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46Redundant truthRatio 5 (1): 24-37. 1992.A strong and weak version of the redundancy theory of truth are distinguished. An argument put forth by Michael Dummett concludes that the weak version is vitiated by truth-value gaps. The weak version is defended against this argument. The strong version, however, is vitiated by truth-value gaps.
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44Definite Descriptions, Negation, and NecessitationRussell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 13 (1): 36-47. 1993.The principal question asked in this paper is: in the case of attributive usage, is the definite description to be analyzed as Russell said or is it to be treated as a referring expression, functioning semantically as a proper name? It answers by defending the former alternative.
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42Are there infinitely many sorts of things?Philosophia 8 (1): 17-30. 1978.An argument is given for Fred Sommers's thesis that the number of sorts of things, that is, the number of types or categories, discriminated by any natural language is always infinite.
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42God and empty termsInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 18 (3). 1985.This paper is a criticism of Plantinga’s analysis of a version of the ontological argument. He thinks it is obvious that his version is valid and that the only question of interest is whether a key premise is true. The paper lays out two relevant semantical accounts of modal logic. It contends that Plantinga needs to show that one is preferable to the other.
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39Can There be a Proof that an Unprovable Sentence of Arithmetic is True?Dialectica 43 (43): 289-292. 1989.Various authors of logic texts are cited who either suggest or explicitly state that the Gödel incompleteness result shows that some unprovable sentence of arithmetic is true. Against this, the paper argues that the matter is one of philosophical controversy, that it is not a mathematical or logical issue.
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39Prior and Lorenzen on QuantificationGrazer Philosophishe Studien 41 150-173. 1991.A case against Prior’s theory of propositions goes thus: (1) everyday propositional generalizations are not substitutional; (2) Priorean quantifications are not objectual; (3) quantifications are substitutional if not objectual; (4) thus, Priorean quantifications are substitutional; (5) thus that Priorean quantifications are not ontologically committed to propositions provides no basis for a similar claim about our everyday propositional generalizations. Prior agrees with (1) and (2). He rejects…Read more
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38Nagel, Internalism, and RelativismJournal of Philosophical Research 16 309-319. 1991.In this paper we (1) give a new interpretation to Thomas Nagel’s The Possibility of Altruism, and (2) use that account to show how internalism and anti-relativism are compatible, despite appearances to the contrary.
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38Roman Suzuko on Situational IdentitySorites 15 42-49. 2004.This paper gives a semantical account for the (i)ordinary propositional calculus, enriched with quantifiers binding variables standing for sentences, and with an identity-function with sentences as arguments; (ii)the ordinary theory of quantification applied to the special quantifiers; and (iii)ordinary laws of identity applied to the special function. The account includes some thoughts of Roman Suszko as well as some thoughts of Wittgenstein's Tractatus.
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34Geach on GeneralizationDialogue 41 (2): 221-. 2002.There are plausible objections to substitutional construals of generalization. But these objections do not apply to a substitutional construal of generalization proposed by Peter Geach several years ago. This paper examines Geach’s conception.
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33A fregean principleHistory and Philosophy of Logic 19 (3): 125-135. 1998.Frege held that the result of applying a predicate to names lacks reference if any of the names lack reference. We defend the principle against a number of plausible objections. We put forth an account of consequence for a first-order language with identity in which the principle holds
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33Minds, substances, and capacitiesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (2): 213-225. 1983.This paper pushes to the claim that the following is Descartes’s fundamental thesis: something has self-presenting states and self-presenting states only. Were he to have established this he would have revamped our worldview in essentially the manner he wished to revamp it. From this proposition one can get an argument for the substance view of the mind in Descartes’s writings.
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31A semantical account of the vicious circle principleNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 20 (3): 595-598. 1979.Here we give a semantical account of propositional quantification that is intended to formally represent Russell’s view that one cannot express a proposition about "all" propositions. According to the account the authors give, Russell’s view bears an interesting relation to the view that there are no sets which are members of themselves.
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31More on assertion and beliefPhilosophical Studies 22 (1-2). 1971.In an earlier paper Sayward argued that a speaker could not make an assertion by uttering a sentence of form “p, but I believe not-p” given that the speaker spoke honestly and literally. Robert Imlay criticized some things said in that earlier paper. This paper responds to those criticisms.
