Christof Rapp

This paper explores a partialist strand in Epictetus’s ethical thought. Epictetus repeatedly refers to the specific roles we have to play in our lives. Some of these roles are defined by certain social relationships in which we are involved: we are children of somebody, sometimes siblings, sometimes someone’s parents or someone’s spouses. All these roles, or so Epictetus argues, define the actions appropriate for someone occupying these specific roles. This means again that there are actions appropriate towards parents, which are different from actions appropriate towards siblings or towards strangers. It is appropriate, then, not to treat everybody alike, but to display a special concern for the well-being of those close to us.

Aristoteles, Schüler Platons und Lehrer Alexanders des Großen, gilt als einer der bedeutendsten Denker überhaupt. Er hat ein umfangreiches, aber auch anspruchsvolles und schwer zugängliches Werk hinterlassen. Seine Schriften sind nicht nur grundlegend für die weitere Entwicklung in Wissenschaften und Philosophie, sondern sie stellen nach wie vor auch eine lebendige philosophische Herausforderung dar: Aristoteles zu studieren, heißt deswegen letztlich nichts anderes als zu philosophieren. Dieses Handbuch bietet einen Überblick über alle Werke und Werkgruppen, es informiert über Grundbegriffe, die sich durch sein Werk ziehen (wie Glück, Tugend, Form, Materie, Syllogismus, Substanz etc.), und es verfolgt die umfangreiche Rezeption vom Peripatos über die frühe Neuzeit bis in die Gegenwart. Für die 2. Auflage wurde das Handbuch umfassend durchgesehen, aktualisiert und um Stichworte zu den Themen Frauen, Mathematik, Mensch, Phronesis und Sklaverei erweitert. Ein neues Kapitel zu Existenzphilosophie und Hermeneutik schließt eine Lücke der Aristoteles-Rezeption im 20. Jahrhundert.

Ce texte traite de la définition aristotélicienne de la cité et des diverses constitutions, en Politique, I et III. On soutient ici (1) que la définition de la cité doit être extraite de deux passages du début du traité, (2) que la cité est définie par le but qui lui est propre et (3) que d’importants théorèmes politiques en Politique III se servent de cette définition initiale de la cité comme d’une prémisse. L’objectif ultime de cet article est de contribuer à l’évaluation du rôle que jouent les définitions dans la méthode qui est celle d’Aristote dans sa philosophie morale et politique.

The volumes of the Symposium Aristotelicum have become essential reference works for the study of Aristotle. In this twentieth volume, ten renowned scholars of ancient philosophy offer a running commentary on Aristotle's De motu animalium. It is in this text, one of his most intriguing works, that Aristotle sets out the general principles of animal locomotion. A philological and a philosophical introduction sketch the current state of research on this treatise, situating current thought in the context of three decades of scholarly debates. The nine contributed essays together comment on each chapter of the Aristotelian text, discussing in detail the philosophical issues that are raised across the different sections of the text. Comprehensive analyses of Aristotle's doctrines and arguments, as well as critical discussion of rival interpretations, make this volume a valuable resource for scholars of Aristotle. The present volume also includes a newly reconstructed Greek text with a facing English translation by Benjamin Morison.

Georg von Hertling (1843-1919) - a cousin of Franz Brentano - is the only Aristotle Scholar and Professor of Philosophy who has ever held the German Chancellorship. Before becoming a conservative politician, he was a spearhead of the German Catholic academics during the confessional struggles in the 1870s. He published a treatise with the title Materie und Form und die Definition der Seele bei Aristoteles, in which he defended a theory of individual forms in Aristotle. To a certain extent, he published this treatise in defence of his cousin Franz Brentano; but while Brentano’s theses on the soul were severely attacked by (mostly Protestant) Aristotle scholars for their Thomistic-Catholic spirit, the “critical method” adopted by Hertling was mostly met with cautious approval.

Wann immer über historische Vorbilder des Kommunitarismus gesprochen wird, fällt der Name des Aristoteles. Vor allem ist es Alasdair MacIntyre, der in seinem Buch After Virtue eine, wie er sagt, Aristotelische Tugendtheorie zu erneuern versucht. Tatsächlich bestehen gewisse Ähnlichkeiten zwischen der tugendtheoretischen Ausprägung des Kommunitarismus und Aristoteles’ praktischer Philosophie. Der vorliegende Text untersucht, ob diese Ähnlichkeiten einer genaueren Überprüfung standhalten. In wichtigen Hinsichten ergeben sich dabei einschneidende Unterschiede. Vor allem fällt es dem Kommunitarismus schwer, Aristoteles’ Berufung auf die menschliche Natur zu integrieren. Die Aristotelische Auffassung, jede Polis strebe nach einem gemeinsamen Gut, sieht der kommunitaristischen Theorie auf den ersten Blick ähnlich, doch zeigt sich auch hier, dass die Tugenden bei Aristoteles nicht ihrem Inhalt nach vom besonderen Gut verschiedener Gemeinschaften abhängig sind.

This paper suggests that within Aristotle’s well-known contribution to the history of ontology two different levels should be kept apart, an analytic-critical and a constructive level. On the first level Aristotle mainly provides analytic-critical tools for overcoming the main problems of all dealings with the notions of being and to be, while the second level consists in Aristotle’s ambitious project of conducting first philosophy (i.e. the specific part of his philosophy that is meant to continue the old and time-honoured project of identifying what Aristotle calls ‘first principles and causes’) as ontology, i.e. as an inquiry into being qua being.

It is sometimes held that in Aristotle’s Politics, the polis has a nature of its own not unlike an organism, which brings with it a range of teleological norms. Against this, it is here argued that the puzzling claim that ‘the state exists by nature’ can best be explained by supposing that for Aristotle, the state exists in accordance with human nature. This is shown through an analysis of the structure of the opening chapters of the Politics, which reveals that not only poleis but also more rudimentary social arrangements (‘first communities’) like families and villages are established by humans in accordance with their natural desires and needs. Thus the polis is not legitimized and normalized through arbitrary references to nature, but solely through its relation to human nature.

Although Aristotle’s name is regularly mentioned when it comes to the question of where the notion of the will historically derives from and although one of the most influential exponents of philosophical theories of the will, Thomas Aquinas, seems to think that he is just applying the Aristotelian theory, many historians of philosophy explicitly deny that Aristotle had a notion of the will. If we think that the notion of the will is among the notions that have been gradually developed in the history of philosophy, nothing is strange about saying that some philosophers prior to this development lacked this particular notion. However, Aristotle’s case is peculiar, because the same historians, who are reluctant to describe such a notion to Aristotle, admit that he played some role in the formation of the same notion. The line-up of more or less recent philosophers and scholars who are of the opinion that Aristotle had no notion of the will is a very remarkable one. This could almost be called a standard or default position, while the list of exponents of the opposed position, i.e. that Aristotle did have a notion or theory of the will, is much shorter.