2300 Copenhagen Denmark Journal Husserl Studies Online ISSN 1572-8501 Print ISSN 0167-9848 Journal Volume Volume 25 Journal Issue Volume 25, Number 2
  •  6
    Intencionalnost i iskustvo
    Filozofska Istrazivanja 26 (2): 319-337. 2006.
    Od objavljivanja Chalmersova utjecajnog rada The Conscious Mind , bilo je uobičajeno dijeliti filozofijske probleme svijesti na dvije grupe. Dok se tzv. »teški problem svijesti« tiče prirode fenomenalne svijesti i perspektive prve-osobe, »laki problem svijesti« uglavnom se bavi pojmom intencionalnosti. No je li stvarno moguće potpuno istraživati intencionalnost bez uzimanja u obzir iskustvene dimenzije? I vice versa, je li moguće razumjeti prirodu subjektivnosti i iskustva ako ignoriramo intenci…Read more
  •  493
    Phenomenology and the project of naturalization
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4): 331-47. 2004.
    In recent years, more and more people have started talking about the necessity of reconciling phenomenology with the project of naturalization. Is it possible to bridge the gap between phenomenological analyses and naturalistic models of consciousness? Is it possible to naturalize phenomenology? Given the transcendental philosophically motivated anti-naturalism found in many phenomenologists such a naturalization proposal might seem doomed from the very start, but in this paper I will examine an…Read more
  •  264
    Back to Brentano?
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11): 66-87. 2004.
    For a cou ple of decades, higher-order the o ries of con scious ness have enjoyed great pop u lar ity, but they have recently been met with grow ing dis sat is - fac tion. Many have started to look else where for via ble alter na tives, and within the last few years, quite a few have redis cov ered Brentano. In this paper such a Brentanian one-level account of con scious ness will be out lined and dis - cussed. It will be argued that it can con trib ute impor tant insights to our under - stand i…Read more
  •  669
    Intentionality and Experience
    Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2): 299-318. 2005.
    Since the publication of Chalmer’s influential work, The Conscious Mind, it has been customary to divide the philosophical problems of consciousness into two groups. Whereas the so-called ‘hard problem’ of consciousness concerns the nature of phenomenal awareness and the first-person perspective, the ‘easy problems of consciousness’ mainly concern the notion of intentionality. But is it really possible to investigate intentionality thoroughly without taking the experiential dimension into accoun…Read more
  •  44
    Nordic society for phenomenology
    Continental Philosophy Review 34 (3): 359-359. 2001.
  •  20
    A Question of Method: Reflective vs. Hermeneutical Phenomenology
    The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 12 111-118. 2007.
    In his Allgemeine Psychologie of 1912, Natorp formulates a by now classical criticism of phenomenology. 1. Phenomenology claims to describe and analyze lived subjectivity itself. In order to do so it employs a reflective methodology. But reflection is a kind of internal perception; it is a theoretical attitude; it involves an objectification. And as Natorp then asks, how is this objectifying procedure ever going to provide us with access to lived subjectivity itself? 2. Phenomenology aims at des…Read more
  •  238
    Horizontal intentionality and transcendental intersubjectivity
    Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 59 (2): 304-321. 1997.
    Through an investigation of Husserl's concept of horizontal intentionality, the article basically argues that the horizon is intrinsically intersubjective, and that it entails an implicit reference to the intentions of possible Others. Against this background it is argued that our perceptual experience of an embodied Other, our factual encounter with the Other, is not the most basic and fundamental type of intersubjectivity. On the contrary, it presupposes a type of intersubjectivity which belon…Read more
  •  2
    Merleau-ponty's reading of Husserl
    In Ted Toadvine & Lester E. Embree (eds.), , Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 3-30. 2002.
  •  256
    Philosophical Issues: Phenomenology
    with Evan Thompson
    In Morris Moscovitch, Philip Zelazo & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness, Cambridge University Press. pp. 67-87. 2007.
    Current scientific research on consciousness aims to understand how consciousness arises from the workings of the brain and body, as well as the relations between conscious experience and cognitive processing. Clearly, to make progress in these areas, researchers cannot avoid a range of conceptual issues about the nature and structure of consciousness, such as the following: What is the relation between intentionality and consciousness? What is the relation between self-awareness and consciousne…Read more
  •  283
  •  101
    Empathy≠sharing: Perspectives from phenomenology and developmental psychology
    with Philippe Rochat
    Consciousness and Cognition 36 543-553. 2015.
  •  157
    Life, thinking and phenomenology in the early Bergson
    In Michael R. Kelly (ed.), Bergson and Phenomenology, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 118--133. 2010.
    How should we appraise Bergson’s relation to phenomenology? There are different ways to tackle this question. In the following my focus will be quite narrow. I will restrict myself to a close reading of Bergson’s doctoral dissertation Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience. The question I wish to ask is basically whether the analysis of consciousness that Bergson provides in the second chapter of the dissertation is phenomenologically convincing.