Johannes Fischer

What role does intuition play in making moral judgements? This question is becoming of key importance in the current debate on fundamentals in applied ethics. The difficulties begin in defining what intuitions exactly are. Another important question revolves around the role of intuitions in rational argument. The main proposition of this essay is that intuitions are not the same as judgements or convictions, although they are often regarded as equivalent, and that intuition is always involved in every attempt at moral reflection and argument.

The Bologna process forces a reframing of the theological education. In the autor's mind, it affords chances for an improved quality during the first two cycles. The change from an input-oriented to an output-oriented leaming provides a better professional competences. In addition, the Bologna process provokes to profile theology in an interdisciplinary context. The article outlines the profile of Theological Ethics as a self-contained discipline, connectedwith both, the other theolgical disciplines and the adjacent sciences, such as medicine, law, and sociology. According to this, the authors discuss the advantages and the risks ofthe two-cylcle, BA/ma education and draw the conclusions for the further curriculas in theological ethics. A coml)lon competence-based core-curriculum is presented in order to get joint standards and to improve student's mobility.

What is the concept of human dignity derived from? Does it have its foundation in the emotions or in reason? By dint of a differentiation between a premoral, sittliche orientation in acting (differentiated in premoral goods, duties and virtues) and a moral orientation, which is due to an external evaluating moral community, the author comes to the conclusion that human dignity finds its foundation in both the emotions and rationality. This has important implications for the task of a theological ethics insofar it is concerned with the concept of human dignity and its enforcement.

The essay discusses two different conceptions of human dignity. According to the first conception, ›respecting the dignity of a human being‹ means to respect something specific that is given by her being human. According to the second conception, however, ›respecting the dignity of a human being‹ means to respect her as a human being. With regard to the first understanding, one is bound to respect human dignity (as an abstract concept), whereas on the basis of the second conception, we owe respect to the human being herself. The duty to respect human dignity serves as a foundation for duties we have with regard to human beings as such. The duty to respect someone as the human being she is, however, is a duty towards her. This duty therefore justifies a right she may claim, namely the right to be respected as a human being. The core of human dignity, then, is this rights-conferring status of being human. This article reacts to the German debate on human embryonic research. Participants in this debate argue that human dignity depends on being human in a generic sense. According to them, the early embryo participates in this sense of being human, which allows them to apply the concept of human dignity, including the absolute protection it entails, to human embryos. The author criticizes this view, claiming that it undermines the very idea of human dignity by neglecting the rights-conferring status of being a particular human being which is at its core. Rather, a »decent society« (Avishai Margalit) is characterized by the fact that its members are treated and respected as (individual) rights-holders.