•  40
    Where Does Moral Knowledge Come From? (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. forthcoming.
    Sarah McGrath offers an account of moral knowledge which, she says, is "economical," that is, it draws on no subject-matter specific mental faculty. In order to defend such a claim, I argue, more attention needs to be paid to the available psychological literature. That literature is far from definitive on this question, but, I suggest, there is some real reason to think that an extravagant account of moral knowledge, one which posits a subject-matter specific moral faculty, may account for th…Read more
  • This anthology brings together ten papers which have defined and advanced the debate between internalism and externalism in epistemology.
  • This anthology brings together ten papers which have defined and advanced the debate between internalism and externalism in epistemology.
  •  51
    Epistemic Justification and Reflection (review)
    Analysis. forthcoming.
    Smithies presents an account of justification that ties it to an idealized view of reflection. I argue that no such account can work. More than this, I argue that the kind of idealization which Smithies offers loses contact with the very phenomenon of reflection which he intends to illuminate. I also discuss how Smithies's view bears on the internalism/externalism controversy.
  •  61
    As George Boole saw it, the laws of logic are the laws of thought, and by this he meant, not that human thought is actually governed by the laws of logic, but, rather, that it should be. Boole’s view that the laws of logic have normative implications for how we ought to think is anything but an outlier. The idea that violating the laws of logic involves epistemic impropriety has seemed to many to be just obvious. It has seemed especially obvious to those who see propositional justification a…Read more
  •  24
    A number of philosophers have found inspiration for a distinctive approach to a wide range of epistemological issues in P. F. Strawson’s classic essay, “Freedom and Resentment.” These Strawsonian epistemologists, as I call them, argue that the epistemology of testimony, self-knowledge, promising, and resolving is fundamentally different in kind from the epistemology of perception or inference. We should not see properly formed belief on these topics as evidence-based, for such an objective per…Read more
  •  5
    Scientific Epistemology: An Introduction
    Oxford University Press, Usa. 2021.
    "This book provides an introduction to a scientifically informed approach to epistemological questions. Theories of knowledge are often motivated by the need to respond to skepticism. The skeptic presents an argument which seems to show that knowledge is impossible, and a theory of knowledge is called upon to show, contrary to the skeptic, how knowledge is indeed possible. Traditional epistemologies, however, do not draw on the sciences in providing their response to skepticism. The approach tak…Read more
  •  20
    Contemporary Theories of Knowledge
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (1): 167-171. 1988.
  •  3
    Perception, Learning and the Self
    Philosophical Review 94 (3): 408-411. 1985.
  • How to Refer to Artifacts
    In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Creations of the Mind: Theories of Artifacts and Their Representaion, Oxford University Press. pp. 138-149. 2007.
  • The Metaphysics of Irreducibility
    with Derek Pereboom
    In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology, Oxford University Press. 2003.
  •  27
    Epistemic Agency
    In Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas (ed.), Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications, Oxford University Press Uk. 2016.
    Over the years, the notion of epistemic agency has played a larger and larger role in Ernest Sosa’s epistemology. In his most recent work, epistemic agency plays an absolutely central role in explaining why it is that our beliefs are subject to normative evaluation. This chapter argues that there are problems with the accounts of epistemic agency which Sosa gives at every stage of his work. More than this, there are other resources within Sosa’s epistemology which can do all the work he calls on…Read more
  •  1
    Second Thoughts and the Epistemological Enterprise
    Cambridge University Press. 2019.
    This volume collects ten previously published papers, together with two papers which are new to this volume. At least since Descartes, epistemologists have often worried about total skepticism: their epistemological theorizing is designed to offer a reply to the radical skeptic, showing how knowledge of the physical world is possible. The essays in this volume have a different focus. Skeptical worries are presented, and, in some cases, responded to, but the source of the worries is quite diff…Read more
  •  162
    The metaphysics of irreducibility
    Philosophical Studies 63 (August): 125-45. 1991.
    During the 'sixties and 'seventies, Hilary Putnam, Jerry Fodor, and Richard Boyd, among others, developed a type of materialism that eschews reductionist claims.1 In this view, explana- tions, natural kinds, and properties in psychology do not reduce to counterparts in more basic sciences, such as neurophysiology or physics. Nevertheless, all token psychological entities-- states, processes, and faculties--are wholly constituted of physical entities, ultimately out of entities over which microph…Read more
  •  3
    The Metaphysical Status of Knowledge
    Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 43 (1): 77-92. 2008.
  •  7
    Knowledge and Its Place in Nature
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2): 403-410. 2005.
  •  7
    Knowledge and Its Place in Nature
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2): 411-419. 2005.
  •  3
    The Impurity of Reason
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1): 67-89. 2000.
    Laurence BonJour has defended the view that we have an a priori intellectual capacity to understand the nature of proper reason. This view is critically examined in detail and a naturalistic alternative is proposed and defended according to which our understanding of proper reasoning requires a posteriori support.
  •  203
    Knowledge and Its Place in Nature
    Philosophical Review 115 (2): 246-251. 2006.
  •  15
    Naturalizing Epistemology
    Philosophy of Science 55 (1): 152-153. 1988.
  •  91
    Linda Zagzebski’s Virtues of the Mind
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1): 197-201. 2000.
  • Knowledge Without Foundations: A Causal Theory
    Dissertation, Cornell University. 1980.
    In Chapter Four, it is argued that coherence is evidence of truth. A sketch of a theory of approximate truth is developed in terms of the theory of reference outlined in Chapter Three, and this notion is put to work in showing that there is reason to believe that most of our beliefs are at least approximately true. It is then argued that coherence with approximately true beliefs, and thus the beliefs we have, is evidence of truth. ;In Chapter Three, the connection between the theory of knowledge…Read more
  •  133
    What is it like to be me?
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1): 48-60. 1998.
    Introspection plays an ineliminable role in affording us with self-knowledge, or so it is widely believed. It is argued here that introspective evidence, by itself, is often insufficient to ground reasonable belief about many of our mental states, and the knowledge we do have of much of our mental life is crucially dependent on other sources.
  •  8
    Goldman and his Critics (edited book)
    Blackwell. 2016.
    Goldman and His Critics presents a series of original essays contributed by influential philosophers who critically examine Alvin Goldman’s work, followed by Goldman’s responses to each essay. Critiques Alvin Goldman’s groundbreaking theories, writings, and ideas on a range of philosophical topics Features contributions from some of the most important and influential contemporary philosophers Covers Goldman’s views on epistemology—both individual and social—in addition to cognitive science and m…Read more
  •  30
    Knowledge needs no justification
    In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 5--23. 2008.
    The Standard View in epistemology is that knowledge is justified, true belief plus something else. This chapter argues that Standard View should be rejected: knowledge does not require justification. The nature of knowledge and the nature of justification can be better understood if we stop viewing justification as one of the necessary conditions for knowledge.
  •  9
    The Laws of Thought
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4): 895-911. 1992.
  •  196
    Testimony, memory and the limits of the a priori
    Philosophical Studies 86 (1): 1-20. 1997.
    A number of philosophers, from Thomas Reid1 through C. A. J. Coady2, have argued that one is justified in relying on the testimony of others, and furthermore, that this should be taken as a basic epistemic presumption. If such a general presumption were not ultimately dependent on evidence for the reliability of other people, the ground for this presumption would be a priori. Such a presumption would then have a status like that which Roderick Chisholm claims for the epistemic principle that we …Read more
  •  187