•  20
    “Teleosemantics and Pushmi-Pullyu Representations” argues that core teleosemantics, particularly as defined in Millikan :281–297, 1989, White queen psychology and other essays for Alice, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1993, Philosophical perspectives, Ridgeview Publishing, Alascadero, 1996, Varieties of meaning, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2004–2008), seems to imply that all descriptive representations are at the same time directive and that directives are at the same time descriptive, hence that all represent…Read more
  •  45
    Neuroscience and teleosemantics
    Synthese 1-9. forthcoming.
    Correctly understood, teleosemantics is the claim that “representation” is a function term. Things are called “representations” if they have a certain kind of function or telos and perform it in a certain kind of way. This claim is supported with a discussion and proposals about the function of a representation and of how representations perform that function. These proposals have been retrieved by putting together current descriptions from the literature on neural representations with earlier e…Read more
  •  52
    INTERVIEW: Gedacht wird in der Welt, nicht im Kopf
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (6): 981-1000. 2010.
    This interview deals with the major themes in the work of Ruth Millikan. Her most fundamental idea is that the intentionality of inner and outer representations can be understood in analogy to biological functions. Another innovative feature is the view that thought and language stand parallel to each other. Thirdly, the basic ideas concerning the ontology and the epistemology of concepts are explained. Millikan aims at clarifying her position by contrasting it with Dretske, Fodor, Sellars, and …Read more
  •  6
    Minds, Machines and Evolution
    Noûs 21 (1): 95-98. 1987.
  •  1
    Ruth Garrett Millikan presents a strikingly original account of how we get to grips with the world in thought. Her question is Kant's 'How is knowledge possible?', answered from a contemporary naturalist standpoint. We begin with an understanding of what the world is like prior to cognition, then develop a theory of cognition within that world.
  •  2
    Replik auf Eider
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (6). 2010.
  •  1
    Varieties of Meaning: The 2002 Jean Nicod Lectures
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3): 674-681. 2007.
  •  9
    Language: A Biological Model
    Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226): 142-145. 2007.
  •  8
    White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice
    Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 233-237. 1998.
  •  78
    Naturalizing Intentionality
    The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9 83-90. 2000.
    “Intentionality,” as introduced to modern philosophy by Brentano, denotes the property that distinguishes the mental from all other things. As such, intentionality has been related to purposiveness. I suggest, however, that there are many kinds of purposes that are not mental nor derived from anything mental, such as the purpose of one’s stomach to digest food or the purpose of one’s protective eye blink reflex to keep out the sand. These purposes help us to understand intentionality in a natura…Read more
  • Language: A Biological Model
    Oxford University Press UK. 2005.
    Guiding the work of most linguists and philosophers of language today is the assumption that language is governed by prescriptive normative rules. Many believe that it is of the essence of thought itself to follow rules, rules of inference determining the intentional contents of our concepts, and that these rules originate as internalized rules of language. However, exactly what it is for there to be such things as normative rules of language remains distressingly unclear. From what source do th…Read more
  •  256
    Images of identity: In search of modes of presentation
    Mind 106 (423): 499-519. 1997.
    There are many alternative ways that a mind or brain might represent that two of its representations were of the same object or property, the 'Strawson' model, the 'duplicates' model, the 'synchrony' mode, the 'Christmas lights' model, the 'anaphor' model, and so forth. I first discuss what would constitute that a mind or brain was using one of these systems of identity marking rather than another. I then discuss devastating effects that adopting the Strawson model has on the notion that there a…Read more
  •  21
    Of what use categories?
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4): 663-664. 1986.
  •  35
    A theory of representation to complement TEC
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5): 894-895. 2001.
    The target article can be strengthened by supplementing it with a better theory of mental representation. Given such a theory, there is reason to suppose that, first, even the most primitive representations are mostly of distal affairs; second, the most primitive representations also turn out to be directed two ways at once, both stating facts and directing action.
  •  22
    Embedded rationality
    In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, Cambridge University Press. pp. 171--183. 2009.
  •  229
    On Knowing the Meaning; With a Coda on Swampman
    Mind 119 (473): 43-81. 2010.
    I give an analysis of how empirical terms do their work in communication and the gathering of knowledge that is fully externalist and that covers the full range of empirical terms. It rests on claims about ontology. A result is that armchair analysis fails as a tool for examining meanings of ‘basic’ empirical terms because their meanings are not determined by common methods or criteria of application passed from old to new users, by conventionally determined ‘intensions’. Nor do methods of appli…Read more
  •  1112
    On Reading Signs; Some Differences between Us and The Others If there are certain kinds of signs that an animal cannot learn to interpret, that might be for any of a number of reasons. It might be, first, because the animal cannot discriminate the signs from one another. For example, although human babies learn to discriminate human speech sounds according to the phonological structures of their native languages very easily, it may be that few if any other animals are capable of fully grasping t…Read more
  •  89
    The language-thought partnership: A Bird's eye view
    Language and Communication 21 (2): 157-166. 2001.
    I sketch in miniature the whole of my work on the relation between language and thought. Previously I have offered closeups of this terrain in various papers and books, and I reference them freely. But my main purpose here is to explain the relations among the parts, hoping this can serve as a short introduction to my work on language and thought for some, and for others as a clarification of the larger plan
  •  44
    Cutting Philosophy of Language Down to Size
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 48 125-140. 2001.
    When asked to contribute to this lecture series, my first thought was to talk about philosophy of biology, a new and increasingly influential field in philosophy, surely destined to have great impact in the coming years. But when a preliminary schedule for the series was circulated, I noticed that no one was speaking on language. Given the hegemony of philosophy of language at mid-century, after ‘the linguistic turn’, this seemed to require comment. How did philosophy of language achieve such st…Read more
  •  39
    Reply to Rosenberg (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3). 2007.
  • The Nicod Lectures book.
  •  129
    Representations, targets and attitudes
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1): 103-111. 2000.
  • The Jean-Nicod Lectures 2002
  •  65
    Knowing What I'm Thinking Of
    with Andrew Woodfield
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 67 (1): 91-124. 1993.
  •  71
    Précis of varieties of meaning (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3). 2007.