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William Child

University of Oxford
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    68
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 More details
  • University of Oxford
    Faculty of Philosophy, University College
    Professor
Email (login required)
Spain
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind
20th Century Philosophy
Areas of Interest
History of Western Philosophy
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Philosophy, Misc
  • All publications (68)
  •  229
    Dreaming, calculating, thinking: Wittgenstein and anti-realism about the past
    Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227). 2007.
    For the anti-realist, the truth about a subject's past thoughts and attitudes is determined by what he is subsequently disposed to judge about them. The argument for an anti-realist interpretation of Wittgenstein's view of past-tense statements seems plausible in three cases: dreams, calculating in the head, and thinking. Wittgenstein is indeed an anti-realist about dreaming. His account of calculating in the head suggests anti-realism about the past, but turns out to be essentially realistic. H…Read more
    For the anti-realist, the truth about a subject's past thoughts and attitudes is determined by what he is subsequently disposed to judge about them. The argument for an anti-realist interpretation of Wittgenstein's view of past-tense statements seems plausible in three cases: dreams, calculating in the head, and thinking. Wittgenstein is indeed an anti-realist about dreaming. His account of calculating in the head suggests anti-realism about the past, but turns out to be essentially realistic. He does not endorse general anti-realism about past thoughts; but his treatment does in some cases involve elements of anti-realism, unacceptable in some instances but possibly correct in others.
    Ludwig WittgensteinDreams
  •  2
    Wittgenstein's externalism: Context, self-knowledge & the past
    In Tomáš Marvan (ed.), What determines content?: the internalism/externalism dispute, Cambridge Scholars Press. 2006.
    Expression-Based Accounts of Self-KnowledgeLudwig WittgensteinExternalism and Self-Knowledge, Misc
  •  197
    Vision and causation: Reply to Hyman
    Philosophical Quarterly 44 (176): 361-369. 1994.
    The Causal Theory of Perception
  • On Having a Meaning Before One’s Mind
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 25 (1). 2006.
  •  271
    Anomalism, uncodifiability, and psychophysical relations
    Philosophical Review 102 (2): 215-245. 1993.
    Anomalous Monism
  •  153
    Wittgenstein, dreaming and anti-realism: A reply to Richard Scheer
    Philosophical Investigations 32 (4): 329-337. 2009.
    I have argued that Wittgenstein's treatment of dreaming involves a kind of anti-realism about the past: what makes "I dreamed p " true is, roughly, that I wake with the feeling or impression of having dreamed p. Richard Scheer raises three objections. First, that the texts do not support my interpretation. Second, that the anti-realist view of dreaming does not make sense, so cannot be Wittgenstein's view. Third, that the anti-realist view leaves it a mystery why someone who reports having dream…Read more
    I have argued that Wittgenstein's treatment of dreaming involves a kind of anti-realism about the past: what makes "I dreamed p " true is, roughly, that I wake with the feeling or impression of having dreamed p. Richard Scheer raises three objections. First, that the texts do not support my interpretation. Second, that the anti-realist view of dreaming does not make sense, so cannot be Wittgenstein's view. Third, that the anti-realist view leaves it a mystery why someone who reports having dreamed such-and-such is inclined to report what she does. The Reply defends my reading of Wittgenstein against these objections.
    DreamsLudwig Wittgenstein
  • Remembering intentions
    In Arif Ahmed (ed.), Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: A Critical Guide, Cambridge University Press. 2010.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  •  266
    Davidson on first person authority and knowledge of meaning
    Noûs 41 (2). 2007.
    First-Person Authority and Privileged AccessDonald Davidson
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