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29Completeness theorems for two propositional logics in which identity diverges from mutual entailmentNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 22 (3): 269-282. 1981.Anderson and Belnap devise a model theory for entailment on which propositional identity equals proposional coentailment. This feature can be reasonably questioned. The authors devise two extensions of Anderson and Belnap’s model theory. Both systems preserve Anderson and Belnap’s results for entailment, but distinguish coentailment from identity.
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29Dialogues Concerning Natural NumbersPeter Lang. 2009.Two philosophical theories, mathematical Platonism and nominalism, are the background of six dialogues in this book. There are five characters in these dialogues: three are nominalists; the fourth is a Platonist; the main character is somewhat skeptical on most issues in the philosophy of mathematics, and is particularly skeptical regarding the two background theories.
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28Is English infinite?Philosophical Papers 17 (2): 141-151. 1988.It is argued that English is finite. By this is meant that it contains only finitely many expressions. The conclusion is reached by arguing: (1) only finitely many expressions of English are tokenable; (2) if E is an expression of English, then E is tokenable.
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28Is Any Economic System Unjust?Southwest Philosophy Review 5 (2): 17-23. 1989.The morality of an economic system characterized as an Adam Smith type system is compared with one characterized by central planning. A prima facie case is made that, while the latter has attributes that satisfy a necessary condition for having moral attributes, the former does not and, as a result, has no moral attributes. But then a deeper look at the situation reveals that the directed systems really do not satisfy the necessary condition either. Both the directed and undirected systems end u…Read more
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28Do we need models?Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 28 (3): 414-422. 1987.The aim of this paper is to provide a nondenotational semantics for first-order languages which will match one for one each distribution of truth-values available in terms of a denotational semantics.
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24Eternal sentencesAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 54 (1). 1976.The paper argues that two apparently attractive conceptions of an eternal sentence are defective. An alternative conception is presented which the authors think allows greater insight into the nature of semantic concepts.
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19Do Moral Explanations Matter?Philosophy Research Archives 14 137-142. 1988.In a recent paper Nicholas Sturgeon claims moral explanations constitute one area of disagreement between moral realists and noncognitivists. The correctness of such explanation is consistent with moral realism but not with noncognitivism. Does this difference characterize other anti-realist views? I argue that it does not. Moral relativism is a distinct anti-realist view. And the correctness of moral explanations is consistent with moral relativism.
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19Steiner versus Wittgenstein: Remarks on Differing Views of Mathematical TruthTheoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 20 (3): 347-352. 2010.Mark Steiner criticizes some remarks Wittgenstein makes about Gödel. Steiner takes Wittgenstein to be disputing a mathematical result. The paper argues that Wittgenstein does no such thing. The contrast between the realist and the demonstrativist concerning mathematical truth is examined. Wittgenstein is held to side with neither camp. Rather, his point is that a realist argument is inconclusive.
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18Should persons be sacrificed for the general welfare?Journal of Value Inquiry 16 (2): 149-152. 1982.It is argued that Robert Nozick is wrong in asserting that persons should not be sacrificed for the general welfare.
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16Austin and perceptionActa Analytica 16 (27): 169-193. 2001.Some of Austin's general statements about the doctrines of sense-datum philosophy are reviewed. It is concluded that Austin thought that in these doctrines "directly see" is given a new but inadequately explained and defined use. Were this so, the philosophical use of "directly see" would lack a definite sense and this would correspondingly affect the doctrines. They would lack definite truth-value. Against this, it is argued that the philosopher's use of "directly see" does not support Austin's…Read more
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11Geach on GeneralizationDialogue 41 (2): 221-240. 2002.RÉSUMÉ: Il y a des objections plausibles contre une approche substitutionnelle de la généralisation, dont certaines peuvent être contrées par un appel à une version de l'approche substitutionnelle qui a été proposée par Peter Geach il y a presque quarante ans. Il n'est pas clair que la conception substitutionnelle de Geach vaille pour tous les phénomènes de généralisation, mais on s'emploie ici à montrer que c'est une conception qui est tout à fait digne de considération et qu'elle donne bel et …Read more
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11Can There Be A Proof That Some Unprovable Arithmetic Sentence Is True?Dialectica 43 (3): 289-292. 1989.
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University of Nebraska, LincolnRetired faculty
Lincoln, Nebraska, United States of America