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312What reflective endorsement cannot doPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1): 1-19. 2009.We sometimes stop to reflect on our mental states, and such reflection can lead, at times, to changing our minds. It can, as well, lead us to endorse the very attitudes which we previously held. Such reflective endorsement has been called upon to play a wide range of roles in philosophical theorizing. It has been thought to ground a distinction between two fundamentally different kinds of knowledge: reflective knowledge and mere animal knowledge. It has been thought to serve as a ground for …Read more
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23A Naturalistic Epistemology: Selected PapersOxford University Press. 2014.This volume draws together influential work by Hilary Kornblith on naturalistic epistemology. This approach sees epistemology not as conceptual analysis, but as an explanatory project constrained and informed by work in cognitive science. These essays expound and defend Kornblith's distinctive view of how we come to have knowledge of the world.
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10La evasión contextualista de la epistemologíaTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 19 (3): 33-40. 2000.
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77Social Prerequisites for the Proper Function of Individual ReasonEpisteme 1 (3): 169-176. 2005.Human beings form beliefs by way of a variety of psychological processes. Some of these processes of belief acquisition are innate; others are acquired. A good deal of interesting work has been done in assessing the reliability of these processes. Any such assessment must examine not only features intrinsic to the psychological processes themselves, but also features of the environments in which those processes are exercised; a mechanism which is reliable in one sort of environment may be quite …Read more
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27How Scientific Practices Matter: Reclaiming Philosophical Naturalism (review)Isis 94 791-792. 2003.
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295Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2001.This anthology brings together ten papers which have defined and advanced the debate between internalism and externalism in epistemology
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38. naturalistic epistemology and its criticsIn Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology, Longman. pp. 383. 2003.
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11Belief in the Face of ControversyIn Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement, Oxford University Press. 2010.We often find that beliefs we hold are in conflict with the beliefs of epistemic peers, individuals who are just as intelligent, just as well-informed, and just as scrupulous in forming their beliefs as we are. Is it permissible to maintain our beliefs in the face of such disagreement? It is argued here that continued belief in these circumstances is not epistemically permissible, and that this has striking consequences for the practice of philosophy: we cannot reasonably hold on to our philos…Read more
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364Knowledge in humans and other animalsPhilosophical Perspectives 13 327-346. 1999.This paper defends an approach to epistemology which treats the study of knowledge as on a par with the study of natural kinds. Knowledge is seen as a natural phenomenon subject to empirical investigation. In particular, it is argued that work in cognitive ethology is relevant to understanding the nature of knowledge, and that this approach sheds light on traditional philosophical questions about knowledge, including questions about the source of epistemic normativity.
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77The impurity of reasonPacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1). 2000.Laurence BonJour has defended the view that we have an a priori intellectual capacity to understand the nature of proper reason. This view is critically examined in detail and a naturalistic alternative is proposed and defended according to which our understanding of proper reasoning requires a posteriori support.
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59How central are judgment and agency to epistemology?Philosophical Studies 174 (10): 2585-2597. 2017.Ernest Sosa’s Judgment and Agency marks an important change from his earlier work in epistemology. While belief was at the center of his earlier approach to epistemological issues, a far more sophisticated mental state, judgment, plays the central role here. This paper examines the significance of this change in focus, and argues that there is reason to favor the earlier belief-centered approach over this new judgment-centered account.
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67Précis of knowledge and its place in nature (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2). 2005.
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178Distrusting reasonMidwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1). 1999.The activity of reason-giving plays an important role in our intellectual lives. Some philosophers, however, have expressed a deep distrust of this activity. This chapter examines the grounds for such distrust and argues that it deserves a far more serious hearing than it is typically given. There are important cases in which the very activity of reason giving should be called into question, but the kinds of challenges to reason giving which are most concerning are, it is argued, ones which d…Read more
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130Why Should We Care About the Concept of Knowledge?Episteme 8 (1): 38-52. 2011.Can we learn something interesting about knowledge by examining our concept of knowledge? Quite a bit, many argue. My own view, however, is that the concept of knowledge is of little epistemological interest. In this paper, I critically examine one particularly interesting defense of the view that the concept of knowledge is of great epistemological interest: Edward Craig's Knowledge and the State of Nature. A minimalist view about the value of examining our concept of knowledge is defended
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251A reliabilist solution to the problem of promiscuous bootstrappingAnalysis 69 (2): 263-267. 2009.Jonathan Vogel has presented a disturbing problem for reliabilism. 1 Reliabilists claim that knowledge is reliably produced true belief. Reliabilism is, of course, a version of externalism, and on such a view, a knower need have no knowledge, no justified belief, indeed, no conception that his or her belief is reliably produced. It is the fact that the knower's true belief is reliably produced which makes it a case of knowledge, not any appreciation of this fact. But Vogel now argues that reliab…Read more
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96Is there room for armchair theorizing in epistemology?In Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory?, Routledge. pp. 195. 2013.Some philosophers believe that epistemological theories are a priori knowable. Others weaken this claim slightly, arguing that epistemological theorizing is properly conducted “from the armchair.” It is argued here that even this claim is far too strong. This paper defends the view that epistemological theorizing must take account of empirical work in psychology, and, without this, epistemology inevitably loses touch with the very phenomena it seeks to account for.
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50The psychological turnAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (3). 1982.This Article does not have an abstract
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120Can Internalism Be Saved?Metaphilosophy 34 (5): 621-629. 2003.Richard Feldman argues that a good deal more of Chisholm's approach can be saved than I allow in “Roderick Chisholm and the Shaping of American Epistemology.” More than this, Feldman argues that there are other, and still more defensible, forms of internalism. I argue here that the problems I presented for Chisholm's view are not so easily sidestepped either within Chisholm's system or by other forms of internalism.
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265Knowledge and its place in natureOxford University Press. 2002.Hilary Kornblith argues for a naturalistic approach to investigating knowledge. Knowledge, he explains, is a feature of the natural world, and so should be investigated using scientific methods. He offers an account of knowledge derived from the science of animal behavior, and defends this against its philosophical rivals. This controversial and refreshingly original book offers philosophers a new way to do epistemology.
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64Some social features of cognitionSynthese 73 (1). 1987.This paper describes and assesses a number of dispositions which are instrumental in allowing us to take on the opinions of others unselfconsciously. It is argued that these dispositions are in fact reliable in the environments in which they tend to come into play. In addition, it is argued that agents are, by their own lights, justified in the beliefs they arrive at as a result of these processes. Finally, these processes are argued to provide a basis for rejecting the claim that fixation of be…Read more
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155Introspection and misdirectionAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (4). 1989.Internalist theories of justification put introspection to work in service of the task of error detection. Introspecting to determine whether our beliefs are well-supported by reasons is supposed to reveal where it is that our beliefs fail to measure up to appropriate standards. Internalists do not, however, offer any empirical evidence that introspection can constructively play this role. This chapter examines relevant evidence from social psychology about the way in which introspection actu…Read more
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54Replies to Alvin Goldman, Martin Kusch and William Talbott (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2). 2005.