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    On swampkinds
    Mind and Language 11 (1): 103-17. 1996.
    Suppose lightning strikes a dead tree in a swamp; I am standing nearby. My body is reduced to its elements, while entirely by coincidence (and out of different molecules) the tree is turned into my physical replica. My replica, The Swampman.....moves into my house and seems to write articles on radical interpretation. No one can tell the difference
  •  79
    Useless content
    In Graham Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics: New Philo-sophical Essays, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2006.
  •  28
    Chapter jc W 1 4
    In Aloysius Martinich (ed.), The philosophy of language, Oxford University Press. pp. 363. 1985.
  •  133
    Naturalist Reflections on Knowledge
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65 (4): 315-334. 1984.
  •  11
    the Nicod Lectures book.
  •  114
    Knowing What I'm Thinking Of
    with Andrew Woodfield
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 67 (1): 91-124. 1993.
  •  183
    Seismograph Readings for explaining behavior
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4): 807-812. 1990.
  •  1
    The Jean-Nicod Lectures 2002
  • Intensjonalność
    Przeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 65. 2008.
    (tłum. Katarzyna Paprzycka)
  •  262
    Representations, targets and attitudes
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1): 103-111. 2000.
  • Bibliography of *Varieties of Meaning*.
  •  274
    Styles of Rationality
    In Susan Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals?, Oxford University Press. 2006.
    By whatever general principles and mechanisms animal behavior is governed, human behavior control rides piggyback on top of the same or very similar mechanisms. We have reflexes. We can be conditioned. The movements that make up our smaller actions are mostly caught up in perception-action cycles following perceived Gibsonian affordances. Still, without doubt there are levels of behavior control that are peculiar to humans. Following Aristotle, tradition has it that what is added in humans is ra…Read more
  •  200
    §1. Both the human capacity for language and individual languages have evolved, in part, by natural selection. This paper considers certain aspects and consequences of this, concerning, among other things, the semanticspragmatics distinction.
  •  2
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    Words, concepts, and entities: With enemies like these, I don't need friends
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1): 89-100. 1998.
    A number of clarifications of the target article and some corrections are made. I clarify which concepts the thesis was intended to be about, what “descriptionism” means, the difference between “concepts” and “conceptions,” and why extensions are not determined by conceptions. I clarify the meaning of “substances,” how one knows what inductions to project over them, the connection with “basic level categories,” how it is determined what substance a given substance concept is of, how equivocation…Read more
  •  1
    On Meaning, Meaning, and Meaning
    In Ruth Garrett Millikan (ed.), Language: A Biological Model, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 53-76. 2005.
    To understand how language works, one must first look to the cooperative functions that various language forms perform, understanding these on a biological model as what these forms accomplish that keeps them in circulation. Next, one should look at language mechanics, at how language forms perform their functions, and especially to the conditions in the world that are necessary to support their specific functions. These are, in part, truth conditions, which are determined by a kind of “meaning”…Read more
  •  1
    The Nicod Lectures book.
  •  159
    Metaphysical anti-realism?
    Mind 95 (380): 417-431. 1986.
  • The Nicod Lectures book.
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    II—Ruth Garrett Millikan: Loosing the Word–Concept Tie
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1): 125-143. 2011.
    Sainsbury and Tye (2011) propose that, in the case of names and other simple extensional terms, we should substitute for Frege's second level of content—for his senses—a second level of meaning vehicle—words in the language of thought. I agree. They also offer a theory of atomic concept reference—their ‘originalist’ theory—which implies that people knowing the same word have the ‘same concept’. This I reject, arguing for a symmetrical rather than an originalist theory of concept reference, claim…Read more
  •  137
    Reply to Recanati (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3). 2007.
  • The Jean-Nicod Lectures 2002
  •  729
    Pushmi-pullyu representations
    Philosophical Perspectives 9 185-200. 1995.
    A list of groceries, Professor Anscombe once suggested, might be used as a shopping list, telling what to buy, or it might be used as an inventory list, telling what has been bought (Anscombe 1957). If used as a shopping list, the world is supposed to conform to the representation: if the list does not match what is in the grocery bag, it is what is in the bag that is at fault. But if used as an inventory list, the representation is supposed to conform to the world: if the list does not match wh…Read more
  •  189
    Are there mental indexicals and demonstratives?
    Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1): 217-234. 2012.
  •  112
  •  23
    Embedded rationality
    In Philip Robbins & Murat Aydede (eds.), _The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition_, Cambridge University Press. pp. 171--183. 2008.