•  2
    IV—On the Dualism of Scheme and Content
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94 (1): 53-72. 1994.
  •  100
    Triangulation: Davidson, Realism and Natural Kinds
    Dialectica 55 (1): 29-50. 2001.
    Is there a plausible middle position in the debate between realists and constructivists about categories or kinds? Such a position may seem to be contained in the account of triangulation that Donald Davidson develops in recent writings. On this account, the kinds we pick out are determined by an interaction between our shared similarity responses and causal relations between us and things in our environment. So kinds and categories are neither imposed on us by the nature of the world, nor impos…Read more
  • The New Wittgenstein
    with Alice Crary, Rupert Read, Timothy G. Mccarthy, Sean C. Stidd, and David Charles
    Mind 114 (453): 129-137. 2005.
  •  5
    Book-Reviews (review)
    Mind 100 (397): 162-171. 1991.
  •  5
    Book Reviews (review)
    Mind 103 (410): 223-229. 1994.
  • Causation and Interpretation: Some Questions in the Philosophy of Mind
    Dissertation, University of Oxford (United Kingdom). 1989.
    Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;I deal with two themes: the idea that an account of thought should be given by giving an account of the ascription of thoughts by a radical interpreter--which I call interpretationism; and the idea that psychological concepts like action and perception are essentially causal. It has often been thought that these two themes conflict; or at least, that if they can co-exist, then they must be kept separate, and associ…Read more
  •  17
    Wittgenstein on Meaning by Colin McGinn (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 85 (5): 271-277. 1988.
  •  16
    Book reviews (review)
    Mind 103 (410): 162-171. 1994.
  •  39
    Interpreting people and interpreting texts
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3). 2006.
    What is the relation between interpreting a person's speech and actions, on the one hand, and interpreting a written text, on the other? That question is considered in connection with the theories of interpretation offered by Donald Davidson and Paul Ricoeur. There are some important similarities between those theories. However, it is argued that Davidson and Ricoeur are divided on fundamental questions about the relation between meaning and intention, about the reference of texts, about the rel…Read more
  •  3
    Critical Notice
    Mind 96 (384). 1987.
    Book reviewed in this article:F.H. Bradley, Collected Works Volumes 1–5
  •  37
    Crane on mental causation
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (1): 97-102. 1997.
  •  77
    Wittgenstein, dreaming and anti-realism: A reply to Richard Scheer
    Philosophical Investigations 32 (4): 329-337. 2009.
    I have argued that Wittgenstein's treatment of dreaming involves a kind of anti-realism about the past: what makes "I dreamed p " true is, roughly, that I wake with the feeling or impression of having dreamed p . Richard Scheer raises three objections. First, that the texts do not support my interpretation. Second, that the anti-realist view of dreaming does not make sense, so cannot be Wittgenstein's view. Third, that the anti-realist view leaves it a mystery why someone who reports having drea…Read more
  •  35
    Reply to Alvin I. Goldman
    In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action, John Benjamins. pp. 45--21. 2002.
  •  69
    Memory, expression, and past-tense self-knowledge
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1). 2006.
    How should we understand our capacity to remember our past intentional states? And what can we learn from Wittgenstein's treatment of this topic? Three questions are considered. First, what is the relation between our past attitudes and our present beliefs about them? Realism about past attitudes is defended. Second, how should we understand Wittgenstein's view that self-ascriptions of past attitudes are a kind of "response" and that the "language-game" of reporting past attitudes is "the primar…Read more
  •  91
    Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind
    Oxford University Press. 1994.
    Philosophers of mind have long been interested in the relation between two ideas: that causality plays an essential role in our understanding of the mental; and that we can gain an understanding of belief and desire by considering the ascription of attitudes to people on the basis of what they say and do. Many have thought that those ideas are incompatible. William Child argues that there is in fact no tension between them, and that we should accept both. He shows how we can have a causal unders…Read more
  •  49
    Wittgensteinian Themes: Essays in Honour of David Pears (edited book)
    with David Francis Pears and David Charles
    Oxford University Press. 2001.
    A stellar group of philosophers offer new works on themes from the great philosophy of Wittgenstein, honoring one of his most eminent interpreters David Pears. This collection covers both the early and the later work of Wittgenstein, relating it to current debates in philosophy. Topics discussed include solipsism, ostension, rules, necessity, privacy, and consciousness.
  • Vision and causal understanding
    In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity, Oxford University Press. 2011.
  • Philosophy of mind. Wittgenstein on the first person
    In Marie McGinn & Oskari Kuusela (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, Oxford University Press. 2011.
  •  87
    For the anti-realist, the truth about a subject's past thoughts and attitudes is determined by what he is subsequently disposed to judge about them. The argument for an anti-realist interpretation of Wittgenstein's view of past-tense statements seems plausible in three cases: dreams, calculating in the head, and thinking. Wittgenstein is indeed an anti-realist about dreaming. His account of calculating in the head suggests anti-realism about the past, but turns out to be essentially realistic. H…Read more
  • Wittgenstein's externalism
    In Daniel Whiting (ed.), The Later Wittgenstein on Language, Palgrave-macmillan. 2010.
  •  7
    Memory, Expression, and Past-Tense Self-Knowledge
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1): 54-76. 2006.
    How should we understand our capacity to remember our past intentional states? And what can we learn from Wittgenstein's treatment of this topic? Three questions are considered. First, what is the relation between our past attitudes and our present beliefs about them? Realism about past attitudes is defended. Second, how should we understand Wittgenstein's view that self-ascriptions of past attitudes are a kind of "response" and that the "language-game" of reporting past attitudes is "the primar…Read more
  •  2
    Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind
    Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (3): 711-715. 1994.