Andree Hahmann

Few philosophers present themselves with as much complexity as Marcus Tullius Cicero. At once a philosopher, statesman, orator, and lawyer, Cicero consciously fashioned his own image for posterity and wrote philosophical texts as invitations for his readers to think for themselves. His philosophy has continued to unfold over the centuries, repeatedly inspiring new and independent philosophical positions. Since J.G.F. Powell’s pivotal contribution in 1995, we have witnessed countless translations and scholarly treatments of Cicero’s philosophy that emphasize his creativity and influence. In this tradition, the present volume offers fresh and incisive contributions that advance the ongoing renaissance in Cicero scholarship. Part One of the volume focuses on Cicero’s approaches to writing philosophy and on specific interpretive questions facing readers of his philosophical corpus. Part Two traces key moments in Cicero’s philosophical afterlife, from Augustine through the Scholastic period to the Renaissance, culminating in the rich and varied tradition of Ciceronian reception in the European Enlightenment. Throughout the volume, special attention is given to Cicero’s practical philosophy.

The purpose of this anthology is to bring together in one volume some of the texts published in the series "Werkprofile", which focus on Kant’s relationship to his philosophical contemporaries and predecessors, and to make them accessible to a wider audience in English. In doing so, the volume is aimed at those who have an interest in better understanding the premises of Kant's philosophy, its historical context, and the development of many of Kant’s fundamental ideas. As it is often hard to glean philosophical motivation directly from reading Kant’s texts, understanding Kant’s commitment to answering certain questions and his silence on others, requires a historical approach. This broader purview will also be helpful for grasping deeper systematic questions at work throughout Kant’s philosophy. The anthology thus aims at inviting a more wide-angled view of Kant’s philosophy by focusing on overlooked references and historical figures. Scholarship on these references is still at an early stage, even though important steps have been taken in this direction in recent years. The aim of our volume is to build on this development and to supplement and expand the content of existing research.

This paper discusses the presence of potentially racist statements in Kant’s philosophical work and the complexity of interpreting their implications for his philosophical system. The goal is to correct a common misunderstanding about the apparent conflict between Kant’s moral universalism and these seemingly racist statements. In addition, the problems arising from Kant’s universalist framework that can lead to pejorative judgments about non-white or non-European cultures are illuminated. In conclusion, it is emphasized that there is an urgent need to examine whether these judgments qualify as a form of racism and how they relate to Kant’s critical systematics.

This chapter explores Cicero’s reception in the German Enlightenment, a topic that has garnered less scholarly attention compared to his influence in the Anglosphere. Focusing on Johann Joachim Spalding and Christian Garve as case studies, we highlight Cicero’s profound and often underappreciated impact on German intellectual thought, particularly in shaping ideas about the human vocation (Bestimmung des Menschen)—a legacy that extends even to the towering figure of the German Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant.

In philosophy, the distinction between the history of philosophy and systematic philosophy has a great influence not only on the organization of teaching, but also on appointments and research funding. Above all, however, it is decisive for the self-understanding of philosophy. In recent years, the significance and function of the history of philosophy has been the subject of controversial debate. After being more or less ignored in analytic philosophy for a long time, there has been an increasing turn to the history of philosophy in recent years. Some authors even speak of a historical turn in analytic philosophy. Since the 1980s there have been growing attempts to theorize the different approaches to the history of philosophy and their presuppositions. Another focus has been on the relationship between the history of philosophy and systematic research. Numerous authors have argued for the importance of historical research for systematic philosophical research or for philosophical education. In this talk, I will be concerned with the distinction between history of philosophy and systematic philosophy itself. I am interested in how exactly this distinction is justified. So my question is: what exactly distinguishes work in the history of philosophy from systematic research? I go through the criteria proposed for this distinction and show that they are often problematic and unclear. I first address the historical distance of the authors, the significance of philosophical discourse, the question of the object of historical research and its unique method. Originality and systematicity turn out to be two essential distinguishing criteria. Ultimately, the common distinction between primary and secondary literature is also related to this. However, using two historical examples, I argue that these criteria are problematic and can hardly justify the wide-ranging distinction. In the third section, I discuss the historical origins of the division between the history of philosophy and systematic philosophy. I argue that the notions of originality and systematicity that emerged in Europe in the second half of the eighteenth century are crucial in this respect, and that these notions are still effective today, albeit unreflectively.

Gerade bei den sogenannten Klassikern der Philosophie lassen sich besonders viele Beispiele für eine konsequente Denkungsart finden. Dass etwa Kant um der Moral willen den unrechtmäßig Verfolgten seinen Häschern auszuliefern bereit ist, stellt eine unerhörte Provokation dar. Anstoß erregen auch viele der konsequenten Schlüsse eines Hobbes oder Spinoza, die in ihren Werken die aus den eigenen systematischen Voraussetzungen zwingend folgenden Resultate rigoros ausbuchstabieren. Bernd Ludwig zählt zu den Interpreten, die in ihrer Forschung stets der Konsequenz im philosophischen Denken nachspüren. Seine Arbeit zu würdigen und dabei der Frage nach der konsequenten Denkungsart als philosophischer Tugend nachzugehen, ist das Ziel dieses Bandes, der Beiträge von Kolleginnen und Kollegen, philosophischen Weggefährtinnen und Weggefährten sowie Schülerinnen und Schülern von Bernd Ludwig versammelt.

In this paper we examine the genealogy and transmission of moral duty in Western ethics. We begin with an uncontroversial account of the Stoic notion of the kathēkon, and then examine the pivotal moment of Cicero’s translation of it into Latin as ‘officium’. We take a deflationary view of the impact of Cicero’s translation and conclude that his translation does not mark a departure from the Stoic ideal. We find further confirmation of our deflationary position in the development of the notion of ‘duty’ in Germany between the 16th and 18th centuries. We examine Pufendorf’s critique of ancient eudaimonism and his appropriation of officium, and claim that it foreshadows Kant’s rejection of Garve’s Ciceronian ethics. We demonstrate the undeniable parallels between Kant’s Groundwork and Garve’s influential translation of Cicero’s De Officiis, thereby indicating a novel way in which we should understand Cicero’s contribution to the development of modern moral philosophy.

This paper attempts to furnish a Stoic reply to an accusation addressing the Stoics' ideal of the wise man according to which it is impossible to realize their ideal and therefore their whole system has to face a paradox: How is wisdom possible when all people are fools and it is impossible for them to become good? In addition to this question there is another important problem connected with the ideal of wisdom. The Stoic philosophers deny transcendental ideas. Instead they are well known for their thorough-going materialism. Therefore, even their idea of the wise man must be based on experience. How would it otherwise be possible to form the idea of wisdom by a method of analogy if experience did not provide any example of truthful virtue to us? A possible answer to this problem can be found in the writings of Seneca, a Stoic of the first century A.D. Seneca emphasizes the close relation between wisdom and human mortality owing to which it is at least possible for the philosopher who has made sufficiently progress in his efforts to gain wisdom to find lasting happiness in death

In Kant's theoretical philosophy substance is not only constitutive for objects as one of the categories of pure reason, but also functions as a substrate for the unity of time. Result of these different functions is an ambiguity in the meaning of Kant's notion of substance. Is there only one or are there many individual substances? This paper traces the ways in which Kant uses substance not only in the Critique of Pure Reason, but also in the draft „Transition 1–14“ of the Opus postumum to find a solution for this problem.