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144Representations, targets and attitudesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1): 103-111. 2000.
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79Useless contentIn Graham Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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5IntroductionAxiomathes 13 (3): 231-237. 2003.Introduction to Millikan's Jean Nicod lectures 2002.
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222A Difference of Some Consequence Between Conventions and RulesTopoi 27 (1-2): 87-99. 2008.Lewis’s view of the way conventions are passed on may have some especially interesting consequences for the study of language. I’ll start by briefly discussing agreements and disagreements that I have with Lewis’s general views on conventions and then turn to how linguistic conventions spread. I’ll compare views of main stream generative linguistics, in particular, Chomsky’s views on how syntactic forms are passed on, with the sort of view of language acquisition and language change advocated by…Read more
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138Teleological Theories of mental contentIn L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Macmillan. 2002.
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266On swampkindsMind and Language 11 (1): 103-17. 1996.Suppose lightning strikes a dead tree in a swamp; I am standing nearby. My body is reduced to its elements, while entirely by coincidence (and out of different molecules) the tree is turned into my physical replica. My replica, The Swampman.....moves into my house and seems to write articles on radical interpretation. No one can tell the difference
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60Seismograph Readings for explaining behaviorPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4): 807-812. 1990.
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133Styles of RationalityIn Susan Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals?, Oxford University Press. 2006.By whatever general principles and mechanisms animal behavior is governed, human behavior control rides piggyback on top of the same or very similar mechanisms. We have reflexes. We can be conditioned. The movements that make up our smaller actions are mostly caught up in perception-action cycles following perceived Gibsonian affordances. Still, without doubt there are levels of behavior control that are peculiar to humans. Following Aristotle, tradition has it that what is added in humans is ra…Read more
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147Words, concepts, and entities: With enemies like these, I don't need friendsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1): 89-100. 1998.A number of clarifications of the target article and some corrections are made. I clarify which concepts the thesis was intended to be about, what “descriptionism” means, the difference between “concepts” and “conceptions,” and why extensions are not determined by conceptions. I clarify the meaning of “substances,” how one knows what inductions to project over them, the connection with “basic level categories,” how it is determined what substance a given substance concept is of, how equivocation…Read more
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74It is likely misbelief never has a functionBehavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6): 529-530. 2009.I highlight and amplify three central points that McKay & Dennett (M&D) make about the origin of failures to perform biologically proper functions. I question whether even positive illusions meet criteria for evolved misbelief
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1Reply: A bet with PeacockeIn C. Macdonald (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Blackwell. 1995.
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160Thoughts without laws: Cognitive science with contentPhilosophical Review 95 (January): 47-80. 1986.
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407Historical kinds and the "special sciences"Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2): 45-65. 1999.There are no "special sciences" in Fodor's sense. There is a large group of sciences, "historical sciences," that differ fundamentally from the physical sciences because they quantify over a different kind of natural or real kind, nor are the generalizations supported by these kinds exceptionless. Heterogeneity, however, is not characteristic of these kinds. That there could be an univocal empirical science that ranged over multiple realizations of a functional property is quite problematic. If …Read more
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96Purposes and Cross-PurposesThe Monist 84 (3): 392-416. 2001.§1. Both the human capacity for language and individual languages have evolved, in part, by natural selection. This paper considers certain aspects and consequences of this, concerning, among other things, the semanticspragmatics distinction.
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The myth of mental indexicalsIn Andrew Brook & Richard Devidi (eds.), Self-Reference Amd Self-Awareness, Advances in Consciousness Research Volume 11, John Benjamins. 2001.
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14Die eingebettete VernunftDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 59 (4): 493-496. 2011.Philosophers and laymen alike have traditionally assumed that whether you can reason well, make valid inferences, avoid logical mistakes and so forth is entirely a matter of how well the cogs in your head are fashioned and oiled. Partner to this is the assumption that careful reflection is always the method by which we discover whether an inference or reasoning process is correct. Against this, I argue that good reasoning needs constant empirical support; conceptual clarity is not an a priori, b…Read more
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |